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This Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) addresses the
environmental impacts which may be caused by the implementation of a space
flight mission to observe the polar regions of the Sun. The proposed action
is completing the preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft,
including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle
in October 1990 or in the backup opportunity in November 1991, and the
alternative of canceling further work on the mission.
The Tier I EIS (NASA 1988a) included a delay alternative which considered
the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991
or later. However, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the
Titan IV, notified the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
that it could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity
because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. Subsequently,
NASA was notified that a Titan IV could not be available until 1995.
Even if a Titan IV were available, a minimum of 3 years is required to
implement mission-specific modifications to the basic Titan IV launch
configuration after a decision is made to use the Titan IV; therefore,
insufficient time would be available to use a Titan IV vehicle in November
1991. Thus, the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a feasible alternative
to the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S)
for the November 1991 launch opportunity. Consequently, NASA terminated all
mission planning for the Titan IV as a backup launch vehicle.
Because the only launch configuration available for a launch in 1990 or
1991 is the STS/IUS/PAM-S and the environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S
launch are the same whenever the launch occurs, a delay alternative would have
the same environmental impacts as the planned launch in 1990. The 1991 backup
launch date is a contingency opportunity due to the short launch period
available in 1990.
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation and are treated in published
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle (NASA 1978)
and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC Environmental
Resources Document (NASA 1986), the Galileo and Ulysses Mission Tier I EIS
(NASA Ig88a), and the Galileo Tier 2 EIS (NASA Ig8ga).
The environmental impacts of normal Shuttle launches are summarized in
Chapter 4. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch
pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and
occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects have been
judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches.
Environmental impacts are possible from mission accidents that could
release some percentage of the plutonium dioxide used in the Ulysses power
system. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the
proposed action are currently underway and preliminary results indicate small
health or environmental risks. A Final Safety Analysis Report will be
available prior to publication of the Final EIS; therefore, the results of
that analysis will be available for inclusion in the Final EIS. There are no
adverse environmental impacts in the no-action alternative; however, the U.S.
Government and the European Space Agency would incur adverse fiscal and
programmatic impacts if this alternative were implemented.
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EXECUTIVESUMMARY
PURPOSEANDNEEDFORTHEACTION
The Ulysses mission is a joint effort conducted by the European Space
Agency (ESA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
ESAis responsible for developing and operating the spacecraft and for about
half of the experiments installed on the spacecraft. NASAis responsible for
providing the launch by the Space Transportation System (STS)/Inertial Upper
Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S), the remaining experiments,
and the mission support using the communications and spacecraft tracking
facilities of NASA'sDeepSpace Network.
The Ulysses mission supports NASA'sSolar System Exploration and Space
Physics Programs. The scientific objectives for the Ulysses mission are to
conduct studies of the Sun and the heliosphere (i.e., the regions of space for
which the Sun provides the primary influence) over a wide and unexplored range
of heliographic latitudes.
ALTERNATIVESCONSIDERED
The proposed action addressed by this (Tier 2) Draft Environmental Impact
Statement (DEIS) is the completion of preparation and operation of the Ulysses
mission, including its launch on the Space Shuttle in October 1990 or in the
backup opportunity in November1991. The launch configuration will use the
STS/IUS/PAM-Scombination. To achieve an orbit over the poles of the Sun, the
spacecraft must travel to Jupiter and use that planet's huge gravitational
pull to propel the spacecraft out of the planetary plane and into a polar
orbit of the Sun.
The alternative to the proposed action is no-action; that is, cancelling
further work on the mission.
The Tier ! EIS (NASA Ig88a) included a delay alternative which considered
the Titan IV launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in
November 1991 or later. However, in November 1988, the U.S. Air Force, which
procures the Titan IV, notified NASA that it could not provide a Titan IV
vehicle for the 1991 backup launch opportunity because of high priority
Department of Defense requirements. Subsequently, NASA was notified that a
Titan IV could not be available until 1995. Consequently, NASA terminated all
mission planning for the Titan IV as a backup launch vehicle.
Even if the Titan IV were available, a minimum of 3 years is required
from the decision to launch on a Titan IV in order to implement mission-
specific modifications to the basic Titan IV launch configuration; therefore,
insufficient time is available to use a Titan IV vehicle in November 1991,
even if it were available. Thus, the Titan IV launch vehicle is no longer a
feasible alternative to the STS/IUS for the November 1991 backup launch
opportunity.
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Because the only launch configuration available is the STS/IUS/PAM-S and
the environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S launch are the same whenever the
launch occurs, a delay alternative would have the same environmental impacts
as the planned launch in 1990. The 1991 backup launch date is a contingency
opportunity due to the short launch period available in 1990. In addition,
delay of the mission beyond the earliest opportunities would threaten the
viability of key scientific teams, threaten the acquisition of key scientific
data, and require an additional expenditure of public funds.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are
associated with normal launch vehicle operation. These effects have been
considered in the previously published EISs on the Space Shuttle Program (NASA
1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979) and in the Final (Tier 1) EIS
for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions (NASA 1988a), the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC) Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), and the Final (Tier 2) EIS
for the Galileo Mission (NASA 1989a). The environmental consequences of
normal Shuttle launches are small and temporary.
In the event of (1) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the
spacecraft from Earth orbit, there are potential adverse health and
environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium
dioxide from the spacecraft's Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG).
The potential effects considered in preparing this EIS include risks of air
and water quality impacts, local land area contamination by plutonium dioxide,
adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, the
occurrence of adverse impacts on wetland areas or in areas containing
historical sites, and socioeconomic impacts.
An extensive analysis of the safety and environmental consequences of
launch or mission accidents indicates very small risks to human health or the
environment. The results of the detailed analyses are summarized for each
mission phase using a base case as summarized below.
The Base Case predicted average releases developed in the risk assessment
(DOE 1990c) based upon extensive safety tests on the RTG and its components,
combined with statistically rigorous modeling of accident sequences and
environments that can cause sufficient damage to the RTG to result in a
release of some percentage of the plutonium dioxide fuel. The average source
term for each phase or subphase were then utilized in atmospheric transport
and deposition calculations. These calculations for the first stage ascent
phase used 40 meteorological data sets from the local KSC area climatology for
the period of the launch opportunity (October 5 through October 23). The
median consequence of the 40 trials is defined as the base case result for the
first stage ascent phase. For each of the subsequent phases, the average
source term was utilized along with average population densities and worldwide
meteorology representative of median conditions for the affected areas. This
defines the base case for each of the remaining mission phases. The
radiological consequences are reported in terms of maximum individual dose to
an exposed individual, total collective (population) dose to all members of
the exposed population, and in terms of land and ocean areas contaminated.
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The total collective dose was reported both with and without de minimis (I
mrem/yr). The de minimi@ dose used was based upon U.S. Department of Energy
(DOE) and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considerations, and
documentation from the National Council on Radiation Protection and
Measurement. More complete discussions of de minimis and its use in this DEIS
are provided in Section 4 and Appendix C.
For the mission as a whole, the accident with the highest probability of
a resultant release is an IUS failure (Phase 4) during deployment which leads
to spacecraft break-up, reentry of the RTG modules, and impact of the modules
on water, in which case there would be no release of RTG fuel. In the
unlikely event the modules impact on hard rock, _ release is predicted to
occur. The probability of release is 2.40 x 10, or about ] in 4,200. The
collective population dose over a 50-year period would be 0.53 person-rem
(0.16 person-rem above de _inimi$). The ability of the modules to survive
Earth orbital reentry heating without a loss of fuel has been demonstrated by
test and operational experience. The release could occur only in the event of
reentry and impact on rock or a similar unyielding surface. If the RTG
reenters and lands in the ocean, statistically the most likely occurrence,
there would be no release.
For the base case analysis, as a whole, collective doses were found to be
very low and indicate no statistical fatalities even in the rare event of an
accident leading to release. The analysis indicated there were limited areas,
on site at KSC, where deposition from near ground-level releases exceeded the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) screening levels.
The overall risks associated with the mission are expected to be less
than those for the Galileo mission. The Ulysses mission has only one RTG
instead of two and has no Earth flyby.
There are no environmental impacts associated with the no-action
alternative. There are, however, severe adverse fiscal and programmatic
impacts inherent in the no-action alternative. No further action would render
the to-date expenditures on the mission a _sunk cost _ and entail a larger
scientific loss in terms of human resources and efforts and the scientific
knowledge that would result from the mission.
This Draft EIS (Tier 2) uses as its primary data source, the safety
analysis being conducted by DOE for the Ulysses mission. That safety analysis
is in preparation, and therfore, DOE has not published its Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR) for the Ulysses mission. The analyses of the last
three mission phases are complete.
Analyses of the fragment environment in the launch phase are continuing.
Based on available information, it is anticipated that the risk of the Ulysses
mission will be well below any of the common risk values encountered in
everyday life (see Subsection 4.4).
This mission-specific Tier 2 EIS follows a Tier I EIS (NASA 1988a) and
provides updated and more detailed information regarding the completion of
preparation and operation of the Ulysses mission.
In view of the detailed analyses of the STS/IUS configuration (DOE ]988a,
DOE Ig88b, DOE Ig89a, DOE 1989b, DOE 1990a) enough information is available to
indicate an envelope of the risks of the Ulysses mission. The Final EIS will
incorporate results of the Final Safety Analysis Report when it is available.
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I. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR ACTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The Ulysses mission is an international cooperative effort of the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space
Agency (ESA). The mission will, for the first time, explore the Sun and its
influence on interplanetary space over the full range of heliographic
latitudes (i.e., over the solar poles). ESA will provide the spacecraft,
provide the spacecraft operations team and control software, integrate all the
science instruments, and provide a complement of scientific investigations;
NASA will provide launch services, including integration of the ESA-assembled
spacecraft into the launch vehicle, mission control facilities and support,
spacecraft tracking and data recovery, and an additional complement of
scientific investigations.
This Draft (TIER 2) Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) provides
updated information associated with the launch and operation of the Ulysses
mission. The proposed action is the completion of preparation for launch and
operation of the Ulysses mission, including its planned launch in October I990
or in the November 1991 backup opportunity (i.e., the earliest opportunities),
using the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle, the Inertial Upper Stage
(IUS) and the Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) launch configuration.
Alternative approaches for achieving the mission are described in Section 2.
This document succeeds a Final EIS (TIER 1) for the Galileo and Ulysses
missions (NASA ]g88a).
The Ulysses mission supports both NASA's Solar System Exploration Program
(SSEP) and NASA's Space Physics Program (SPP). The Ulysses mission will
contribute to the SSEP goal of characterizing the solar system's
interplanetary medium; the mission will contribute to the SPP goals of
describing the high latitude characteristic of the solar wind and how it helps
control the geospace environment and possible effects of solar processes on
the Earth.
1.2 PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
The Ulysses mission will be the first solar exploration mission to
observe the polar regions of the Sun and explore the heliosphere at high
heliographic latitudes. The mission will provide scientists with a unique
opportunity to broaden human understanding of the Sun. Since the Sun is the
star nearest Earth, knowledge gained from the Ulysses mission will also
enhance the understanding of other stars and the space that separates them.
The major scientific objectives of the Ulysses mission are to:
m Characterize the inner heliosphere as a function of heliographic
latitude
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• Characterize particles and fields from the ecliptic to the Sun's poles
- Particles: solar wind, cosmic rays, solar-heliospheric energetic
particles
- Fields: plasma waves, solar emissions, solar-heliospheric magnetic
particles.
Specifically, Ulysses carries individual instruments to conduct
investigations of the properties of the solar wind (plasma and ion
composition), the Sun/wind interface, the heliogenic magnetic field, solar
radio bursts and plasma waves, solar x-rays, solar and galactic cosmic rays,
and interplanetary and interstellar neutral gas and dust.
In pursuing these ends, the Ulysses mission, as a joint endeavor between
NASA and ESA, will serve to strengthen the spirit of international cooperation
in space exploration.
The findings of the Ulysses mission are expected to be very important for
the following reasons. First, because of its proximity, the Sun is the only
star whose internal processes can be studied with high temporal and spatial
resolutions. Since our Sun is of a common stellar size and nature that is
generally found in the universe, our increased understanding of its behavior
will contribute greatly to our knowledge of stellar processes. Second, solar
processes have great influences on Earth. Not only does the Sun heat and
illuminate the Earth, but the Sun also influences terrestrial phenomena in
more subtle ways. For instance, solar flares and solar magnetic disturbances
can disrupt radio communications on Earth. Solar emissions, both the solar
particle flux and the photon flux, play important roles in the Earth's upper
atmospheric chemistry. Solar variability may also contribute to the
variability in climate on Earth.
1.2.1 Exploration Out of the Ecliptic
The plane in which the Earth and the other planets orbits our Sun is
called the ecliptic. Because the Sun's spin axis is tilted seven degrees
toward this plane, direct earth-based measurement of the Sun's particle
emissions and magnetic field tend to be limited to within 7 degrees of the
equator. In order to study the complete range of heliographic latitudes (the
third dimension), a spacecraft must leave the ecliptic and traverse the solar
poles. Until recently, the same limitation has plagued direct space-based
measurements. No launch vehicles have been available with sufficient thrust
to send the spacecraft out of the ecliptic. However, Ulysses will overcome
these limitations by using Jupiter's immense gravitational field to sling
itself out of the ecliptic and back toward the Sun and into an orbit that will
allow observation from a polar perspective. To gain sufficient energy to
leave the ecliptic, the Ulysses spacecraft will execute a gravity-assisted
fly-by of Jupiter and head back toward the Sun. The trajectory will carry the
spacecraft first over the Sun's south pole and then upward over the north
pole. In so doing, the spacecraft will monitor the heliosphere out to 5
astronomical units (AU) (i.e., Sun-to-Earth distances), which is Jupiter's
orbital distance, and then back to approximately 1.3 AU at perihelion, its
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point of closest approach to the Sun. The mission is planned to arrive in the
Sun's polar regions near the solar minimum when the Sun's activity is less
volatile; this provides an opportunity to view phenomena such as the solar
winds and the Sun's magnetic fields in their least perturbed state. The
mission will end when the spacecraft power level is reduced to a point where
the spacecraft instruments no longer function. The spacecraft will continue
to travel around the Sun in a 5 AU to 1.3 AU elliptical orbit.
The heliosphere is the region encompassing the Sun where the solar wind
(a wind of charged particles emitted from the Sun) dominates the interstellar
medium and tends to sweep away much of the interstellar gas. The heliosphere
is thought to exist as far out as ]00 AU, well beyond the outermost planet.
To have a comprehensive understanding of the Sun, both of how it behaves
as a star and how it influences Earth, it is important to understand how the
Sun influences the heliosphere in three dimensions. There is good reason to
believe that the solar wind phenomena change as one moves away from the solar
equatorial region (i.e., the region of ecliptic in which the Earth orbits the
Sun). For instance, as the Sun rotates, the solar magnetic field lines, which
are carried outward by the escaping solar wind, spiral outward in the Sun's
equatorial plane, the ecliptic. However, as one moves away from the ecliptic
to high solar latitudes, the influences of the Sun's rotation dramatically
diminish, hence the solar magnetic field lines are expected to be more nearly
radial.
From high solar latitudes, scientists expect to observe solar phenomena
significantly different from that previously observed in the Sun's equatorial
region. In particular, scientists anticipate differences in the behavior of
the solar wind. This "wind" is comprised of charged particles that flow
continuously from the Sun pushing against interstellar gas molecules situated
beyond 50 AU. Because the particles in these flows carry with them the Sun's
magnetic field, any disturbance on the Sun will be reflected both in the wind
and the magnetic field. Ulysses will be investigating regions of the Sun
where such disturbances, known as sunspots, occur. It will also investigate
areas known as coronal holes. Within these regions, the topology of the Sun's
magnetic field differs. Together, these areas are part of the reason why
scientists expect to see solar wind behavior that is different from what has
been previously observed in the Sun's equatorial regions.
The heliosphere extends to the point where the pressure of the solar
winds equal those of the interstellar gas. Ulysses will provide a unique
opportunity to compare heliospheric measurements from high solar latitudes
with those obtained from six other spacecraft at great distances from the Sun.
These spacecraft are located both near the ecliptic (Pioneers 10 and 11), and
at moderate distances from the ecliptic (Voyagers ] and 2). The ICE-E and
IMP-8 spacecraft will provide a good comparison, with in-ecliptic data
obtained near the Sun (1 to 3 AU), Table I-1 shows the configuration of the
Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft. As a result of these combined measurements,
scientists will be able to measure the solar winds and magnetic fields from
their origins to near the edge of the heliosphere.
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TABLE1-1. RELATIVERANGES,OVERTIME, OFOTHERSPACECRAFTIMPORTANT
TOTHEULYSSESCIENCEPROGRAM
Spacecraft Solar Inclination Ranqe in AU
|990 1995" 1998
Voyager I 35 deg N. 44 60 71
Voyager 2 45 deg S. 30 46 57
Pioneer 10 3 deg N. 56 61 69
Pioneer ]1 17 deg N. 40 42 50
a Ulysses in high solar polar region
The Pioneer spacecraft were launched in 1972 and 1973 and the Voyagers
were launched in 1977. As these spacecraft recede from Earth and their power
systems diminish in strength, it will become increasingly difficult to receive
their data. Tracking and data acquisition experts estimate that data from the
Pioneer spacecraft will no longer be available after 1997 or 1998, while data
from the Voyager spacecraft will be available beyond 2010. With its planned
launch in October 1990, Ulysses will transmit data from its Jupiter flyby to
the first solar polar pass in 1994 as the solar wind becomes less turbulent
following the solar maximum of 1990. The Ulysses pole-to-pole passage in
]gg4-to-]gg5 will occur just before solar minimum conditions when the
spacecraft should encounter a relatively well-ordered structure in which
latitude dependencies are most clear.
1.2.2 Better Understandinq the Suq tO Better Understand the Earth
Conditions on Earth are in many ways linked to conditions on the Sun.
For instance, variations in the Sun's magnetic field and solar wind interfere
with radio communication and electric power distribution on Earth. These
solar variations also cause dramatic changes in the constituents of the
Earth's upper atmosphere, perhaps affecting its climate. The Earth's magnetic
field also varies in accordance with these solar variations, sometimes
allowing energetic charged particles to reach the Earth's surface.
To the extent that such changes on the Sun can have a measurable effect
upon the Earth, a better understanding of the Sun will facilitate
understanding and predicting conditions on Earth. Ulysses will undertake a
variety of observations designed to improve this understanding. In
particular, Ulysses will observe, from a polar perspective, the solar corona
(the Sun's outer atmosphere), the solar wind, and the Sun's magnetic field.
These observations are expected to yield new insights into the behavior of
sunspots, solar flares, solar x-rays, solar radio noise, and the behavior of
the solar atmosphere across different heliographic latitudes, phenomena which
may have a bearing on what happens on Earth.
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1.2.3 Unravelinq the MYsteries of the Stars
Since the Sun is our nearest star, better understanding of its nature and
physical behavior may also help us to unravel the mysteries associated with
other stars and the space that separates them. Ulysses will endeavor to
improve this understanding by investigating the role that solar wind and
coronal holes play in dissipation of the solar atmosphere. By carrying
special cosmic ray instrumentation out of the ecliptic to high latitudes where
such rays can more easily penetrate the Sun's magnetic field, scientists hope
to detect virgin, mid-energy, interstellar cosmic rays. This will lead to a
better understanding of the nature and origins of cosmic rays. Scientists
will also directly measure the heliosphere's neutral helium content. These
helium measurements will help provide information on the state of the
interstellar gas in the vicinity of the solar system, and the measurement of
the heliosphere's dust particle content will help scientists to better
understand where this dust comes from and how it evolves.
1.3 NEED FOR THE ACTION
It is vital at this stage of solar system exploration and space physics
to fully characterize the three dimensional structure of the heliosphere. The
Ulysses mission will be the first source of those data that will contribute to
a number of national and international goals. The Ulysses mission is expected
to make major scientific contributions to the International Heliospheric
Study, whose aim is investigation of the structure of the heliosphere. The
measurements to be gained from the Ulysses mission cannot be obtained from
Earth or from Earth orbit. They can only be made in-situ by a spacecraft that
is well out of the ecliptic.
Furthermore, the President of the United States has announced the
intention to establish a permanent human presence on the Moon and to undertake
human exploration of Mars. In a general sense, the more we understand the
physics of the Sun, the better we will understand solar flares and other
energetic solar disturbances that could influence the environment in which
humans may operate in space.
Ulysses wlll be the first mission to explore interplanetary space above
the Sun's polar caps. As such, it will return new discoveries no matter when
it is executed. However, two compelling reasons suggest that the planned 1990
launch is particularly timely to ensure a maximum scientific return from this
mission.
The first reason has to do with the If-year cycle of solar activity. A
1990 launch allows Ulysses to undergo its sequential polar passages in mid-
1994 and mid-1995 (south and then north poles, respectively). Since the
current solar activity cycle will peak in 1990, Ulysses will therefore
traverse the high solar latitude heliosphere when the Sun is rapidly
approaching its minimum of activity. This means that the interplanetary
medium, which is what Ulysses measures, will be least complicated by sporadic,
energetic solar events, and therefore, easiest to interpret as far as a new
environment is concerned. Conversely, when the last few solar events do occur
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during these polar overflights, they will be far more isolated so that their
effect on the interplanetary medium will be most obvious.
The second reason is that space science in the early to mid 19gO's will
enjoy a particularly rich complement of other solar and interplanetary
missions sponsored by NASA, ESA, Japan, and/or the USSR (a subset of which is
called the International Solar Terrestrial Program). These 13 to ]5 different
missions range from NASA's Pioneers and Voyagers at the outer edge of the
solar system, to missions like Polar in near Earth orbit, each of which
simultaneously samples a different part of the heliosphere or near-Earth space
environment. Taken as an entire mission set, the total scientific return will
be immensely greater than the sum of its parts. For Ulysses to conduct its
primary mission during this same period, thereby measuring the otherwise
unsampled solar polar region, is a particularly fortuitous circumstance that
will not be repeated in even the most optimistic of mission planning
scenarios. This constellation of simultaneously operating spacecraft is a
definitely perishable circumstance. The life of these spacecraft will
deteriorate, and the very distant ones (e.g., Pioneers) will no longer be
within range for receipt of data.
The Ulysses mission can be launched only during specific periods, spaced
about 13 months apart, depending on the position of Jupiter and the capability
of the available launch vehicles. Presently, the available launch opportunity
is in October 1990. The proposed action is needed to implement the mission at
the earliest available launch opportunities.
I-6
2. ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION
2.1 ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED
This Draft (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Ulysses
mission considers the following alternatives:
Proposed Action: Completion of preparation and operation of the
mission, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation
System/Inertial Upper Stage (STS/IUS) vehicle, supplemented by the
Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) third stage, in October 1990
or in the backup opportunity in November 1991.
• No-Action Alternative: Cancellation of any further commitment of
resources to the mission.
Delay alternatives, to allow access to alternative power sources or
alternative launch systems, are discussed in subsections 2.2.4.2 and 2.3,
respectively.
2.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ACTION TO PROCEED AS PLANNED WITH COMPLETION
OF PREPARATIONS AND OPERATION OF THE ULYSSES MISSION, INCLUDING ITS
PLANNED LAUNCH ON THE STS IN OCTOBER 1990 OR IN THE BACKUP OPPORTUNITY
IN NOVEMBER 1991
2.2.1 Mission Desiqn
The launch of the Ulysses spacecraft is planned for October 1990. Its
trajectory, as shown in Figure 2-I, provides for it to travel in the ecliptic
and pass over the north pole of Jupiter in February 1992. The flyby will
thrust it out of the ecliptic and return it toward the Sun. The spacecraft
will reach 70 degrees south polar latitude in June 1994, will reach
maximum latitude in August 1994, and will again cross 70 degrees south
latitude in September 1994. The spacecraft will achieve its closest approach
to the Sun of 1.3 astronomical units (AU) (i.e., Sun-to-Earth-distances) at
the solar equatorial crossing in February 1995. The second polar pass will
begin when the spacecraft exceeds 70 degrees north latitude between June and
September 1995. This will end the primary Ulysses mission, although the
spacecraft will remain in a 1.3 by S AU orbit and will have the potential to
remain operational and provide limited data acquisition for one additional
solar orbit.
2.2.2 Mission Launch Operations
The Ulysses mission can be launched only during specific periods
depending on the positions of the planets and the capabilities of the
STS/IUS/PAM-S launch vehicles. The principal opportunity for launch occurs in
October 1990. Planetary missions have a relatively short launch period during
each launch opportunity where the Earth is properly positioned. In 1990 this
period is Ig days for the Ulysses launch (10/5/90 to 10/23/90). Since
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technical problems with the launch vehicle or the spacecraft, or adverse
weather conditions, could occur which would cause the launch opportunity to be
lost in this period, NASA has identified a contingency launch period. The
contingency launch period for Ulysses occurs in November 1991.
When a mission delay causes a launch opportunity to be missed, spacecraft
trajectories and mission operations must be redesigned and generally mission
budgets must be augmented. The redesign of the mission operations requires
modified plans for communications, spacecraft tracking, and mission operation
facilities support. These new plans affect not only the delayed missions but
also other missions that depend on the resources of these facilities. Because
of the specialized nature of space exploration missions such as Ulysses,
trained personnel and the use of supporting facilities must be retained when
missions are delayed between launch opportunities. These factors all result
in large additional costs associated with delaying a mission.
2.2.3 Spacecraft Description
The Ulysses spacecraft weighs approximately 800 pounds and is illustrated
in Figure 2-2. The spacecraft is spin-stabilized with an antenna on top, one
RTG, a boom used for selected scientific experiments, and a main body that
contains the remainder of the science experiments and the spacecraft
subsystems.
The portions of the spacecraft that are relevant to assessing potential
environmental impacts are the power and propulsion subsystems. The particular
elements of these subsystems that are of interest are the RTG use in the power
subsystem and the propellants in the attitude control and propulsion
subsystem.
2.2.4 Spacecraft Power Source
Alternate power sources include fuel cells, batteries, photovoltaic
systems, RTGs, alkali metal thermoelectric converters, and turbine energy
conversion. These potential power sources and the specific power system
performance criteria for the Ulysses mission are discussed below.
2.2.4.1 Power System Performance Criteria
The Ulysses spacecraft 5-year mission through the solar system imposes
stringent performance criteria on spacecraft systems and components. The
following performance criteria apply to the power system:
(1) Safe passage through the asteroid belt
(2) Operation during and after passage through the intense radiation
field of Jupiter
(3) Sufficient power to operate at Jupiter's distance from the Sun
(4) Low weight-to-power ratio
(5) Maximum reliability.
NASA and other agencies of the Federal government support a wide range of
research and technology development programs in spacecraft power systems. An
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analysis of alternate power sources was summarized in the Tier I EIS (NASA
Ig88a, Section 2). In response to scoping comments, an updated and expanded
analysis of alternative power systems is presented below.
2.2.4.2 Alternative Spacecraft Power Sources
Spacecraft power sources include fuel cells, batteries, photovoltaic
power sources, advanced solar dynamic (ASD) power sources, a new type of
radioisotope thermoelectric converter known as an alkali metal thermoelectric
converter (AMTEC), and radioisotope driven turbine converters (TECs). Table
2-] summarizes the analysis of these alternatives with respect to their
ability to satisfy the power requirements for the Ulysses mission. While fuel
cells and batteries have a proven record of reliability and safety, their high
weight (over 15,000 kg in each ease) to achieve the required power precludes
their use as sole power sources for any long duration planetary mission.
Because of the necessity to turn the spacecraft away from the Sun to
perform a trajectory correction maneuver, the use of photovoltaic power would
have to be augmented by the additional use of batteries and associated control
equipment. Solar power technologies have not yet progressed to a stage of
development consistent with the requirements of the Ulysses mission and use of
available launch vehicles. Since the Ulysses spacecraft must fly by Jupiter
with a solar intensity only 10 percent that of Earth, the large solar array
for a Ulysses mission would require a complete spacecraft system redesign,
including selection of 3-axis control as opposed to the current spin-
stabilized approach. A conceptual design study using state-of-the-art array
technology indicates that this system would require an increase in the total
spacecraft mass of about ],200 pounds. This would require at least a
Titan/Centaur/3-axis stabilized kick stage launch vehicle which would require
the development of the 3-axis stabilized kick stage. No such launch vehicle
configuration currently exists, nor has its development been approved or
authorized; consequently, this is not a feasible alternative.
Even with the Advanced Photovoltaic Solar Array (APSA), now in the ground
demonstration phase, with a specific power of 130 W/kg which is about 4 times
the specific power of the current state-of-the-art planar rigid array, a
complete spacecraft redesign would be needed. Moreover, the state of
development of light-weight photovoltaic technology is such that technology
readiness cannot be expected before 1993, after which testing and spacecraft
adaptation will have to be made. Such a process normally will take another 5
years before an actual array is ready to be integrated with and used on a
spacecraft. However, because of the newness of the design and the lack of
flight experience, use of such a system would greatly increase the risk of
spacecraft failure during the mission. Although APSA would be lighter than
the rigid array design, a launch vehicle capability greater than the
STS/IUS/PAM-S would be required.
Improved isotope powered systems are also in an early state of
technological readiness with the earliest ground demonstration expected in the
late-lggOs. Initial laboratory models of the AMTEC systems have been
constructed which indicate that AMTEC may be capable of a power density of
about 20 W/kg. However, AMTEC development will not progress to the point of
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flight testing until the mid to late lggOs. The radioisotope-driven TECs are
only in the preliminary design phases. Therefore, these systems cannot be
considered for use to power a spacecraft on missions such as Ulysses for any
launch prior to 2000.
The RTG systems also have a proven record of reliability and are the only
power source available that satisfies all of the performance criteria
associated with the Ulysses mission.
2.2.4.3 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG)
The RTG provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to NASA for use
on the Ulysses spacecraft uses the general purpose heat source (GPHS) as its
source of energy. The GPHS is the culmination of almost 25 years of design
evolution of heat source technology. The RTG (see Figure 2-3) is designed to
provide a minimum of about 284 Watts at the beginning of the Ulysses mission.
RTGs have been used on 23 previous U.S. space missions. These applications
have included some of NASA's most impressive successes, including Voyager,
Pioneer, Viking, and all but the first of the manned Apollo landings on the
Moon.
The RTG consists of a heat source and a thermoelectric converter that
converts heat into electricity. The RTG heat source consists of a stacked
column of 18 individual modules containing a total of 10.75 kg (23.7 Ibs) of
plutonium dioxide fuel (DOE IggOa). Each GPHS module contains one graphite
block, called an aeroshell, that encases two graphite cylinders called
graphite impact shells (see Figure 2-4). Each cylinder contains two pellets
of plutonium dioxide encased in iridium/tungsten alloy metal; i.e., two fueled
clads. Each clad contains 0.15 kg (0.33 Ibs) of plutonium dioxide fuel. The
graphite blocks provide protection against atmospheric heating and subsequent
release of the plutonium dioxide in the event that the modules are released in
an accident and fall back to Earth. The graphite cylinders provide protection
from ground or debris impacts in the event of an accident. The iridium/
tungsten metal contains the fuel and provides an additional layer of
protection. The plutonium dioxide generates heat by the natural radioactive
decay largely of the Pu-238 isotope. Table 2-2 provides a breakdown and
isotopic composition of the 10.754 kg (23.7 Ibs) of plutonium dioxide used to
manufacture an RTG.
Until the RTG is transported to the KSC, it will be stored at a DOE
facility. A few days before launch, the RTG will be installed on the
spacecraft.
The DOE safety philosophy for the design of the RTG requires containment
or immobilization of the plutonium fuel to the maximum extent possible during
all mission phases, including ground handling, launch, and unplanned events
such as reentry, impact, and post-impact situations. Safety is a principal
engineering design goal of the heat source. The safety-related design goals
are to: I) contain or immobilize the fuel to the maximum extent possible
under normal and accident environments, and 2) ensure compatibility with the
2-8
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TABLE 2-2. CHARACTERISTICS AND ISOTOPIC COMPOSITION OF RTG FUEL
Plutonium
Isotope
Specific
Weight radioactivity Total
Percent at Half-Life (Curies/gram of Curies
Manufacture (Years) plutonium) (lO/gO)*
236 5.27 x I0"s 2.85 532 0.4
238 *85.03 87.7 17.1 130,000
239 12.85 24,100 0.0621 75.5
240 1.70 6,560 0.227 36.4
241 0.35 14.4 103.2 2,360
242 0.08 376,000 0.00393 <0.1
Other
radioisotopes 0.11
TOTALS ]00%
3.6
132,500
Based on computation of isotopic composition by Mound Laboratory for the
launch date in October 1990. The radioisotopic fuel for the Ulysses RTG
(F-3) is a mixture of plutonium dioxide (PuO_) containing 85 percent (plus
or minus I percent) Pu-238 and totalling 10,754 grams (Campbell 1989).
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power generation system. The following is a brief summary (Turi 1989) of
relevant safety environments and the GPHS response:
_: Fueled clads contained in GPHS modules and intact RTGs
were shown to survive overpressure of 2,210 psi; bare fueled clads
withstood pressures of 1,070 psi without breaching.
Solid Propellant Fjre_: Bare fueled clads and clads contained in the
Graphite Impact Sheild (GIS) were shown to survive solid propellant
fires (i.e., temperature calculated at 3,700"C or 6,6gO°F), without
fuel release. [Liquid propellant fires, which reach a lower
temperature than solid propellants, would not damage fueled clads
contained in a GIS (DOE 1990b).]
Hjqh y_locitv Fraqments: Tests with bare fueled clad exposed to small
high velocity projectiles indicate that, given the protection afforded
by the RTG case and the GPHS module, projectiles of this type will not
result in damage to the clads. Further tests, representative of Solid
Rocket Booster (SRB) fragment impacts (I/2 inch thick steel), indicate
that the RTG will survive face-on fragment impacts at a velocity up to
212 m/s (695 f/s) with no release of fuel; edge-on fragment impacts at
95 m/s (312 f/s) breached only the leading clads of the GPHS module
impacted.
• Reentry: GPHS modules survive Earth-escape-velocity-reentry ablation
and thermal stress with wide margins.
Earth Impact: GPHS modules were designed to survive impact on hard
surfaces (granite/steel/concrete) at terminal velocity (maximum speed
reached by falling object) of 53 m/s (172 f/s). Test results show no
failures of clads against sand up to 250 m/s (820 f/s), no clad
failures against concrete at terminal velocity, and small releases
against steel or granite at terminal velocity.
The design features for the GPHS incorporate many safety-related
considerations. The fuel used in the GPHS design is plutonium-238 dioxide,
high-fired and hot-pressed into 62.5 Watt capacity ceramic fuel pellets. In
this form, plutonium dioxide is virtually insoluble in ground or sea water
should such exposure occur. In fact, GPHS modules survive water impact and
will resist significant fuel release for virtually unlimited periods when
submerged.
The primary protective material used to encapsulate and immobilize the
fuel is an alloy of iridium. Iridium is a unique noble metal found in
deposits of gold and platinum. It is compatible with the fuel material to
over 1,500°C (2,700°F), resists oxidation in air to 1,000°C (I,BOO°F), and
melts at 2,447°C (4,437°F). Each clad also contains a vent designed to
release the helium generated by the fuel alpha particle decay and to prevent
the release of the plutonium dioxide.
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The graphitic materials in the GPHS perform several functions. The
primary function is to provide reentry protection for the fueled clads through
the use of the aeroshell. A second major function is impact protection. This
is accomplished by both the aeroshell and the impact shell. The impact shell
also serves as a redundant reentry aeroshell. The third function is to
provide a mounting structure for the clads to survive normal ground handling
and launch dynamic loads. The material used for the aeroshell and impact
shell is called fine weave, pierced fabric (FWPF). FWPF is a carbon-carbon
composite material woven with high-strength graphite fibers in three
perpendicular directions. Upon impregnation and graphitization, the material
has an extremely high thermal stress resistance as required for reentry
protection. FWPF has a very fine structure that results in uniform ablation
characteristics leading to high confidence in ablation margins. This
material, used primarily by the Air Force for missile nose cones, is one of
the best available for reentry applications.
The GPHS deliberately was designed to be composed of small, modular units
so that reentry heating and terminal velocity would be lower than they were
for previous heat sources. A modular heat source tends to minimize the amount
of fuel that can be postulated to be released in a given accident. For
example, for a high-velocity fragment impact resulting from a severe explosion
that penetrates the GPHS, only a few of the fueled clads would be expected to
release fuel. This is an improvement over earlier heat source designs.
Overall, the DOE has spent 9 years in engineering, fabricating, and
safety and environmental testing of the GPHS, building on the experience
gained from previous heat source development programs and a data base that has
accumulated since the Ig50s. Test results have demonstrated the present
design exceeds the already stringent safety standards achieved by earlier heat
source models.
2.2.4.4 RTG Performance History
RTGs have been used in the U.S. space program since 1961 and have powered
some of this Nation's most successful missions including the Apollo Lunar
Surface Experiment Packages (ALSEPs), the Viking Lander on Mars, Pioneers I0
and 11 and Voyagers I and 2. In all, there have been 40 RTGs involved in 23
previous U.S. space launches.
Three U.S. spacecraft powered by RTGs have failed to achieve their
intended mission and have involved accidental reentries. In each case the
malfunction was neither caused by nor related to the RTG, and in fact, the
RTGs on these spacecraft performed entirely as intended. The RTGs on each of
these spacecraft responded to the reentry environment entirely as designed.
Early RTG models carried only a few pounds of radioactive material and
were built to burn up at high altitude during accidental reentry. When the
Navy's Transit-SBN-3 navigational satellite malfunctioned in 1964 and failed
to achieve orbit, the RTG on board met the design criteria by burning up in
the upper atmosphere upon reentry.
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Since Ig64, RTGs have been designed to contain or immobilize their
plutonium fuel to the maximum extent possible during all mission phases
regardless of the accident environment. This design philosophy has performed
flawlessly in two subsequent mission failures where RTGs were present. In May
1968, two SNAP IgB2 RTGs landed intact in the Pacific Ocean after a Nimbus B
weather satellite failed to reach orbit, and the fuel was recovered. In April
1970, the Apollo 13 lunar module reentered the atmosphere and its SNAP 27 RTG
heat source, which was jettisoned, fell intact into the 20,000 feet deep Tonga
Trench in the Pacific Ocean. There is no evidence of any release of the
radioactive material.
2.2.5 Spacecraft Propulsion Subsystem
The Ulysses spacecraft propulsion subsystem uses hydrazine
monopropellant, which spontaneously ignites by catalytic decomposition within
the propulsion subsystem thrust chambers. This propellant is the most
efficient, space-storable (i.e., can be stored without any special temperature
control equipment) propellant available for the mission, and the use of any
other space-storable propellants would result in unacceptable weight increases
for the spacecraft. The propellant tank of the spacecraft is loaded at the
KSC. The Ulysses spacecraft carries 34 kgs (74 Ibs) of hydrazine. NASA has
prescribed specifications concerning the storage and handling of this
propellant.
2.2.6 STS/IUS/PAM-S Launch Confiauration
The STS/IUS/PAM-S launch configuration consists of the STS Shuttle launch
vehicle to achieve Earth orbit, and a two-stage IUS supplemented with a PAM-S
third stage for use to propel the spacecraft on its interplanetary trajectory.
The IUS/PAM-S and attached spacecraft are carried into Earth orbit in the
Shuttle cargo bay. Figure 2-5 illustrates the configuration of the IUS/PAM-S
and spacecraft in the Shuttle cargo bay for launch. Figure 2-6 shows the
configuration of the spacecraft assembled with the IUS/PAM-S. The selection
of the STS/IUS/PAM-S launch vehicles was addressed in the Tier I FEIS (NASA
Ig88a).
The STS consists of a piloted reusable vehicle (the Shuttle) mounted on a
non-reusable External Tank (ET) containing liquid hydrogen and oxygen
propellants and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). The Shuttle has three main
rocket engines and a cargo bay 60 feet long by 15 feet in diameter (NASA
1978).
At launch, both SRBs and the Shuttle's rocket engines burn simul-
taneously. After approximately 128 seconds into the flight, the spent SRB
casings are jettisoned and subsequently recovered from the ocean. The ET is
jettisoned before the Space Shuttle goes into Earth orbit. The Shuttle's
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) is then used to propel the Shuttle into the
desired Earth orbit. Once the IUS with its payload is deployed, the OMS is
used to take the Shuttle out of orbit. The Shuttle is piloted back to Earth
for an unpowered landing. A more detailed description of the Shuttle can be
found in Appendix B of the Galileo Tier 2 EIS (NASA Ig8ga) and the Shuttle EIS
(NASA 1978).
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Once deployed from the Shuttle, an "upper stage" propels the spacecraft
into higher Earth orbits or to Earth-escape velocities needed for planetary
missions. The upper stage for use on the Ulysses mission is a two-stage solid
fuel rocket IUS supplemented with the solid fuel PAM-S booster.
2.2.7 Ranqe Safety Considerations
The Eastern Space and Missile Center (ESMC) at Patrick Air Force Base is
responsible for range safety for any NASA/KSC space launch. The goal of Range
Safety is to control and contain the flight of all vehicles, precluding the
impact of intact vehicles or pieces thereof in a location that could endanger
human life or damage property. Although the risk can never be completely
eliminated, Range Safety attempts to minimize the risks while not unduly
restricting the probability of mission success.
Each STS flight vehicle carries a Range Safety Flight Termination System
(FTS). When activated by an electronic signal sent by the Range Safety
Officer, the FTS activates explosive charges designed to destroy the vehicle.
The STS FTS enables the Range Safety Officer to destroy the SRBs and ET if the
flight trajectory deviates unacceptably from the planned course.
2.2.8 Mission Continqencies
2.2.8.1 Intact Aborts
The STS vehicle has an intact abort capability in the event specific
failures (e.g., engine loss, electrical/auxiliary power failure, etc.) occur
during the early phases of launch. Intact abort is defined as safely
returning the Shuttle crew and cargo to a suitable landing site. Five basic
abort modes exist providing continuous intact abort capability during ascent
to orbit: Return To Launch Site, Transoceanic Abort Landing, Abort-Once-
Around, Abort-To-Orbit, and Abort-From-Orbit. These intact, safe abort
capabilities enable protection of the crew and the payload after anomalies and
may avoid loss of missions. Manned systems offer an abort capability that
does not exist on expendable launch vehicles that is unique to this type of
launch vehicle. The planned U.S. and tentative foreign intact abort landing
sites for the Ulysses mission are as follows.
Type of Abort Site
Return To Launch Site
Transoceanic Abort Landing
Abort-Once-Around
Kennedy Space Center
Ben Guerir, Morroco
Alternate -
Moron, Spain
Banjeel, Gambia
Zaragoso, Spain
Dakar, Senegal
Edwards Air Force Base, CA
Alternates
White Sands Space Harbour, NM
Kennedy Space Center
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Abort-From-Orbit EdwardsAir Force Base, CA
Alternates -
White Sands Space Harbour, NM
KennedySpace Center
2.2.8.2 Contingency Aborts
Contingency abort conditions are defined when two of the three Shuttle
main engines fail prior to single engine Transoceanic Abort Landing capability
or when all three engines fail prior to achieving an Abort-Once-Around
capability. These conditions result in a crew bailout and subsequent ocean
impact of the Shuttle.
There is a possibility of performing a Return To Launch Site abort if
two or three main engines fail within 20 seconds after launch or a
Transoceanic Abort Landing if three engines fail during the last 30 seconds of
powered flight. During the remainder of the ascent phase; however, two or
three main engine failures result in a contingency abort scenario.
2.2.8.3 On-Orbit Spacecraft Aborts
It is also possible to abort the Ulysses mission if problems occur after
deployment of the Ulysses/IUS/PAM-S from the STS Shuttle up to the point of
IUS ignition. In the event any upper stage motor fails to ignite, the
IUS/PAM-S will continue to sequence through subsequent burns and spacecraft
separation, assuming the IUS sequencing continues to function. If the IUS
attitude control is operating, then the nominal IUS stage I and stage 2 burns
will leave the PAM-S/spacecraft on an escape trajectory without the PAM-S
burns. If either or both IUS stages were not to burn, then the PAM-S burn
alone would place the spacecraft on an escape trajectory.
The percent of anomalous burns occurring in one of the three stages in
the IUS/PAM-S assembly that still achieve an escape trajectory are 34, 58, and
99.6 percent for the IUS Stage 1, IUS Stage 2, and PAM-S, respectively.
Overall 66 percent of the trajectories for which a single motor anomalous burn
has occurred result in an escape trajectory (NASA 1988b).
2.3 THE DELAY ALTERNATIVE
The only launch configuration other than the STS/IUS/PAM-S potentially
capable of achieving the launch requirements of the Ulysses mission is the
Titan IV/IUS/PAM-S. However, the U.S. Air Force has informed NASA that a
Titan IV launch vehicle will not be available before 1995 (Mahon Iggo).
Therefore, the STS/IUS/PAM-S launch configuration is the only feasible launch
configuration available to NASA for the Ulysses mission.
Since the only launch configuration available is the STS/IUS/PAM-S, and
since environmental impacts of an STS/IUS/PAM-S launch are the same whenever
the launch occurs, the delay alternatives will have the same environmental
impacts as the proposed action. Furthermore, the discussion of alternative
power systems (Section 2.2.4) also indicated that the proposed power system is
the only feasible alternative for achieving the Ulysses mission with currently
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available launch systems. Therefore, as neither alternative power systems nor
alternative launch configurations will be available before the late 1990s to
achieve this mission, and delays involving the same systems as proposed would
not yield different impacts even if undertaken at a later date, this EIS does
not consider a delay of the launch as a separate alternative.
The Ulysses mission has the objective of collecting data on the three-
dimensional nature of the heliosphere. A key element of that objective is to
relate the behavior of the solar wind and solar magnetic field lines close to
the Sun (as observed by Ulysses) with their behavior in the outer solar
system. With a launch of the Ulysses spacecraft in the 1990 or 1991
opportunity, the timing is such that the tracking and data collection systems
of the Deep Space Network (DSN) will be capable of acquiring outer solar
system data from the Pioneer 10 and 11 and Voyager I and 2 spacecraft in 1994,
1995, or 1996. It is estimated that the DSN could receive data from both of
the Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft until possibly as late as 1997 or 1998.
However, with later launches of Ulysses, the continuing deterioration of the
Pioneer spacecraft makes it unlikely that these spacecraft will be able to
provide outer planet measurements. No alternative power system or launch
vehicle will be available prior to 1995. So, for example, if the launch of
Ulysses were delayed until 1995, then its solar passes would not occur until
1999 and 2000; therefore, outer solar system data from the Pioneers would be
lost (see Section 1.3).
2.4 DESCRIPTION OF THE NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
The no-action alternative would result in the termination of the further
commitment of resources to the mission. If NASA did not proceed with the
Ulysses mission, the potential scientific returns of this mission would not be
obtained. In addition, cancellation of the mission would leave the European
Space Agency (ESA) without the means for launching or powering their Ulysses
spacecraft; such an action by NASA would likely have severe repercussions on
the future prospects for U.S./International cooperation in space exploration.
2.5 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
The criteria pertinent to a comparison of the proposed action with the
no-action alternative are summarized in Table 2-3 and have been separated into
those related to normal missions and those related to accidents.
2.5.1 Environmental Impacts Qf the Mission
2.5.1.1 Environmental Impacts from Normal Mission
None of the alternatives, including the proposed action, are expected to
result in any significant environmental impacts to the physical environment.
The proposed action will result in limited short-term air, water quality, and
biological impacts in the immediate vicinity of the launch site. These
impacts have been previously addressed in other National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) documents (NASA 1978, NASA 1986, NASA 1988a, NASA ]989a, USAF 1986,
USAF Ig88b) and are associated with the routine launch operations of the STS
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TABLE2-3. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
PROGRANqATI C CONSIDERATIONS
LAUNCHOPPORTUNITY
Vehicte Avaiteb|ttty
Launch Period
- First Possibte Launch Date
- Length
Dairy Launch Window
Mission Narg|ns:
- Power
- PropeL tent
SCIENCE RETURN
Jupiter Arrivat Date
High SoLar Latitude Arrivat Date
SCIENCE PROGRNd
TOTAL ESTIMATED MISSION COST
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Supporttn9 Facltity Avaitebitity
Personnel Avaitabitity
SAFETY & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
Expected (Normat Launch)
• Land Use
• Air Ouatity
• Sonic Boom
PROPOSEDACTION
I STS/IUS/PAJq-S
I IN 1990
I (AND 1991 BACKUP)
I
Firm Commitment
October 5, 1990
19 Days
60-180 Minutes
Adequate
Adequate
February 1992
June 1994
Fur t Return
Probabte
$210 Nit tton
Firm Commitment
Project Team in Piece
No significant adverse
impacts on non-Launch
retsted Land uses.
Short-termdegradetion
of air quality within
Launch ctoudmndnear-
fietd (about 1,600 feet
from Launch pad).
No significant edverse
impacts outside the near-
fietd env|ronment.
Short term tocatlzs<l
decrease in ozone, with
rapid recovery.
NO ACTION
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
None
None
No Substitute
Nissfon Ptanned
Sunk Cost of
$150 MiLLion
Not Requlrod
None
No sustained adverse
impacts.
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
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TABLE 2-3. SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
PROGRAI_IATI C CONSIDERATIONS
a Hydrology and Water Quality
• BioLogicaL Systems
Endangered and Threatened
Spec ies
• Socioeconomic Factors
Expected (Batance of Nission)
/k
Potential Accidents:
Quantity of P[utonium Dioxide
Released to the Biosphere in the
Event of on Accident during
Nission
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Retease
- Expectat | ona
PROPOSEDACTION
STS/IUS/PAN- S
IN 1990
(AND 1991 BACKUP)
No significant adverse
tong-tem impacts.
Short-terll increase in
the acidity of nearby
water |MCKxJndi_ts.
Short-term vegetation
damage contributes to
Long-term decrease in
species richness In
near-fietd over time
with Shuttte operations.
Fish kJtts in near-by
waterways expected
with each Shuttle
taunch.
No significant adverse
effects outside the
near-field.
No Impact.
No significant adverse
effects. Short-term
economic benefits from
tourism.
No s|gnificant adverse
effects.
388 C| st 1.77X10 "7
Probabitity
NO ACTION
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
No Effect
Nolle
• Expectation of results over Phase I, determined by probability weighing the base case
resutts for every sub-period in Phase 1.
Based on pretimtnery information contained in the Safety Status Report for the Ulysses
m_ssfon (DOE 1990c).
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TABLE 2-3 SUMMARY COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES (Continued)
PROGRANNATI C CONSIDERATIONS
Lifetime Incremental Collective
(Population) Dose in the Event of
a NissienAccident-Totat
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release
- Base Case
• Total Dose
(without de mtntmts
• Above de minimis
Incremental Cancer Fatalities among
Exposed Population in the Event of
a Nissten Accident
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
ReLease
- Base Case
• Without de mintmiS
• With de minimis
Intend Area Potentially Affected
by Deposition in Event of an
Accident
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
Release
- Base Case (Expectation)
Intend Area Potentially Requiring
Cleanup and Mitigation at Second
Year Following Accident (i.e.,
Annual Dose Rate Exceeding
25 mrecVyr)
Launch Vicinity Accident Causing
ReLease
- Base Case (Expectation)
PROPOSEDACTION
STS/IUS/PAN-S
IW 1990
(AWD 1991 BACKUP)
2.42X102
person rein
0.0847
fatal i ties
12.3 km2
0 km2
NO ACTION
Nolle
Mone
None
Norse
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and Titan IV launch vehicles. The impacts were determined to be localized to
designated areas and, therefore, insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations.
The following subsections briefly summarize the impacts described in Section
4.
proposed ACtion
Short-term air quality degradation at the launch site and downwind of the
launch will occur from the hydrochloric acid and aluminum oxide emissions from
the solid rocket booster engines. The greatest effect will be in the "near
field" (i.e., within about go0 feet of the launch pad). Additional deposition
will occur outside this area in lower concentrations, with most deposition
expected to occur over the ocean.
Short-term impacts on natural vegetation and biota could be acute near
the launch pad. Damage would be confined to vegetation and biota near the
launch pad. Acidification of mosquito impoundments near the launch pad also
may occur. These impacts are similar to those observed during the past 10
years and are on KSC land. At the time of launch, birds are expected to be
startled by the noise, but no long-term consequences are expected. No adverse
impacts on endangered species are expected (based on experience with Shuttle
launches to date).
Beneficial impacts on the local economy will result from the influx of
tourists who come to view the launch. Additional benefits will result from
the science returns, as discussed previously.
No-Action Alternative
The no-action alternative, while not creating any direct environmental
impacts, could limit the scientific base for future technological advances.
On the other hand, successful completion of the mission under the proposed
action would result in new scientific knowledge that could lead to
technological advances that could have significant long-term positive
benefits.
2.5.1.2 Possible Environmental Impacts of Mission Accidents
Proposed Action
For the proposed action, there is a slight chance of adverse impacts.
Analysis indicates that the chance is small of any accident occurring that
could release some percentage of the plutonium dioxide fuel (NASA Ig88a, NASA
Ig8ga, and Section 4 of this EIS).
The DOE conducts a detailed program of safety verification, testing, and
analysis to determine the chances and consequences of releasing plutonium
dioxide from the Ulysses spacecraft's RTG in the event of an accident. The
goal of the DOE program is to ensure the integrity of RTGs, predict their
response to a broad range of accident conditions, and estimate the
environmental impact, if any, of an accident. The results of analyses
available to date are presented in Section 4 and are briefly summarized in
Table 2-3. A Final Safety Analysis Report will be available prior to the
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publication of the Final EIS, and therefore the results of that analysts will
be available for Inclusion in the Final EIS.
For the mission as a whole, the accident with the highest probability of
a resultant release is an IUS failure (Phase 4) during deployment which leads
to spacecraft break-up, reentry of the RTG modules, and impact of the modules
on water, in which case there would be no release of RTG fuel. In the
unlikely event the modules impact on hard rock, a release is predicted to
occur. The probability of release due to this accident scenario is 2.4 X 10.4 ,
or about I in 4,200. The collective population dose over a SO-year period
would be 0.53 person-rem (0.16 person-rem above de mlnimi$). The ability of
the modules to survive Earth orbital reentry heating without a loss of fuel has
been demonstrated by test and operational experience. The release could occur
only in the event of reentry and impact on rock or a similar unyielding
surface. If the RTG reenters and lands in the ocean, statistically the most
likely occurrence, there would be no release.
An additional potential concern relates to the non-ionizing effects of
electromagnetic fields from radio frequency transmitter/antenna systems upon
the ltquid and solid fuels (Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuels
[HERF]). The proper bonding and grounding of fuel systems and their
appurtenances (per Military Standard B-5087B) to Space Shuttle structure
precludes the potential ignition threats due to arcs created by radiation and
triboelectric charging.
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO) have been well
studied and tested by NASA, other government agencies, and commercial testing
laboratories and have resulted in design and safety margins for ordnance
installation, wiring, and pyro-lnitiator controllers.
Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) of telecommunications equipment,
electrical equipment and control of Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) is a
rigorous on-going activity. This includes the design and installation and
usage scenarios of subsystems and line replaceable units in Space Shuttle
Systems. The control circuits of the Space Shuttle, payload, and Airborne
Support Equipment systems that constitute potential hazards are carefully
reviewed for acceptable inhibit control types and redundancy as required by
safety standards.
The EMI Safety Margins (EMISM) requirements delineated in Military
Standard E-6051D for conducted and radiated emissions versus susceptibility of
electric, electronic and ordnance equipment are strictly enforced.
Potential electrostatic charging mechanisms and Electrostatic Discharge
(ESD) are carefully accounted for in the design of the Space Shuttle,
payloads, experiments, and other Government furnished equipment manifested for
flight. Radio frequency bonding, fault bonding, static bonding, hazard
bonding, antenna bonding and launch site bonding criteria, lightning
protection criteria, and launch commit criteria concerning weather and other
considerations are strictly enforced.
Designs and procedures are under continuous review and enhancement. In
addition, systems with explosion potential are not armed until the appropriate
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time, such as launch and other key mission milestones. The Space Shuttle and
payloads are designed and/or shielded by enclosures to withstand the launch
electromagnetic environment. All Eastern Test Range (ETR) transmitter/antenna
systems are controlled by the ETR Range Officer and the Department of Defense.
No-Ac_iQn Alternative
There are no adverse health or environmental impacts from the no-action
alternative.
2.5.2 Scope and Timinq of Mission Science Returns
Evaluation of the alternatives indicates that there are no significant
health or environmental impacts outside the immediate vicinity of the launch
pad associated with a normal mission. There are, however, major adverse
fiscal and programmatic impacts attendant with the no-action alternative.
The proposed action would accomplish NASA's scientific objectives for the
Ulysses mission's study of the Sun. The proposed action would result in the
earliest collection of this scientific data at a most optimum time because of
the position of other spacecraft.
The no-action alternative, by eliminating the previously cited small risk
of consequences from its operation, would result in not obtaining any science
data and therefore would effectively prevent the United States and the ESA
from achieving their solar system exploration objectives.
2.5.3 Launch Preparation and OperatiQn Costs (Mission OnlY)
The proposed Ulysses mission, with an estimated cost to completion of
approximately $210 million (excluding launch vehicle costs), represents the
minimum cost alternative to NASA for meeting the objectives of the Ulysses
mission. The November 1991 backup contingency launch date, if necessary,
would add an additional $14 million, excluding launch vehicle costs.
The no-action alternative would represent the least cost alternative for
NASA but would render useless the $150 million current investment.
2.5.4 Launch Schedules an_ Launch Vehicle Availability
Consistent with the planning for the proposed action, the Ulysses mission
has been manifested for flight on board the STS in October 1990. There are no
plans within the existing launch manifest to launch Ulysses on board the STS
in 1991; however, if NASA were unable to launch Ulysses in 1990, a contingency
plan would be to rearrange the manifest and attempt a launch in 1991.
2.5.5 Facility and Personnel Availability
To maintain the proposed action, the necessary NASA and ESA scientific
and engineering personnel are in place to implement the Ulysses mission in
1990. NASA's Deep Space Network is prepared to meet the project's tracking
and data relay requirements.
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Selection of the no-action alternative would result in releasing a
Shuttle launch commitment (and an IUS/PAM-Supper stage booster) in October
1990 for either a NASAor Department of Defense mission. The existing
engineering work force would be available to work on other NASAprojects.
Most significantly, the scientific investigations of scores of scientists who
have worked manyyears to conduct experiments as part of the Ulysses mission
would be terminated.
2.5.6 Summary
The launch of the Ulysses mission in 1990 or 1991 will allow the
collection of data simultaneously with the Pioneer 10 and 11 and Voyager I and
2 spacecraft in the outer heliosphere and will enable a three-dimensional
study of the heliosphere. In the event that the mission were delayed well
beyond 1991, some of the data acquisition in the Ulysses science program would
be lost. As discussed in this section, the only combination of spacecraft,
power source, and launch vehicle configuration that can meet the objectives is
the currently designed Ulysses spacecraft, the use of an RTG as the power
source, and the STS/IUS/PAM-S as the launch vehicle.
Later launch windows are December 1992, January 1994, February 1995,
March 1996, April 1997, May 1998, and June 1999. The STS/IUS/PAM-S launch
vehicle option is the only technically feasible choice for launches prior to
January 1994 because approximately three years is required from the time a
decision is made to use a particular launch vehicle, such as the Titan IV
expendable launch vehicle, and the time that the requisite modifications can
be completed to the spacecraft and launch vehicle. In addition, the U.S. Air
Force, which procures the Titan IV launch vehicle, notified NASA in November
of 1988 that it could not provide a Titan IV vehicle for the 1991 launch
opportunity due to high priority Department of Defense requirements.
Consequently, NASA terminated all mission planning and preparation for the
Titan IV planetary back-up (i.e., back-up launch capability for the Magellan,
Galileo, and Ulysses missions). Furthermore, the U.S. Air Force has indicated
that the first availability of a Titan IV vehicle will be in 1995. Therefore,
only the STS/IUS/PAM-S is both capable of performing the mission and available
to NASA for missions in the early 1990s.
Information on a number of potential power source alternatives for the
spacecraft were presented in Section 2.2.4. The only power source currently
available which can perform reliably during all phases of the mission is the
RTG. Developmental work currently underway is expected to provide additional
potential power sources in the mid to late 1990s. The most promising appears
to be the advanced photovoltaic solar array which could be combined with
batteries to provide power. Flight testing of this source is currently
scheduled for 1993; consequently, the earliest estimate for a possible
application would be for a March 1996 mission. Therefore, alternative power
sources to replace the use of an RTG are not available before the late 1990s.
In summary, no alternative to the proposed launch vehicle is available
before 1995, and no alternative to the RTGs as a power source is available
before the late 1990s.
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The proposed action of completion of preparation and operation of the
Ulysses mission, including its planned launch in October 1990, with November
1991 as a back-up opportunity, is the only reasonable alternative for
accomplishing the Ulysses mission in a timely manner and without major
disruption to the NASA and ESA scientific programs. The no-action alternative
involves cancellation of the mission, loss of the sunk costs, loss of the
potential for collecting significant scientific data (see Section 1.3), and
the abrogation of a NASA/ESA international agreement.
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3. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
This section addresses those elements of the human environment that could
potentially be affected by the proposed and alternative actions addressed
within this document. The section is divided into three major parts
addressing: (I) the region in which the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) and Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) launch areas are located, (2) the local
area encompassing the STS and Titan IV launch sites, and (3) the "global
commons" or the global environment. A brief discussion of plutonium levels in
the environment is included in the third subsection to provide the reader with
a perspective regarding the types, sources, and levels of environmental
plutonium on a broad scale.
The affected environment has been discussed in detail in a previous (Tier
2) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Galileo mission (NASA Ig8ga).
Refer to that document for additional maps of environmental resources.
3.1 REGIONAL OVERVIEW
For the purpose of this document, the region is defined as the six county
area (Brevard, Volusia, Seminole, Lake, Orange, Osceola counties) which
encompasses KSC and CCAFS, as shown in Figure 3-I.
3.1.1 Land Use
About 8 percent (328,000 acres) of the total region (4.1 million acres)
is urbanized (ECFRPC 1987), with the largest concentrations of people
occurring in three metropolitan areas: (I) Orlando in Orange County, with
expansions into the Lake Mary and Sanford areas of Seminole County to the
north; and into the Kissimmee and St. Cloud areas of Osceola County to the
south; (2) the coastal area of Volusia County, including Daytona Beach, Port
Orange, Ormond Beach, and New Smyrna Beach; and (3) along the Indian Lagoon
and coastal area of Brevard County, specifically the cities of Titusville,
Melbourne, and Palm Bay. Approximately 85 percent of the region's population
lives in developed urban areas.
The majority of the region is considered rural, which includes
agricultural lands and associated trade and services areas, conservation and
recreation lands, as well as undeveloped areas. Agricultural activities
include citrus groves, winter vegetable farms, pastureland and livestock,
foliage nurseries, sod farms, and dairy land. Citrus farming has been harmed
in recent years by canker outbreaks and freezes, and the majority of groves in
Lake, Seminole, Volusia, and Orange counties remain vacant and unused (ECFRPC
1987). With over 5,000 farms, nurseries, and ranches in the region, about 35
percent (1.4 million acres) of the regional area is devoted to agriculture.
Conservation and recreation lands account for almost 25 percent of the
total acreage in the region, or slightly over I million acres (ECFRPC
Undated). About 866,600 acres are land resources, and about 156,000 acres are
water areas. The region also contains about 5,400 acres of saltwater beaches
and about 48 acres of archaeological and historic sites.
3-I
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
/
%
I
/
I,
,p
t*
t_
i
Source:
FIGURE 3-1. LOCATION OF REGIONAL AREA OF INTEREST
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NASA 1979
A number of areas within the region have special status land use
designations. These include a portion of the Ocala National Forest, the
Canaveral National Seashore adjacent to KSC, one State preserve, seven State
wildlife managementareas, and two national wildlife refuges including the
Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge at KSC.
3.1.2 Meteoroloqy and Air Qualii_y
The climate of the region is subtropical with two definite seasons:
long, warm, humid summers and short, mild, dry winters. Rainfall amounts vary
both seasonally and from one year to the next. Average rainfall is 51 inches;
the monthly high occurs in July and the low usually in April. These
fluctuations result in frequent, though usually not severe, episodes of
flooding and drought. Temperature is more constant than precipitation with
prolonged cold spells and heat waves being rare. Tropical storms, tropical
depressions, and hurricanes, all of which can produce large amounts of
rainfall and high winds, occasionally strike the region. The last hurricanes
to affect the area were David in September 1979 which paralleled the coast
(ECFRPC 1987), and Hugo in September 1989 which went ashore in South Carolina.
There are 14 air monitoring sites in the region: 7 are for total
suspended particulates, 2 each for sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide and ozone,
and I for nitrogen dioxide. Lead is not monitored anywhere in the region.
Most of the monitoring sites are located in the Orlando urban area; there are
no air quality monitoring sites in Lake or Osceola Counties.
Air quality is generally good. Orange County is the only county in the
region that has been designated a non-attainment area (in this case, for
ozone). Data from the period 1984-1986 indicate that ozone standards were
being met (State of Florida 1987). Orange County was redesignated by EPA
(5/13/87) as an ozone "attainment" area (52 FR 17953).
3.1.3 Hydroloqy and Water Oualitv
The region not only borders the Atlantic Ocean, but contains
approximately 2,300 lakes, 2 major estuaries, and about 700 miles of streams
and rivers.
Almost all (89 percent) of the fresh water used in the region is drawn
from groundwater supplies, principally the artesian Floridan Aquifer. Some
small users withdraw water from the nonartesian surficial aquifers that
overlie the Floridan Aquifer. The Floridan Aquifer covers 82,000 square miles
and is 2,000 feet thick in some areas. In portions of the region, such as the
coastal zone and an area bordering the St. Johns River, the Floridan Aquifer
is too saline for potable water use (ECFRPC 1987). Wells tapping the
surficial, unconfined aquifer are largely used for non-potable or individual
domestic uses, although this source is also used for some municipal public
supply systems (e.g., the cities of Mims and Titusville, about 15 miles
northwest of the KSC/CCAFS launch sites; and Palm Bay, about 40 miles south of
the KSC/CCAFS launch sites, in Brevard County). Lake Washington, in Brevard
County, about 32 miles south of the KSC/CCAFS launch sites, is the only
surface water used as a potable water supply in the region, supplying the City
of Melbourne (ECFRPC 1987).
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Groundwater reserves are recharged by the percolation of rainwater. The
region contains some effective recharge areas for the Floridan Aquifer (Figure
3-2). These areas are located primarily in the upland portions of Lake,
Orange, Seminole, Osceola, and Volusia Counties and are composed of very
porous, sandy soils. Rainfall quickly percolates through the soils into the
aquifers below. In the most effective recharge areas, approximately 15 inches
of rainfall enter the Floridan Aquifer each year -- almost 30 percent of the
total rainfall.
The major surface water resources in the region are the upper St. Johns
River basin, the Indian River Lagoon system, the Banana River and a portion of
the Kissimmee River along the western border of Osceola County. The St. Johns
River, from its headwaters in the marshes at the southern end of Brevard
County to the northernmost part of Lake Washington, is classified by the State
as Class I water (potable water supply), and as noted earlier, serves as the
source of potable water for the City of Melbourne and much of the surrounding
population in that area. The remainder of the St. Johns within the region is
Class III water (recreation and fish and wildlife propagation).
The Kissimmee River (and its system of lakes) is a major contributor of
flow into Lake Okeechobee to the south of the region, and is the major
drainage for Osceola County and a portion of eastern Orange County. The river
system is characterized by a series of control structures and channeled
connections between the lakes for the purposes of flood water level control
and navigation (FSU 1984).
Waters with special status within the region include the:
Weikiva River; a federally designated Wild and Scenic River, which
forms the border between northwestern Seminole County and eastern Lake
County
e Mosquito Lagoon portion of the Indian River Lagoon which is a State of
Florida Aquatic Preserve
Southern portion of the Banana River from the southern end of CCAFS
south and the Indian River Lagoon between Malabar and Sebastian Inlet,
also designated as Aquatic Preserves
Portions of the Banana River and Mosquito Lagoon, as well as the
northern portion of the Indian River within the confines of KSC
designated by the State as Outstanding Florida Waters, along with the
Weikiva River, the Butler chain of lakes, and the Clermont chain of
lakes.
In total, the region contains 4 aquatic preserves, 24 bodies of surface water
designated as Outstanding Florida Waters, and I Area of Critical State Concern
the Green Swamp.
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3.1.4 Geoloay and Soils
The region is underlain by a series of limestone formations with a total
thickness of several thousand feet. The lower formations (the Avon Park and
Ocala group) constitute the Floridan Aquifer. Overlying these formations are
beds of sandy clay, shells, and clays of the Hawthorn formation which form the
principal confining beds for the Floridan Aquifer. Overlying the Hawthorn
formation are Upper Miocene, Pleiocene, and recent deposits which form
secondary semi-confined aquifers and the surficial aquifer.
3.1.5 Bioloqical R_sgurce@ and Endangered Species
As noted in Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.3, the region has a large number of
terrestrial and aquatic conservation and special designation areas (e.g.,
wildlife management areas and aquatic preserves), which serve as wildlife
habitat, and comprise about 25 percent (about I million acres) of the total
land and water acreage within the region (about 4.1 million acres).
Figure 3-3 provides an overview of land cover types found throughout the
six county region, with a county-by-county breakdown provided in Table 3-I.
Freshwater and coastal wetlands comprise about 23 percent of the total area of
the six county region, followed by xeric grassland (21 percent), scrub and
bush (17 percent), water (12 percent), and hardwood/pine forest (11 percent)
being the dominant cover types in the region.
A total of 141 species of freshwater, estuarine, and marine fish have
been documented within the northern portions of the Indian River Lagoon near
KSC (ECFRPC 1988). Of these, 65 species are considered commercial fish and 85
are sport fish and/or are fished commercially. One species known to inhabit
the river, the rainwater killifish (Lucania Darva), while not on the Federal
or State threatened and endangered lists, has been listed by the Florida
Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals as "imperiled statewide"
($2), and by the Florida Natural Areas Inventory as a "species of special
concern."
The St. Johns River supports both fresh and saltwater fishing (DOE
IgSga). Sport fish include largemouth bass, bluegill, black crappie, bowfin,
gar, bullhead, bream, and catfish. The St. Johns River basin is heavily
fished, as indicated by an estimated 50,000 man-hours of fishing effort in
1983 in Lake Washington and Lake Harney alone.
As noted in Section 3.1.6.2, commercial fishing is an important economic
asset to the region. Brevard County and Volusia County ranked fifth and sixth
respectively, among the 12 east coast Florida counties in terms of 1987
finfish landings. Brevard ranked first in invertebrate landings (crab, clams,
oysters, etc.) and first in shrimp landings, with Volusia fifth in both
categories.
Important terrestrial species in the region include migratory and native
waterfowl (ringneck, pintail, and bald pate ducks, for example), as well as
turkey, squirrel, white-tailed deer and wild hogs. Black bear also are known
in the region. The St. Johns River basin is an important waterfowl hunting
area. The seven State wildlife management areas in the region are hunted for
small game, turkey, hogs, or deer.
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The Federal government's Endangered or Threatened Species List, prepared
by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), currently recognizes ]9
endangered or threatened species in this region. Another 55 species are
*under review" for possible listing, of which 35 are plants. The State of
Florida list includes 47 species considered endangered or threatened. The
Florida Committee on Rare and Endangered Plants and Animals, a group
consisting largely of research biologists, gives endangered or threatened
status to 55 species. The Florida Natural Areas Inventory, run by the Nature
Conservancy under contract to the Florida Department of Natural Resources,
includes 62 species in its top two most endangered categories. Roughly half
of all the endangered and threatened species identified by these lists occur
tn wetlands, principally estuarine environments; the other half depend on
upland habitats (ECFRPC ]987).
3.1.6 Socioeconomic Environment
The socioeconomic environment of the six counties that could be affected
by the launch includes fast growing communities and urban areas that have
adopted long-range plans reflecting the rapid influx of development in the
regional area.
3.].6.1 Population
The existence of three separate metropolitan areas is reflected in the
designation of three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (HSAs) within the region
by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (ECFRPC ]987). These MSAs are the Orlando
MSA (Orange, Osceola, and Seminole Counties), the Daytona Beach RSA (Volusia
County), and the Melbourne-Titusville-Palm Bay MSA (Brevard County). The
population in Lake County, though growing faster than the State average, is
split between many small-to-medium-sized municipalities and rural areas.
Growth Rate
The regional population is growing at a rate faster than the State--
during 1960 the region contained 12.8 percent of the state population; in 1970
and in 1980 the growth rate flattened out and the region contained ]3.6
percent and 13.7 percent of the State population, respectively. In June of
1980 the disproportional growth of the region resumed. The 1980 regional
population was 1,336,646, a 45 percent increase from the 1970 census. The
estimated growth from 1980 to 1986 was a 33.6 percent increase (an addition
448,898 persons). Current estimates (1987) are that the growth rate is higher
in recent years than at the beginning of the decade, and that between 1986 and
1987 the population increased 4.6 percent (77,711 people), placing 14.6
percent of Florida's population in the region. This trend is projected to
continue through ]gg1. The 1987-]991 growth is expected to be almost 20
percent, or approximately 337,000 people (ECFRPC Undated).
All counties are expected to show increases in population. In the early
]9gOs, it Is anticipated that 2,000,000 people will be living in the region.
By the year 2000, official estimates show the region will have about 2,300,000
residents, 40 percent more than in 1985 (ECFRPC 1987).
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Orange County is expected to remain the most populated county, growing to
673,200 in ]991, followed by Brevard (428,200), Volusia (373,400), Seminole
(302,100), Lake (153,000), and Osceola (115,200). Osceola is projected to
have the fastest population growth rate over the 1987 to 1991 time frame with
an increase of 39.5 percent. Seminole is projected to have a 25.2 percent
increase, followed by Brevard (19.9 percent), Lake (17.6 percent), Volusia
(17.1 percent) and Orange is expected to show the slowest growth rate (16.5
percent). This projected population growth is summarized in Table 3-2 (ECFRPC
Undated).
TABLE 3-2. PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTH, EAST CENTRAL FLORIDA REGION
(]986-]991)
Population Change 1986-199]
Area 1986" 1991 Number Percent
Brevard 357,000 428,200 71,200 19.9
Lake 130,100 153,000 22,900 17.6
Orange 577,900 673,200 95,300 16.5
Osceola 82,600 115,200 32,600 39.5
Seminole 241,300 302,100 60,800 25.2
Volusia 319,000 373,400 54,400 17.1
TOTAL 1,707,800 2,045,]00 337,300 19.8
(average)
* April 1986 estimate
(rounded to nearest 100).
(Source: ECFRPC Undated)
3.1.6.2 Economics
The region's economic base is tourism and manufacturing. Tourism related
jobs, although difficult to define, include most jobs in amusement parks,
hotels, motels, and campgrounds as well as many jobs in retail trade and
various types of services. Manufacturing jobs, while probably outnumbered by
tourism jobs, may provide more monetary benefits to the region because of
higher average wages and a larger multiplier effect (as jobs are added to the
economy in one sector, needs are created which lead to an expansion of
employment in other sectors) (ECFRPC 1987).
3-10
Economic Base
Tourism in the region now attracts more than 20,000,000 visitors
annually. Walt Disney World and Sea World, near Orlando, along with KSC, are
among the most popular tourist attractions in the state (ECFRPC 1987).
Manufacturing employs approximately 100,000 people regionwide. Orange
and Brevard counties account for about 70 percent of this employment. Retail
and wholesale trade provide jobs for more than half (58.9 percent in 1984) of
the regions' employed persons. Other economic sectors that provide
significant employment in the region include: construction (7.5 percent),
transportation, communication and utilities (5.6 percent), finance, insurance,
and real estate (5.9 percent), and agriculture (2.7 percent).
Commercial fisheries of the two regional counties bordering the ocean
(Brevard and Volusia) landed a total of 23,608,458 pounds of finfish,
invertebrates (clams, crabs, lobsters, octopus, oysters, scallops, squid,
etc.), and shrimp in 1987. Brevard and Volusia ranked fifth and sixth,
respectively, among the 12 east coast counties of Florida in total 1987
finfish landings. Brevard led east coast counties in invertebrate landings
with about 16 million pounds. Volusia County ranked fifth with about 0.4
million pounds. Brevard also ranked first on the east coast with 1.6 million
pounds of shrimp; Volusia was fifth with about 0.3 million pounds.
The region's agricultural activities include citrus groves, winter
vegetable farms, pastureland, foliage nurseries, sod, livestock, and dairy
production (ECFRPC 1987). In the central region, 30 percent of the land is
forested and supports silviculture, including harvesting of southern yellow
pine, cypress, sweetgum, maple, and bay trees. Large cattle ranches occupy
almost all of the rural land in Osceola county (ECFRPC 1987). Agricultural
employment declined in 1986 to 2.2 percent of the region's employment base
(ECFRPC Undated).
KSC's Contribution to the Economy of the State of Florida
Contracts and employment at KSC added $1.24 billion to Florida's economy
during the Federal government's Fiscal Year 1989, ending September 30, 1989.
Of these expenditures, $1.07 billion went to contractors operating on-site at
the space center, $7 million went to off-site business in Brevard County, and
about $14 million involved other purchases and contracts awarded to Florida
businesses outside of Brevard County. At least 70 percent of the on-site and
Brevard County expenditures were estimated to have stayed in the local area in
the form of payrolls and purchases (KSC 1989).
Civil service salaries through the end of FY89 amounted to $102 million,
an increase of about $13 million over the previous year. Permanent Federal
employees at KSC edged over the 2,400 mark during the period. While 3,800
individuals were employed through construction and tenant jobs at KSC, the
majority of workers at KSC are employed by the on-site contractors and number
almost 12,000. Overall, approximately 18,000 workers were employed at KSC
through the close of the Fiscal Year (KSC 1989).
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Reqional Employment
About 49 percent of the residents in the region are employed, ranging
from 56 percent in Orange County to 33 percent in Lake County with 55 percent
in Seminole, 49 percent in Osceola, 45 percent in Brevard, and 41 percent in
Volusia. The region's labor force and employment have risen each year since
the mid-]970s, and employment is expected to continue to increase through 1991
to a total of 1.08 million civilian jobs by ]991 from 0.83 million in ]986.
The region's unemployment rate in 1986 was 5.1 percent (ECFRPC Undated).
ReqlonBl Income
Income in the region has been increasing faster than inflation. The ]985
to 1986 average annual wage rose 3.7 percent (about two times faster than the
inflation rate of 1.9 percent). The 1986 average wage over all sectors was
$17,604. Per capita income in the region has risen steadily since 1979 from
$7,799 to $12,273 in 1984. The highest income was in Orange County ($12,90]),
followed by Brevard ($12,235) and Osceola ($11,026). The regional per capita
income for 1987 to 1991 is projected to increase at a rate somewhat greater
than inflation, perhaps surpassing the national average in 1991 (ECFRPC
Undated).
3.1.6.3 Transportation
The region's airports, for the most part, still are able to accommodate
increasing numbers of passengers. Orlando International Airport, already the
43rd busiest airport in the world in number of passengers, is an exception.
The Greater Orlando Airport Authority has recently announced plans to double
its capacity to 24,000,000 passengers annually. Two other major airports are
Daytona Beach Regional and Melbourne Regional (ECFRPC 1987).
The region's road network includes five major limited access highways:
Interstate 4, Interstate 95, Florida's Turnpike, the Spessard L. Holland East-
West Expressway, and the Martin L. Andersen Beeline Expressway. In addition,
numerous Federal, State, and county roads are located in the region (ECFRPC
1987).
The remainder of the region's transportation network is varied. Rail
service for freight is available in all counties, but passenger service is
limited. Ports at Cape Canaveral and Sanford provide access for water-borne
shipping and cruises. Mass transit or paratransit is currently operating in
all counties of the region except for Osceola (ECFRPC 1987).
3.1.6.4 Public and Emergency Services
Nearly 90 percent of the people in the region rely upon public supplies
of potable water, while the remainder use private wells. Problems with
saltwater intrusion into ground water is already evident, especially in
coastal Brevard County (ECFRPC 1987).
Health care within the region is available at 28 general hospitals, three
psychiatric hospitals, and two specialized hospitals. Over 6,600 beds are
provided in the general hospitals. Doctors, dentists, and other heath care
professionals, as well as nursing homes are located throughout the region
(ECFRPC 1987).
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3.1.6.5 Historical/Cultural Resources
There are 45 sites within the region that are listed in the National
Registry of Historic Places, 2 in the National Registry of Historic Landmarks,
and one area (Kissimmee River Prairie) that is a potential addition to the
National Registry of Natural Landmarks.
3.2 LOCAL ENVIRONMENT
The local environment is defined as the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
(CCAFS) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). The following brief descriptions
use the Air Force Environmental Assessment for the Complementary Expendable
Launch Vehicle (later renamed the Titan IV) at CCAFS (USAF 1986), the 1988
supplement to that document addressing an increase in the number of Titan IV
launches from CCAFS (USAF ]g88), and the KSC Environmental Resources Document
(NASA 1986) as primary sources for data and figures.
The KSC/CCAFS area is located on the east coast of Florida, in Brevard
County near the City of Cocoa Beach, approximately I5 miles north of Patrick
Air Force Base (PAFB), about 30 miles south of Daytona Beach and 40 miles due
east of Orlando (see Figure 3-4). The local area is part of the Gulf-Atlantic
coastal flats and occupies Cape Canaveral and the north end of Merritt Island,
both of which are barrier islands.
3.2.1 Land Use
KSC (Figure 3-5) occupies almost 140,000 acres, S percent of which is
developed land (6,55B acres) and the rest (]33,444 acres) is undeveloped.
Nearly 40 percent of KSC consists of open water areas, such as portions of
Indian River, the Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon and all of Banana Creek.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains
operational control over about 4.7 percent of KSC (6,507 acres). This area
comprises the functional area that is dedicated to NASA operations. About 62
percent of this operational area is currently developed as facility sites,
roads, lawns, and maintained right-of-ways. The undeveloped operational areas
are dedicated as safety zones around existing facilities or held in reserve
for planned and future expansion. For areas not directly utilized for NASA
operations, land planning and management responsibilities have been delegated
to the National Park Service (Cape Canaveral National Seashore within KSC) and
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (Cape Canaveral National Seashore
outside KSC, and the 75,400 acre Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge).
These agencies exercise management control over agricultural, recreational,
and various environmental management programs at KSC.
CCAFS occupies approximately 15,800 acres (a 25 square mile area) of the
barrier island that contains Cape Canaveral (USAF 1986). Approximately 3,800
acres or 25 percent of the Station is developed and consists of launch
complexes and support facilities (see Figure 3-6). The remaining 75 percent
(about 12,000 acres) consists of unimproved land. The Titan IV Launch Complex
41 is located at the northernmost section of CCAFS, occupying 28.4 acres of
land. This complex was previously used along with Launch Complex 40 for test
flights of the Titan Ill A, Ill C, and Centaur Vehicles in the early ]g6Os.
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3.2.2 Meteoroloqy and Air Quality
Like the region, the climate of KSC and CCAFS is subtropical with summers
that are hot and humid, and winters that are short and mild. Mean
temperatures range from the low 60s in the winter months to the low 80s in the
summer months. Precipitation is moderately heavy with an average annual
rainfall of 45.2 inches. Hail falls occasionally during thunderstorms, but
hailstones are usually small and seldom cause much damage. Snow is rare.
In general, the winds in September through November occur predominantly
from the east to northeast (see Figure 3-7). Winds from December through
February occur from the north to northwest, shifting to the southeast from
March through May, and then to the south from June through August. It should
be noted that the radiological impact assessments found in Section 4 and
Appendix B, use launch window-specific wind roses (see Figure 3-7) and
meteorological conditions. While those specific wind roses are consistent
with the seasonal conditions illustrated here, they do vary slightly for
individual launch windows. Sea breeze and land breeze phenomena occur
commonly during the day due to unequal solar heating of the air over land and
over ocean. Land breeze occurs at night when air over land has cooled to a
lower temperature than that over the sea. Temperature inversions occur
infrequently (approximately 2 percent of the time).
Tornadoes may occur but are rare. The U.S. Air Force (USAF ]986) cited a
study which concluded that the probability of a tornado hitting a point within
the Cape Canaveral area in any given year is 0.00074, with a return frequency
of approximately once every 1,300 years.
Tropical depressions and hurricanes occur throughout the wet season in
Florida. While the possibility for winds to reach hurricane force (74 miles
per hour or greater) in any given year in Brevard County is approximately 1 in
20 (USAF 1986), only 24 hurricanes have passed within 115 miles of KSC and
CCAFS since 1887 (NASA 1986). Hurricane David (September 1979) and Hurricane
Hugo (September 1989) were the last hurricanes to affect the area.
Air quality at KSC/CCAFS is considered good, primarily because of the
distance of the launch sites from major sources of pollution. There are no
Class I or nonattainment areas (for ozone, NO, SO., lead, CO, and
particulates) within about 60 miles of KSC/CC_FS, _xcept Orange County to the
west, which is a nonattainment area for ozone (USAF 1986).
The ambient air quality at KSC is influenced by NASA operations, land
management practices, vehicle traffic, and emission sources outside of KSC
(NASA 1986). Daily air quality conditions are most influenced by vehicle
traffic, utilities fuel combustion, standard refurbishment and maintenance
operations, and incinerator operations. Air quality at KSC is also influenced
by emissions from two regional power plants which are located within a 10 mile
radius of KSC. Space launches, training fires, and fuel load reduction burns
influence air quality as episodic events.
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Ambient air quality at KSC is monitored by two Permanent Air Monitoring
System (PAMS) stations (NASA 1986). PAMS A is located at the Environmental
Health Facility Site, about 5 miles south of Launch Complex 39, and PAMS B is
located east of Kennedy Parkway and north of Banana Creek, about 4 miles west
of Launch Complex 39.
A summary of air quality parameters collected from the PAMS A facility in
1985 is provided in Table 3-3. The primary standard for NO_ was exceeded in
Januar The 109 ug/m_ of NO_ was 221 percent greater than _he highest level
recorded in the State during _he year. KSC 24-hour maximum levels for SOz
during 1984 and 1985 were also among the highest along the east coast of
Florida NO 2 and SO_ levels and prevailing westerly winds indicate that power
plants to the west o_ KSC are the primary source of these emissions (NASA
]986).
Although never exceeding established standards, ozone is the most
consistently "high" criteria pollutant at KSC (NASA 1986).
3.2.3 Hydroloqv and Water Quality
3.2.3.1 Surface Waters
Major inland water bodies in the CCAFS and KSC area are the Indian River,
Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon (Figure 3-8). These water bodies are
shallow lagoons, except for the portions maintained as part of the
Intercoastal Waterway, between Jacksonville to the north and Miami to the
south. The Indian and Banana Rivers join at Port Canaveral and form a
combined area of 150,000 acres in Brevard County, with an average depth of 6
feet. This area receives drainage from 540,000 acres of surrounding area
(USAF 1986).
The surface water shorelines at KSC are dominated by mosquito control
impoundments. The water levels in these impoundments are raised and lowered
seasonally as a control technique to reduce mosquito populations. These
impoundments are typically fringed by mangrove or salt marsh communities. The
shallow submerged bottoms range from unvegetated sand shell bottoms to meadows
of seagrasses.
The Banana River and Indian River were historically connected by Banana
Creek. This connection was severed in 1964 with the construction of the
Launch Complex 39 crawlerway. Navigation locks within Port Canaveral
virtually eliminate any significant oceanic influence on the Banana River.
Public navigation on the Banana River is prohibited north of NASA Parkway
East.
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3.2.3.2 Surface Water Quality
In compliance with the Clean Water Act, the state of Florida has
classified the surrounding surface waters, according to five classifications
based on their potential use and value.
All of the Mosquito Lagoon area within KSC boundaries and the
northern-most segment of the Indian River are designated as Class II waters
(Shellfish Propagation and Harvesting) (see Figure 3-9). Class II waters
establish stringent limitations on bacteriological and fluoride pollution.
The discharge of treated wastewater effluent is prohibited, and dredge and
fill projects are regulated to protect the area from significant damage. The
remainder of surface waters surrounding KSC are designated as Class III (Body
Contact Recreation and Fish and Wildlife Propagation) waters (Figure 3-9).
Banana Creek water quality (Class Ill) is influenced by non-point source
runoff from the Shuttle Landing Facility, the Vertical Assembly Building area,
Kennedy Parkway, and undeveloped areas of the Merritt Island National Wildlife
Reserve. Banana Creek has experienced fish kills in the summer when high
temperature and extensive cloud cover reduce the dissolved oxygen levels in
the shallow waters of the Creek.
There are about 21,422 acres of mosquito control impoundments in 75 cells
at KSC. These impoundments dominate the shoreline of KSC. Water levels are
managed by the USFWS for mosquito control purposes.
Limited water quality data and the applicable standards for the Indian
River, Banana Creek, the Banana River, and Mosquito Lagoon are provided in
Table 3-4. These data indicate that with the exception of the mosquito
control impoundments north of Pad 39-B, the State of Florida standards are not
exceeded.
The surface waters adjacent to the Merritt Island National Wildlife
Refuge have been designated as Outstanding Florida Waters (OFWs) (see Figure
3-10). The OFW designation supersedes other surface water classifications,
and water quality standards are based on ambient water quality conditions or
the designated surface water standard, whichever is higher. This level of
protection prohibits any activity that would reduce water quality below the
existing levels. The entire Mosquito Lagoon has been designated by the State
of Florida as an Aquatic Preserve (see Figure 3-11).
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TABLE 3-4. SURFACE WATER QUALITY AT KSC*
Dissolved Turbidity
Water Body Salinity (ppt) pH Oxygen Nitrogen Phosphorous (JTU)
Indian River 30.2 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.06 3.6_
(Titusville - north)
(FDER Class II)
Indian River 28.4 8.1 6.9 0.04 0.06 3.75
(Titusville - south
to NASA Parkway West)
(FDER Class Ill)
Indian River 27.8 8.1 7.2 0.06 0.05 5.0
(NASA Parkway West
south to Bennett
Causeway)
(FDER Class III)
Mosquito Lagoon 31.8 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.08 4.9
(at KSC)
(FDER Class II)
Banana Creek 11.4 8.2 9.8 0.003 0.38 7.5
(FDER Class Ill)
Mosquito Control
Impoundments 9.4 8.8 11.1 <0.02 0.31 14.8
(north of Launch
Complex 39)
Banana River 25.9 8.2 6.9 0.03 0.05 4.3
(NASA Causeway,
north to near Titan
IV Launch Complex 41)
(FDER Class lll)
FDER Class II chlorides 6.5-8.5 5.0 Mean (See 0.0001 29 NTU
Standards 10% above (I unit 4.0 Min. note A) (elemental) above
background variation) (See background
(marine) note C)
FDER Class Ill chlorides 6.5-8.5 (fresh) 5.0 Min. (See 0.0001 29 NTU
Standards 10_ above 6.5-8.5 (marine) (fresh) note B) (elemental) above
background (1 unit 4.0 Min. (marine) background
(marine) variation) (marine) (See note D)
*Art measurements are in mg/[ unless otherwise noted.
NOTES:
A. No alteration so as to cause imbalance in natural population.
B. No alteration so as to cause imbalance in natural population.
C. Total P - no alteration so as to cause imbalance in natural population.
D. Total P - no alteration so as to cause imbalance in natural population.
Source: NASA 1986.
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The Florida Department of Natural Resources (FDNR) in its capacity to
manage marine fisheries has established water classifications that regulate
the harvesting of shellfish. Shellfish may be harvested from lapproved" or
"conditionally approved" areas only, with "conditionally approved" areas
closed to harvesting for 72 hours after rainfalls which exceed predetermined
amounts. Prohibited and unclassified areas can not be harvested. Shellfish
harvesting classification of the waters surrounding KSC/CCAFS are illustrated
in Figure 3-12.
Launch Complex 41 at the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS) is
bordered by the Banana River Aquatic Preserve to the west and the Atlantic
Ocean to the east. The Banana River is classified by the State of Florida as
a Class Ill water for body contact recreation and the propagation and
maintenance of diverse fish and wildlife. Surface runoff from Launch Complex
41 flows toward the Banana River. Basic water quality data for the Banana
River can be found in Table 3-4.
3.2.3.3 Ground Waters
Three geohydrologic units underlie KSC and the CCAFS. In descending
order, these units are: a Surficial Aquifer, Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifers
(found in the confining layer underlying the Surficial Aquifer), and the
Floridan Aquifer.
_urficial Aquifer
The Surficial Aquifer (an unconfined hydrogeologic unit) is contiguous
with the land surface and is recharged by rainfall along the coastal ridges
and dunes, with little recharge occurring in the low swampy areas. The
recharge area at KSC/CCAFS for the Surficial Aquifer is shown in Figure 3-13.
In general, water in the Surficial Aquifer near the groundwater divide of
the island has potential gradients that tend to carry some of the water
vertically downward to the deepest part of the Surficial Aquifer and
potentially to the upper units of the Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifers (NASA
1986). East and west of this zone, water in the Surficial Aquifer has
vertical and horizontal flow components. Farther toward the coastline,
circulation becomes shallower until, at some point, flow is essentially
horizontal to the water table (Figure 3-14). Major discharge points for the
Surficial Aquifer are the estuary lagoons, shallow seepage occurring to
troughs and swales, and evapotranspiration. Inland fresh surface waters are
primarily derived from surficial groundwater.
Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifers and the Floridan Aquifer
Groundwaters under artesian and semi-confined conditions, the Floridan
and Secondary Aquifers, have upward flow potentials. Because of the thickness
and the relatively impermeable nature of the confining units, however, it is
thought that no significant inter-aquifer leakage is occurring from the
Floridan Aquifer naturally. The general horizontal direction of flow in the
Floridan Aquifer is northerly and northwesterly. The great elevation
differential between the Floridan Aquifer recharge areas (e.g., Polk and
Orange Counties) and discharge areas along the Atlantic Coast provides the
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potential for the flowing artesian pressure experienced at KSC. Recharge to
the Secondary Aquifers is dependent on leakage through the surrounding lower
permeability beds.
3.2.3.4 Quality of Groundwater
Water from the Floridan Aquifer at KSC and CCAFS is highly mineralized
(principally chlorides) and is not used as a potable water source.
Florida groundwater criteria have been established as four classes:
Class G-I through G-IV, with Class G-I being the most restrictive. The
majority of the State's groundwaters are classified as G-II (potable water
use), and for all practical purposes, there are no G-I or G-IV classifications
in Florida.
Overall, water in the surficial unconfined aquifer at CCAFS is of good
quality and meets State of Florida Class groundwater quality standards for
potable water use with the exception of chloride, iron, and total dissolved
solids. The elevated concentrations of these parameters are due to the
influence of adjacent saline surface waters. No potable water wells are
located at Launch Complex 41 or in its vicinity. At KSC, high chloride
concentrations occur on the north, east, and west fringes due to intrusion
from surrounding saline water bodies. Thus, water quality improves towards
the north-south axis of KSC because this is where prime areas of freshwater
recharge occur and where potentiometric (water table) heads have prevented
seawater intrusion.
Preliminary data for the Secondary Semi-Confined Aquifer show that some
of these aquifers may be marginal water sources; however, it appears that they
are not capable of sustaining large scale development.
3.2.3.5 Offshore Environment
The Atlantic Ocean offshore environment at KSC/CCAFS can be described
according to its bottom topography and characteristics of ocean circulation in
the area.
Out to depths of about 60 feet, sandy shoals dominate the underwater
topography. The bottom continues seaward at about the same slope out to about
34 miles where the bank slopes down to depths of 2,400 to 3,000 feet to the
Blake Plateau. The Blake Plateau extends out to about 230 miles from the
shore at KSC/CCAFS. Figure 3-15 shows the bathymetry of the offshore areas.
Offshore currents in general reflect the general northern flow of the
Gulf Stream, as illustrated by Figure 3-16 (NOAA ]980). Studies of water
movements in the area indicate a shoreward direction of the current for the
entire depth, surface to bottom, in the region out to depths of 60 feet (18
nautical miles) at speeds of several miles per day. Wind-driven currents
generally determine the current flow at the surface. In the region out to the
sloping bank, the flow is slightly to the north tending to move eastward when
the winds blow to the south. Water over the Blake Plateau flows to the north
most of the time and is known as the Florida current of the Gulf Stream (USAEC
1975).
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3.2.4 GeoloqY and Soils
KSC/CCAFS is located on a barrier island composed of relict beach ridges.
This island parallels the shoreline separating the Atlantic Ocean from the
Indian River, Indian River Lagoon, and Banana River. The area is underlain by
limestone formations a few thousand feet thick. The formations, from oldest
to youngest, respectively are: the Avon Park and the Ocala; overlying the
artesian Floridan Aquifer are the confining beds of the Hawthorn Formation;
the confining beds are overlain by Pleistocene and Recent Age unconsolidated
deposits.
Soils in the area of KSC/CCAFS have been mapped by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Soil Conservation Service (SCS). Five major soil associations
have been identified by the SCS. (The locations of the major soils
associations can be found in NASA 1986.) The soils in the immediate vicinity
of Launch Complex 39 at KSC consist of poorly drained, nearly level saline to
brackish soils. The principal soils association at Launch Complex 41 are
moderately to excessively drained, sandy soils on level or moderately sloping
topography.
3.2.5 Bioloqical Resources
3.2.5.1 Terrestrial Biota
Vegetation communities and related wildlife habitats are representative
of barrier island resources of the region (Figure 3-17). Major natural
communities include beach, coastal strand and dunes, coastal scrub, and
wetlands. Coastal hammocks and pine flatwoods found on KSC to the northwest
increase the ecological diversity and richness of the area. About 90 percent
of the total KSC land area (about 73,300 acres) is undeveloped, and falls into
these community types. About 77 percent (about ]2,000 acres) of CCAFS is
undisturbed or has reverted back to natural conditions.
Major Plant Commqnities and Related Habitat
The principal communities in the vicinity of Launch Complex 39 at KSC and
41 at CCAFS are beach, coastal strand and dune, coastal scrub, and wetlands.
Beaches of KSC and CCAFS are largely unvegetated, but provide significant
wildlife resources. The tidal zone supports a high number of marine
invertebrates, as well as small fish that are food for many shore birds.
Several species of gulls, terns, sandpipers, and other birds use beaches of
the Cape Canaveral area. In addition, research indicates that these beaches
are very important to nesting sea turtles (see Section 3.2.5.3).
Coastal strand and dune communities are marked by extremes in temperature
and prolonged periods of drought. Vegetation on the dunes are dominated by
sea oats. Other grasses, such as slender cordgrass and beach grass, also
occur. Shrubs such as beach berry and marsh elder, occur in the dune
community along with herbs, such as beach sunflower and camphorweed. The
strand occurs between the coastal scrub community and the salt spray zone of
the dune system. Growth characteristics of strand vegetation produces a low
profile that is maintained by nearly constant winds. Plants that can tolerate
strand conditions are saw palmetto, wax myrtle, tough buckthorn, cabbage palm,
partridge pea, prickly pear, and various grasses.
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Coastal scrub is the largest natural community at CCAFS, covering
approximately 9,400 acres at CCAFS and almost 20,000 acres at KSC. The
coastal scrub association is characterized by xeric tree species, including
scrub oak, live oak and sand live oak, and myrtle oak. The scrub community is
a harsh environment limited by low soil moisture conditions. Herbaceous and
shrub vegetation is sparse and includes wire grass, saw palmetto, tar flower,
lantana, wax myrtle, greenbriar, prickly pear, gopher apple, and others.
Wetlands within and surrounding the launch area are important wildlife
resources. About 78 percent of KSC, for example, is considered wetland
habitat. Wetland types that are found in the area include freshwater ponds
and canals, brackish impoundments, tidal lagoons, bays, rivers, vegetated
marshes, and mangrove swamps. These wetlands provide resources for a vast
assemblage of marine organisms, waterfowl, and terrestrial wildlife.
Pine flatwoods occur principally in the northwest and central portions of
KSC. Dominant tree species are pines, including slash pine, longleaf, and
sand pine.
Coastal hammocks are characterized by closed canopies provided by cabbage
palms, which is the dominant tree species. Additional tree species in
hammocks are red bay, live oak, and strangler fig.
Ruderal vegetation dominates sites disturbed by or created by past human
activity, such as construction and agriculture. Vegetation communities
include Brazilian pepper, Australian pine, wax myrtle and melaleuca. Citrus
groves, the only agricultural community currently occurring within KSC, occupy
about 2,500 acres of land, slightly over 3 percent of the total KSC land area.
The groves occur in the northern portion of KSC along Mosquito Lagoon and on
the Merritt Island portion of KSC south of Banana Creek.
Wildl ife
Nearly 60 species of reptiles and amphibians are known to inhabit the
area. Three of the resident species (the American alligator, the eastern
indigo snake, and the Atlantic salt marsh snake) are federally protected.
KSC and the surrounding coastal areas provide habitat for nearly 300 bird
species. Nearly 90 species are resident breeders while over 200 species
overwinter at KSC. The breeding, wintering, and migratory bird species and
their relative occurrence within 17 habitat types at KSC have been documented
and are found in NASA 1986.
The expansive areas of wetlands provide ideal feeding, roosting and
nesting habitat for nearly two dozen species of wading birds. Many of the
wetlands within the Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge are managed to
provide wintering habitat for approximately 200,000 waterfowl.
Colonial nesting birds occur within ]] rookeries at and near KSC/CCAFS,
with 4 rookeries located within 2 miles of Launch Complexes 39 and 41. Among
the species utilizing these locations are egrets, ibis, heron, cormorant, and
anhingua.
3-36
More than 20 species of mammals are known to inhabit the Merritt Island
land mass. Mammals include mice, voles, raccoons, opossum, rabbit, wild hog,
and aquatic mammals, such as the manatee and bottlenose dolphin.
3.2.5.2 Aquatic Biota
The coastline from Daytona south to Melbourne and extending seaward to a
depth of ]00 fathoms is one of the most productive marine fishery areas along
the southern Atlantic Coast. The inshore waters support an important sea
trout and redfish sport fishery. The lagoons and rivers support commercial
fishery operations for blue crab and black mullet.
Shellfishing is an important component of the commercial and recreational
fishing effort. Brevard County leads the State in the production of hard
clams (quahogs) and scallops. The commercial scallop fishery predominates off
shore; it is estimated that 30 to 40 million pounds of calico scallops were
harvested off Cape Canaveral in 1984. A number of renewable oyster leases are
held in the waters near KSC. The southern quahog is the most frequently taken
species with large numbers being gathered from the tidal mud flats by both
commercial and recreational fishermen. See Figure 3-12 for shellfish
harvesting areas around KSC/CCAFS.
The lagoon system surrounding KSC provides both recreational fin and
shrimp fishing. It is estimated that, in ]985, 90,300 recreational fishermen
utilized the fishery resources surrounding KSC. The fish fauna of the Indian
River lagoon system has received considerable attention. The fresh and
brackish waters associated with the KSC area are reported to support 141
species.
Benthic macroinvertebrates of the northern Indian and Banana Rivers can
be classified as estuarine-marine animals. A total of ]22 species of benthic
macroinvertebrates have been reported from brackish lagoons surrounding Launch
Complex 39A and the northern Banana River. Although shrimp species of
commercial importance were collected, the northern Indian River is not
considered an important nursery area for these species. Mosquito Lagoon,
however, is considered an important shrimp nursery area. Blue crabs also were
determined to spawn in the area.
3.2.5.3 Endangered and Threatened Species
The USFWS and Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (FGFWFC)
protect a number of wildlife species listed as endangered or threatened under
the Federal Endangered Species Act of ]973 (as amended), and under the Florida
Endangered and Threatened Species Act of ]977 (as amended), respectively. A
list of the protected species at KSC/CCAFS is found in Table 3-5. The Federal
list contains seven species as endangered and three species as threatened.
The State of Florida lists two additional species as threatened.
A review of CCAFS endangered or threatened species shows that only three
species (southeastern Kestrel, Florida scrub jay, eastern indigo snake)
potentially occur in the immediate vicinity of Launch Complex 41. An
additional three species (woodstork, bald eagle, peregrine falcon) may
occasionally occur in wetlands located to the east of the complex.
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TABLE 3-5. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RESIDING OR
SEASONALLY OCCURRING ON KSC/CCAFS AND ADJOINING WATERS
Species
Status
USFWS* FGFWFC**
Mammals
Caribbean manatees (Trichechus manatus) E E
Birds
Wood stork (Mycteria american) E
Bald eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus) E
Peregrin falcon (Falco peregrinus) T
Southeastern kestrel (Falco sparverius)
Red-cockaded woodpecker (Picoides borealis) E
Florida scrub jay (Ahpelocoma coerulesens)
Dusky seaside sparrow (Ammospiza maritima) E
E
T
E
T
T
T
E (last known
individual died
in captivity in
1987)
Atlantic green turtle (Chelonia mydas) E
Atlantic ridley turtle (Lepidochelys kempi) E
Atlantic loggerhead turtle (Caretta caretta) T
Eastern indigo snake (Drymarchon corals) T
E
E
T
T
Key
*U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
**Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
E - Endangered.
T - Threatened.
Source: USAF 1986
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Caribbean manatees, green turtles, ridley turtles, and loggerhead turtles
are known to occur in the Banana River, Mosquito Lagoon, and along Atlantic
Ocean beaches. Of the remaining two species, dusky seaside sparrow is now
thought to be extinct, and the red-cockaded woodpecker is not expected to
occur in the vicinity of Launch Complex 41 due to the absence of suitable
habitat.
Ten nesting locations that have been used by the bald eagle have been
located at KSC. A 1985 survey noted that 5 locations were active, with 10
adults producing 7 eaglets. Nesting typically occurs between October and mid-
May. Eagles are susceptible to disturbance during the mating and rearing
cycle from courtship through about the first 12 weeks of nesting.
With respect to the West Indian Manatee, the following areas at KSC/CCAFS
have been designated as Critical Habitat by the USFWS: the entire inland
section of water known as the Indian River, from its northernmost point
immediately south of the intersection of U.S. Highway I and SR-3; the entire
inland section of water known as the Banana River; and all waterways between
the Indian and Banana Rivers (exclusive of those existing manmade structures
or settlements that are not necessary to the normal needs of the survival of
the species).
Osprey, listed by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Flora and Fauna were thought to be actively utilizing a total
of 25 nesting sites near KSC. The closest site was a nesting area about 2
miles to the west of KSC Launch Complex 39 (about 3 miles approximately
northwest of CCAFS Launch Complex 41).
3.2.6 $ocioeconomics
3.2.6.1 Population
The demographics of the local area sites are based upon the workforce
employed at CCAFS and KSC and are influenced by the influx of people and their
distribution prior to and during launches. During a launch, approximately
6,000 employees may be onsite. The population may increase during launches of
special interest by more than 100,000 spectators, varying with the time of day
and year, and the weather. These individuals occupy nearby beach areas and
line the public roads in the area. Onsite population at launch time is
increased by about 17,300 visitors and press personnel (Harer 1988). These
additional people are distributed among various viewing areas as follows:
• 2,000 people at the #1VIP Site (Static Test Area)
9,000 people at the #2 VIP Site (east of the Banana River Causeway
drawbridge; total could increase to ]1,000-]3,000 people if #I VIP
Site cannot be used)
• 2,000 press members at the site west of the Banana River
drawbridge
• 4,000 people at the Indian River Causeway Site (east of the drawbridge
for ] mile)
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• 250 people at the O&C Building
• 50 people at the LCC Building
3.2.6.2 Economy
The economy of the surrounding area is influenced by the presence of both
CCAFS and KSC, but the area's dependence upon them has lessened in recent
years. NASA civilian employment in Brevard County accounted for about 11
percent of county employment in 1987, whereas in 1967 it accounted for about
25 percent of county employment (Brevard County 1988a). KSC contracts,
however, provide a substantial amount of income, totaling about $720 million
in 1987.
3.2.6.3 Transportation
The area is serviced by Federal, State, and local roads. Primary
highways include Interstate 95, US-I, State Route (SR)-AIA, and SR-520. Urban
areas on the beaches and Merritt Island are linked by causeways and bridges.
Road access to KSC is from SR-3 and the Cape Road from the south, NASA
Causeway (SR-405) and the Beach Road (SR-406) from the west, and Kennedy
Parkway from the north. There are about 211 miles of roadway at KSC; 163
miles paved and 48 miles unpaved. CCAFS is linked to the highway system by
the South Gate via SR-AIA, NASA Causeway, and Cape Road.
Rail transportation in the area is provided by Florida East Coast
Railway. A mainline traverses the cities of Titusville, Cocoa, and Melbourne.
Launch Complex 41 is serviced by a branch line from Titusville through KSC.
At KSC, approximately 40 miles of rail track provide heavy freight transport
to KSC.
Melbourne Regional Airport is the closest air transportation facility and
is located 30 miles south of CCAFS. CCAFS contains a skid strip used for
Government aircraft and delivery of launch vehicles. Any air freight
associated with operation of Launch Complex 41 uses the CCAFS skid strip.
Ferrying and support aircraft serving KSC utilize the Shuttle Landing
Facility.
Port Canaveral is the nearest navigable seaport and has a total of 1,578
feet of dockage available at existing wharf facilities.
3.2.6.4 Public and Emergency Services
A mutual agreement exists between the City of Cape Canaveral, KSC, and
the Range Contractor at CCAFS for reciprocal support in the event of an
emergency or disaster. Two fire stations located in the Vertical Assembly
Building (VAB) Area and the Industrial Area provide for effective coverage of
KSC.
Security operations include access control, personnel identification,
traffic control, law enforcement, investigations, classified material control,
and national resource protection. The Brevard and Volusia County Sheriff's
departments, the USFWS and the National Park Service supplement KSC security
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forces in patrolling non-secure areas of KSC (e.g., Cape Canaveral National
Seashore, Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge) (NASA 1986).
Medical services are provided at the facilities and by hospitals at
Patrick Air Force Base and in Cocoa, Titusville, and Melbourne. CCAFS is
equipped with a dispensary under contract to NASA. Medical services are
provided to KSC by an Occupational Health Facility and an Emergency Aid
Clinic.
No public school facilities are present on CCAFS or KSC. All school-age
children of the KSC and CCAFS workforce attend school in the vicinity in which
they live.
No recreational facilities are present on CCAFS, except for those
associated with the Trident Submarine Wharf, a service club, and a naval
recreation facility. Cultural facilities on station include the Air Force
Space Museum, tow facilities, and Mission Control, all located at the southern
portion of the base. Offbase military and civilian personnel utilize
recreational and cultural facilities available within the communities.
KSC has a 238 acre recreational area (Complex gg) located on the Banana
River near the southern limit of KSC property (NASA 1979). The Visitor's
Information Center at KSC, located about 6 miles east of U.S. Highway I,
provides exhibits, lectures and audio-visual displays, and bus tours on the
facility for visitors.
KSC and CCAFS obtain their potable water from the City of Cocoa water
system under a contract that provides for some g million gallons per day.
Approximately half that amount is normally used by the two facilities. The
on-site distribution systems are sized to accommodate the constant high volume
flow required by the launch deluge system. The city's well field in Orange
County has a capacity of 32 million gallons per day (USAF 1986).
KSC also enforces procedures, plans and personnel training with respect
to the use and handling of radioactive sources. Comprehensive radiological
contingency plans have been developed to address all launch phase accidents
that could potentially involve the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG)
aboard the Ulysses spacecraft. These plans conform to the requirements of the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan that involves the efforts of
numerous government agencies including NASA, DOE, the Department of Defense,
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the State of Florida.
3.2.6.5 Historic/Archaeologic Resources
A map showing the relative locations of State listed archaeologic sites
is provided in Figure 3-18.
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FIGURE 3-18. GENERAL LOCATIONS OF HISTORICAL/ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES IN
THE VICINITY OF KSC/CCAFS
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A systematic survey of areas in the Merritt Island National Wildlife
Refuge was conducted in 1978 (NASA 1986). No significant cultural resources
were found other than four historic sites: Sugar Mill Ruins, Fort Ann, the
Old Haulover Canal, and the Dummett homestead.
Two locations were assessed in 1981 (NASA 1986). One area covered 6
acres where Peacock Pocket Road marks the east boundary and SR-402 borders on
the north; the other area was located on the south edge of SR-402
approximately 2,300 feet west of Peacock Pocket Road. No significant
archaeological sites were found on either of the two locations. No
significant cultural resources were found as the result of other surveys,
which included a 1982 survey of the United Space Booster Facility tract on
Merritt Island and of the Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster Facility site.
An archaeological/historical survey of CCAFS was conducted in 1982 (USAF
1986). It was determined that Cape Canaveral had been inhabited for 4,000 to
5,000 years. The survey located 32 prehistoric and historic sites and several
uninvestigated historic localities. The initial results of the field survey
indicated that many of the archaeological resources had been severely damaged
by construction of roads, launch complexes, powerlines, drainage ditches, and
other excavation. None of these sites are located in the vicinity of Launch
Complex 41.
Recently, NASA developed a site along Banana Creek to allow VIPs to view
Shuttle launches. Because it was determined that this site contained state
listed archaeologic site BRI70, NASA funded an extensive archaeologic dig of
this site that was complete in 1988 in conjunction with the development of the
area.
3.3 GLOBAL COMMONS
This section provides a general overview of the global commons in terms
of overall population distribution and density, general climatological
characteristics, and surface type (i.e., ocean, rock, soil), and also provides
a brief discussion of the global atmospheric inventory of plutonium. The
information provided was extracted primarily from the "Overall Safety Manual"
prepared for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in 1975 (USAEC 1975). The
"Overall Safety Manual" utilized worldwide population statistics and other
information compiled into 720 cells of equal size. The cells were derived by
dividing the entire Earth from pole to pole into 20 latitude bands of equal
area. Each latitude band was then segmented into 36 equal size cells for a
total of 720 cells. Given that each of the cells covered an area of the Earth
equal to 273,528 square miles, it has been assumed for the purposes of this
discussion that while worldwide population, for example, has certainly changed
since the reference was prepared, the change is not significant relative to a
given 273,528 square mile cell.
3.3.] Population Distribution and Density
Figure 3-19 illustrates the distribution of the Earth's population across
each of the 20 equal area latitude bands. It should be noted that the
population scale is logarithmic. Figure 3-20 illustrates the land-adjusted
population densities within the latitude bands.
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FIGURE 3-19. TOTAL AND URBAN _IORLD POPULATION BY EQUAL AREA LATITUDE BANDS
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From these exhibits it can be seen that, with the exception of the four
more southern latitude bands, the total population among the bands varies by
about one order of magnitude. In addition, Figure 3-19 indicates that the
bulk of the population within most of the bands can be found in rural areas.
The greatest population densities (Figure 3-20) occur in a relatively narrow
grouping of the four northern bands between latitudes 17 and 44 degrees north
(bands 4 through 7).
3.3.2 _I imatoloqy
Worldwide climatic types, which range from the perpetual frost of the
polar climates to the dry desert climates, are illustrated in Figure 3-21.
3.3.3 Surface Types
The distribution of surface types, worldwide, is an important
characteristic in considering the potential consequences of accident scenarios
analyzed for the Ulysses mission. Table 3-6 provides a breakdown, by each of
the 20 equal area latitude bands noted previously, of the total land fraction
and the total ocean fraction broken down by two ocean depth categories -
surface depth, i.e., 75 meters (246 feet) average depth; and intermediate
depth, i.e., 500 meters (1,640 feet) average depth. The land fraction was
further subdivided by the fraction consisting of soil cover and rock cover.
For the most densely populated bands (bands 4 through 7), it can be seen that
the land fraction varies from about 34 percent (band 7) to about 46 percent
(band 4), and within those four bands the soil fraction is dominant (75
percent in band 4 to 92 percent in band 7). It can also be seen (by
subtracting the total land fraction from ].0) that the bulk of the Earth's
surface is covered by water.
3.3.4 Worldwide Plutonium Levels
Plutonium-238, the primary fuel of the Ulysses spacecraft RTG, already
exists in the environment as a result of atmospheric testing of nuclear
weapons and a 1964 launch accident. The following paragraphs describe the
worldwide, national, and regional levels of plutonium in the environment.
This information is relevant to analyzing the scope of postulated incremental
releases of plutonium into the environment that could result from a Ulysses
mission accident.
Over the period 1945 through ]974, above-ground nuclear weapons tests
produced about 440,000 curies of plutonium (EPA 1977, USAEC 1974). About 97
percent (about 430,000 curies) of this plutonium was Pu-239 and Pu-240 which
are essentially identical both chemically and with respect to their
radiological emission energies. The remainder (about 10,000 curies) consisted
primarily of Pu-238 (about 9,000 curies), as well as Pu-241 and Pu-242.
Consequently, above-ground nuclear testing represents the major source of the
worldwide distribution of plutonium in the environment.
Of the approximately 430,000 curies of Pu-239 produced, about 105,000
curies were deposited at and near the test sites (EPA 1977). The remaining
325,000 curies were injected into the stratosphere (about 6 to 15 miles above
the Earth's surface). The stratospheric inventory returned to Earth as
"fallout." About 25,000 curies were deposited in the northern hemisphere,
primarily in the mid-latitudes, with about 70,000 curies deposited over the
southern latitudes (EPA 1977). About 5,000 curies remained aloft as of 1974.
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TABLE 3-6. SURFACE TYPE DISTRIBUTIONS FOR EACH LATITUDE BAND
Latitude
Band
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
Total Land Ocean Surface Ocean Intermediate Land Soil
Fraction Depth Fraction Depth Fraction Frac..t!cn
0.4739 0.1648 0.1444 0.0"
0.5845 O. 1247 0.0704 0.0"
0.5665 0.0441 0.0452 0.749"
0.4580 0.0349 0. 0429 0. 749
0.4353 0.0357 0.0290 0. 847
0. 3980 0.0312 0. 0365 0. 912
0.3391 0. 0358 0. 0334 0.924
0.2545 0. 0214 0.0300 0. 942
0.2444 0.04 00 0. 0368 0.923
0.2211 0.0400 0. 0197 0.916
0.2500 0.0326 0. 0263 0. 956
0.2199 0.0387 0.0299 0.945
0.2169 0.0329 0.0200 0.915
0.2480 0.0128 0.0319 0.911
0.2231 0.0088 0.0155 0.908
0.1372 0.0185 0.0172 0.888
0.0465 0.0191 0.0256 0.704
0.0223 0.0172 0.0427 0.704"
0.0034 0.0036 0.0115 0.0"
0.5438 0.0077 0.0850 0.0"
Land Rock
Fra ction
1.00"
1.00"
0.251"
0.251
0.153
0.088
0.076
0.058
0.077
O. 084
0.044
0.055
0.085
0.089
0.092
0.112
0.296
0.296*
I .00"
I .00"
* Assumed Values Source: USAEC 1975
3-48
Approximately 16,000 curies of fallout settled on the continental United
States (USAEC 1974). Figure 3-22 illustrates the accumulation of Pu-23g
fallout in millicuries per square kilometer measured at various locations in
the United States. In general, drier areas of the United States had lower
accumulations than wet areas, indicating scavenging of Pu-239 from the
atmosphere by rainfall. Some dry western areas are apparent exceptions to
this indicating the possibility that there are regions where stratospheric
debris may preferentially enter the troposphere to be deposited on the Earth's
surface.
Table 3-7 indicates that the Pu-238 inventory from weapons tests (about
9,000 curies) was increased by a space nuclear source, specifically from the
1964 reentry and burn-up of a SNAP-9A Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generator.
This release of plutonium into the atmosphere was consistent with the RTG
design philosophy of the time. Subsequent RTGs, including those on the
Ulysses spacecraft, have been designed to contain the Pu-238 fuel to the
maximum extent possible recognizing that there are mass and configuration
requirements relative to the spacecraft and its mission which must be weighed
against the design and configuration of the power source and its related
safety requirements.
The addition of ]7,000 curies of Pu-238 from the SNAP-gA brought the
total global inventory of plutonium to about 457,000 curies. Since 1964,
essentially all of SNAP-9A release has been deposited on the Earth's surface
(USAEC 1974). About 25 percent (approximately 4,000 curies) of that release
was deposited in the northern latitudes, with the remaining 75 percent
settling in the southern hemisphere.
TABLE 3-7. MAJOR SOURCES AND APPROXIMATE AMOUNTS OF PLUTONIUM
DISTRIBUTED WORLDWIDE
Amount
Sources (Curies)
% Activity by Isotope
Pu-238 Pu-23g Pu-240
Atmospheric Testing 1945-74
• Deposited near testing sites
• Deposited world wide
Space Nuclear (Snap-gA, 1964)
Total
Total global excluding amounts
near to test sites
110,000
330,000
]7,000
457,000
347,000
3 58 38
3 58 39
100
Source: USAEC 1975
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4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
4.1 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSED ACTION
4.1.1 Imp!jcation_ of Completion.of Prelaunch Preparation of the Spacecraft
The activities associated with completing the preparations to the
spacecraft primarily involve the completion of post-test spacecraft mechanical
assembly, integration tests with the launch vehicle, and final launch
preparation. There are no environmental consequences associated with these
activities.
4.1.2 _nvironmental Consequences of Normal Launch of the Shuttle
The environmental consequences of normal operations and normal launches
were most recently addressed in the Final (Tier 2) Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for the Galileo mission (NASA 1989a), and are summarized in
Table 4-]. These consequences were also discussed in detail in previously
published National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) documents,
including Environmental Impact Statements (EISs) on the Space Shuttle Program
(NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (KSC) EIS (NASA 1979), the KSC
Environmental Resource Document (NASA 1986), the Tier ] EIS for the Galileo
and Ulysses missions (NASA 1988a).
4.].3 Nonradioloqical Consequences of Shuttle Launch Accidents
The nonradiological consequences of Shuttle accidents were addressed in
the Shuttle Program EIS (NASA 1978), the Tier ] Galileo and Ulysses missions
EIS (NASA 1988a), and the Tier 2 Galileo EIS (NASA Ig8ga). The anticipated
nonradiological consequences are summarized in Table 4-2. The Ulysses mission
uses the Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) third stage, but the presence
of the PAM-S would not be expected to alter the previous analysis to any
significant extent. Therefore, the nonradiological impacts of Shuttle launch
accidents for the Ulysses mission are expected to be the same as documented in
the Final (Tier 2) Galileo EIS.
As will be discussed below, accidents are possible which could result in
the Ulysses spacecraft reentering the atmosphere. In this case it is expected
that the spacecraft would break up and the hydrazine fuel from the spacecraft
would be dispersed in the atmosphere. The hydrazine would not reach the Earth
in concentrations sufficient to be of concern.
4.].4 Procedure for Analysis of Radioloqical Accidents and Consequences
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducts a detailed analysis of the
safety of the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) systems used on
space missions. DOE documents the analysis for each mission in a Final Safety
Analysis Report (FSAR). The elements of the analysis and the information flow
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TABLE 4-I. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF NORMAL LAUNCH
OF THE STS AND BALANCE OF A NORMAL ULYSSES MISSION
Environmental Components Impacts
NORMAL LAUNCH
Land Use
Air Quality
Sonic Boom
Hydrology and
Water Quality
Biological
Systems
Endangered and
Threatened
Species
Socioeconomic
Factors
Radiation Ex-
posure of
Occupational
Personnel and
Public from
Handling of RTG
BALANCEOF
NORMAL
MISSION
No significant adverse impacts on land uses not related to
the launch.
Exhaust emissions consist principally of chlorides and
particulates (aluminum oxide). Short-term degradation of
air quality within launch cloud and near-field environment
(about 1,600 feet from launch pad). No significant adverse
impacts outside the near-field environment. Short-term
localized decrease in stratospheric ozone density with no
permanent or long-lasting effects. Short-term decrease in
ion and electron concentration in localized area of upper
ionosphere. No significant effects on radio transmission.
No significant adverse impacts.
No significant adverse long-term impacts. Short-term
increase in the acidity of nearby water impoundments.
Short-term vegetation damage contributes to long-term
decrease in species richness in near-field over time with
Shuttle operations. Fish kills in nearby mosquito control
impoundments expected with each Shuttle launch. No
significant adverse effects outside the near-field.
No significant adverse effects.
No significant adverse effects. Short-term economic
beneficial effects from tourism.
No health effects to workers and public. Radiation from
RTG is very short ranged. All movement and handling
operations under strict control and supervision.
No significant adverse effects. Some soluble products from
residual solid rocket booster (SRB) fuel introduced into
ocean environment. Impacts short-term and localized. Sonic
boom during reentry from orbit and landing of STS.
Source: NASA ]989a
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TABLE 4-2. NONRADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF UNPLANNED EVENTS
Event Nonradiological Consequences
On-Pad Propellant Spills
On-Pad Fire/Explosion
Ascent Accident
External Tank Jettison
Jettison of Solid Rocket
Booster
Orbiter Landing Accident
No significant impact. Spills collected in
sumps and catch basins for proper disposal.
Fire -- Ground-level concentrations of SRB
propellant combustion products would be reduced
by heat and cloud rise from main engine exhaust.
Explosion -- Significant blast effects could be
experienced if sudden rupture of external tank
occurred. Worst-case prediction indicates glass
breakage at 4,000 meters from pad.
If vehicle departs radically from nominal flight
path, Range Safety Office has capability to
terminate flight (vehicle destruct) to prevent
impact on land area.
Tank jettisoned into ocean with early mission
abort. No toxic materials in external tank
(only hydrogen and oxygen). Only effect is from
physical impact of tank. Aircraft and ships
receive prior advisory on launch corridor.
Propellant combustion products same as for
normal launch. Products disbursed into air or
ocean water; unburned propellants would slowly
disburse into ocean with localized toxic effects
on biota.
Consequences similar to large airplane crash
except less fire due to small fuel inventory on-
board STS.
Ocean crash would release STS fuel (mono-methyl
hydrazine) into the water. Some fish may
succumb in localized area near STS, but no
large-scale or permanent effects on ocean
environment.
Small quantities of hydrocarbon on-board STS
would float to the surface with no significant
impact.
4-3
are summarized in Figure 4-I. For the Ulysses mission, work on the FSAR has
been underway since mid 1989, but is not yet complete. Therefore, DOE has
prepared a Safety Status Report (DOE IggOa, DOE Iggob, DOE 1990c) to provide
the basic safety data used in this Draft (Tier 2) EIS. The analytical steps
and the information flow used in preparing the interim report were precisely
the same as those for the FSAR; however, certain data from the final input are
not available for use by this DEIS. Research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) of RTGs has been an ongoing activity within DOE for over 3
decades and continues at the present time.
As indicated in Figure 4-], the safety analysis begins with NASA's
identification of accident scenarios and environments which may affect the RTG
along with the probability of their occurrence. DOE then calculates the
response of the RTG to the environments making use of the extensive DOE data
base on RTG materials and their performance under a wide range of conditions.
If an accident environment leads to a release of plutonium dioxide (Pu02),
that release is called a "source term." The amount of release, particle size
distribution, and the location of the release are tabulated along with the
conditional probability of the release. An analysis is then conducted to
determine the health and environmental consequences of the release.
Additional information on the safety analysis process is contained in
Appendices B and C.
4.1.4.1 Accident Scenarios, Environments, and Probabilities
An extensive review of the potential failure modes in each of the major
elements of the Shuttle system identified accidents which could result in
accident environments posing a potential threat to the RTG. The accidents of
concern were then arrayed by mission phase in which they could occur. (See
Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the mission phases.) The probability
of each of these accident scenarios occurring was then estimated by NASA
(1988c) and provided to DOE for use in the development of the FSAR presently
underway. Additional details regarding this process and the accident
environments can be found in Appendix B. Of particular importance, however,
is the elimination of certain accident scenarios and environments as
contributors to fuel releases on the basis of further test and analysis.
These were principally:
The RTG case and General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) failure criteria
for a solid rocket booster (SRB) fragment impact were revised to
reflect results from the Large Fragment Test series (Cull 1989).
• The amount of propellant that can mix with air in a vapor cloud
explosion following an in-flight failure of the external tank (ET) was
reduced based upon the findings of the NASA/DOE/Interagency Nuclear
Safety Review Panel (INSRP) Explosion Working Group's evaluation of
the Challenger and Titan 34-D accidents (NASA et al. 1989). This had
the effect of eliminating vapor cloud explosions as a threat to the
RTG.
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The threshold for damage to the RTG from payload bay wall impact was
found to be overly conservative by a factor of 5 for removal of the
RTG case, and a factor of about 1.5 for removal of the case plus GPHS
aeroshell and the graphite impact shell. This had the effect of
eliminating Phase 0 fuel spill explosion and subsequent payload bay
implosion as a threat to the RTG.
4.].4.2 Accident Source Terms and Consequences
Not all SRB accidents will lead to a release. For instance, in an SRB
case failure scenario, the most probable result is that the SRB fragments will
miss the RTG. To analyze possible accidents in detail, an extensive Monte
Carlo based computer program was developed. This program is called the Launch
Accident Scenario Evaluation Program (LASEP). The program allows for the
generation of SRB fragments (by random failure or range destruct action) and
tracks the trajectory of each fragment. If the fragment strikes the RTG, the
program utilizes a model to calculate fueled clad distortion. Then, based on
test data and analysis, the distortion is used to calculate the amount and
particle size characteristics of any release.
After the first stage ascent phase, the accident scenarios of interest
are those which result in reentry of the RTG. Extensive testing and
operational experience indicate that RTG modules will survive suborbital and
earth orbital reentry heating conditions without release of plutonium. The
only situation in which release can occur is when a module survives reentry
but lands on a very hard surface (rock or steel). So the analysis of the
scenario is conducted on a probabilistic basis.
For the first stage ascent phase, the results of the source term analysis
using LASEP were then used as input to the consequence analysis. This began
with aggregation of the source terms according to atmospheric dispersion
pathway (i.e., fireball, ground release, or at-altitude). Atmospheric
dispersion models then estimated the transport and deposition of released
material. The average source term for each phase or subphase was then run for
all 40 meteorological data sets of interest and a median (50th percentile)
consequence was identified. For Phases 2, 3, and 4, a modified dispersion
calculation was performed to estimate consequences for these phases (see
Appendix C).
4.1.4.3 Risk Assessment
The aim of the analysis is to characterize the distribution of possible
accidents and their consequences. The consequence analyses for early first
stage ascent phases use meteorological data sets compiled from the Cape
Canaveral local area climatology. Health and environmental effects were based
on detailed land use and demographic statistics projected for 1990.
After about 45 seconds mission elapsed time, the vehicle is sufficiently
high in the atmosphere that about 9g percent of any potential release would be
deposited in the ocean. The remainder consists of small particles (less than
10 microns in size) which would be subject to long-term residence time and
transport in the upper atmosphere before settling to Earth. For these
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analyses, a globally averaged population distribution was used for land areas
under the ground track of the mission (i.e., between 28 North and South
latitude).
The results of the analyses are summarized in Table 4-3, which lists the
source terms, and Table 4-4, which lists phase value for the consequences.
Table 4-3 presents the source terms utilized in the Risk Analyses for the
Ulysses mission (DOE 1990c). Table 4-4 provides the estimated radiological
consequences associated with those source terms. For the first stage ascent
phase, the phase value is the probability weighted consequence summed over the
five time intervals. For later phases, the consequences are taken to be
uniform over the whole phase. Note that in Appendix C, the first stage ascent
phase is divided into five subphases based on the accident probabilities of
the SRBs and the characteristics of the mission profile. The aim is to
provide greater resolution in the analysis. In addition, the first stage
ascent phase results are summarized in terms of an expectation (probability
weighted) source term and probability weighted consequences.
In Table 4-4, columns 3 and 4 list Maximum Individual Dose and Collective
Dose in units of millirem (mrem) and person-rem, respectively. The largest
value of Maximum Individual Dose results from an accident in either of the
last two mission phases (on-orbit, payload deploy), in which an RTG module
impacts hard rock at the Earth's surface. This leads to a localized release
and Maximum Individual Dose of 36.2 millirem. These calculations use a 50-
year dose commitment, as explained in Appendix C. While this dose is a 50-
year dose, by assuming it is delivered in only ] year, a conservative
comparison can be made with the values listed in Table 4-5 for radiation
exposures routinely encountered. Column 5 lists the amount of the Collective
Dose that is above _e minimis. As the released material is dispersed, it
generally becomes more dilute but a larger population is exposed. The
Collective Dose counts each person exposed and the dose level of their
exposure; the units are person-rem. A linear multiplier of 3.5xi0 "4 cancer
fatalities per person-rem is used to estimate the number of health effects
(column 6). Health effects are defined as the number of additional cancer
mortalities that would be expected in the exposed population, over and above
the number that would normally occur.
Health effects are calculated on the basis of the collective or
population dose multiplied by a health effects factor (number of cancer
fatalities per rem of exposure). The health effects factor utilized by DOE in
the Safety Status Report was developed as follows.
Since plutonium-238 is an alpha emitter, the guidance provided by BIER IV
(Nat. Res. Coun. 1988) was considered appropriate in deriving a health effects
estimator for use in the Ulysses risk analysis. It should be noted that the
recently released BEIR V Report (Nat. Res. Coun. 1990) deals primarily with
the effects of gamma radiation, not the alpha radiation that is emitted by the
plutonium dioxide RTG fuel. BEIR V incorporates, without change, the
recommendations of BIER IV with respect to alpha radiation. In deriving such
a factor, consideration was given to the method of calculating internal doses
based on ICRP-30 (ICRP 1978), which uses organ weighing factors based on low-
LET radiation. When this is done In conjunction with the central estimates
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TABLE4-3. ACCIDENTSOURCETERMCALCULATIONSFOR
VARIOUSSCENARIOSOFTHEULYSSESMISSION
Phase
Averaqe Source Term (Ci)
Altitude
Release Ground- of Release
Probability Fireball Level At-Altitude (ft)
First
1.77xi0 "7 132 2.05 254Stage ,
Ascent" (I in 6 million)
48,478
Second
Stage 2.31XI0 "6 0 0.834 0
Ascent (I in 433 thousand)
On Orbit 6.16x]0 "6 0 0.477 0
(i in 162 thousand)
Payload
Deploy 2.40x10 "4 0 0.477 0
(I in 4,200)
0
0
NOTES
I For the ascent phase, listed values are probability weighted means,
over the five time intervals. (See Appendix C.)
EXAMPLE
Phase Vatue for Firebatt Release =
(8.16 x 10 .8 x 288) + (1.9_ X 10"8 x O) + (0,482 X 10"8 x O) + (0.793 X 10"8 x O) + (6.38 x 10.8
(8.16 x 10.8 ) + (1.92 x 10 .8 ) + (0.482 x 10 .8 ) + (0.793 x 10.8 ) ÷ (6.38 x 10 .8 )
- 132 C|
summed
x O)
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TABLE 4-5. AVERAGE ANNUAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT OF IONIZING
RADIATIONS TO A MEMBER OF THE U.S. POPULATION
Source
Dose Equivalent a
mrem
Effective Dose Equivalent
mrem % of Total
Natural.
Radon ° 2,400 200 55
Cosmic 27 27 8.0
Terrestrial 28 28 8.0
Internal 39 39 1]
Subtotal--Natural -- 300 82
Man-Made
Medical
X-ray diagnosis 39 39 11
Nuclear medicine 14 14 4.0
Consumer Products 10 10 3.0
Other
Occupational 0.9 <I <0.3
Nuclear fuel cycle <1.0 <I <0.03
Fallout <1.0 <I <0.03
Miscellaneous c <I.0 <1
Subtotal--Man-Made -- 63 18
Total Natural and
Man-Made -- 360 100
Source: adapted from Nat. Res. Coun. 1990
a To soft tissues.
b Dose equivalent to bronchi from radon daughter products. The assumed
weighting factor for the effective dose equivalent relative to whole-body
exposure is 0.08.
c Department of Energy facilities, smelters, transportation, etc.
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for health effects due to internally deposited alpha emitters based on BEIR
IV, an appropriate health effects estimator can be derived as described in the
Safety Status Report (DOE IggOc). The result of this calculation, specific
for plutonium dioxide and reflecting all particle sizes and ingestion
pathways, can range from 3.2 x I0"" to 3.5 x 10.4 excess cancer fatalities per
person-rem. For the purposes of calculating health effects for the base
cases, a value of 3.5 x IO* has been used. No health effects are anticipated
from any of the accidents analyzed.
Columns 7, 8, and g in Table 4-4 list the areas of deposition in which
the dose levels at the second year after an accident release would be greater
than I00, 25, and IO mrem, respectively. For the purposes of this analysis,
if the annual dose rate exceeds 100 mrem/yr, cleanup is indicated to ensure
that administrative controls on land use (to limit individual risk) are not
required for extended periods of time (DOE IggOc). The level of 25 mrem/yr is
indicative of an intermediate level and reflects DOE experience in its
Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Plan (FUSRAP) activities. No areas
exceeded IO mrem/yr; however, some limited areas on site at KSC would exceed
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) screening level indicating that
monitoring would be required to determine the actual concentrations, as noted
in Column IO.
Column IO of Table 4-4 lists the land areas estimated to initially
receive deposition at or above an EPA suggested screening level of 0.2 _Ci/m 2
at or above which monitoring is recommended (EPA 1977). This is a deposition
level below which monitoring should not be necessary. (See Section 4.2.1 and
Appendix C for more detail.)
The ocean area where initial deposition could exceed 0.2 _Ci/m 2 is
provided only as an indication of potential impact.
It should be noted that in case of a real accident, mitigation activities
would be based on thorough monitoring and evaluation at that time. This
analysis was only intended to be indicative of the situation that might
pertain.
In order to compare the risks associated with this mission to risks
encountered elsewhere, one may calculate an average individual risk. That is,
the risk of a particular consequence divided by the affected population. For
the purposes of this discussion, risk is defined as the product of the total
probability of release and the consequence of that release. For instance, for
Phase 4, the total probability of release is 2.4 x 10.4. That release could
lead to 0.0002 conditional incremental cancer mortalities. The risk of
fatality from a Phase 4 release is 4.8 x 10"B health effects. In the absence
of the de minimi) assumption, the collective dose affects a population of
5,000 people. So the average individual risk of fatality in the affected
population is 4.8 x 10.8 divided by 5,000, or approximately I in 100 billion.
This risk value is well below the risks encountered in everyday life as
tabulated in Table 4-6.
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TABLE 4-6. CALCULATED INDIVIDUAL RISK OF FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSES a
Accident Type
Number of
Fatalities
for 1987
Approximate
Individual Risk
Per Year c
Motor Vehicle
Falls
Drowning
Fires and Flames
Poison
Water Transport
Air Travel
Manufacturing d
Railway
Electrocution
Lightning
Tornadoes b
Hurricanes b
Suicide
Homicide and Legal Intervention
(Executions)
Guns, Firearms, and Explosives
Suffocation
All Accidents
Diseases
48,290
11,733
4,360
4,710
5,315
949
1,263
1,200
624
760
99
I]4b
46b
30,796
21,103
1,656
3,688
95,020
1,993,381
2 in 10 thousand
5 in 100 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
4 in 1 million
5 in ] million
5 in I million
5 in 2 million
6 in 2 million
4 in 10 million
5 in 10 million
2 in 10 million
12 in 100 thousand
9 in 100 thousand
7 in I million
3 in 200 thousand
4 in 10 thousand
8 in I thousand
ALL CAUSES 2,123,323 g in I thousand
a USDHHS 1989.
b 1946 to 1984 average.
c Fatalities/Total Population. (USBC 1988).
d Source USBC 1986.
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Appendix C summarizesthe DOESafety Status Report for the Ulysses
mission and describes the work of the DOEto characterize the distribution of
consequences in a mathematically rigorous way. That work is treated in a
section entitled Integrated Risk Assessmentbut is not yet complete and so has
not been incorporated in this DEIS. That work will be completed in the Final
Safety Analysis Report and will be included in the Final Environmental Impact
Statement.
4.2 ENVIRONMENTALASSESSMENTMETHODOLOGIES
Accidental releases can occur in the KennedySpace Center vicinity only
during the ascent phase and at unspecified areas worldwide during later launch
phases. Section 3 presented a description of the environments that could be
affected by radioactive deposition. Twodifferent impact assessment
methodologies were developed to analyze these releases. One is for the
KennedySpace Center vicinity during the early first stage ascent phase. The
other is global for later phases. Included within the KennedySpace Center
assessment methodology is a discussion of the relationship of PuO2 particle
size distribution to the potential areas of radioactive deposition. The
methodology for estimating potential economic costs resulting from the
accidents is also provided.
4.2.1 Kennedy Space Center and Vicinity
The method used to assess impacts from accidents in the early first stage
ascent phase (up to about 45 seconds after launch) involves 3 main steps. The
first step is the identification of areas where there could be deposition
above a specified level (0.2 _Ci/m 2) by mission phase (Table 4-4). For the
purposes of this EIS, the level chosen is based on EPA guidance (EPA 1977) for
contamination of soil by unspecified transuranic elements, including PuO2, and
is expressed in mi_rocuries per square meter (_Ci/m(). This EPA screening
level is 0.2 _Ci/m _. EPA suggests that areas contaminated above the 0.2
_Ci/m 2 level should be evaluated for possible mitigation actions. The
recommended screening level was selected on the basis of limiting the
additional annual individual risk of a radiation induced cancer death to less
than one chance in one million. Given that humans are generally considered
the species most sensitive to radiation effects, contamination below the
screening level is conservatively judged to have minimal impacts on other
plant and animal species. Thus, for EIS purposes, areas that do not exceed
the 0.2 _Ci/m 2 screening level are considered to have negligible potential for
significant environmental impact and are not analyzed.
The data presented in Table 4-4 identify the calculated areas initially
contaminated above 0.2 _Ci/m 2 for two categories: inland areas and ocean. The
screening level applies only to land contamination. The ocean area
contaminated is provided only as an indication of potential impact. The
inland category includes: all non-wetland inland land cover classes, such as
upland forest, urban, and agricultural areas; all wetland types, such as
coastal marshes and mangrove, freshwater marshes and swamps; and all estuarine
(brackish) and fresh open water. The ocean category is any marine waters.
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The second step is to adjust the inland area category to reflect the
amount of dry land uses that occur within this category. The third step is to
partition the dry land category into the three major types of environmental
resources that could be impacted, specifically urban, natural habitat, and
agriculture. To estimate environmental resources within the dry land category
that could be affected by deposition, the dry land areas were assumedto be
similar to the percentage of urban, agriculture, and natural vegetation land
cover types in Brevard County. This allows the impact assessment to be
refined because, for example, potential impacts to natural habitats within the
dry land category are likely to be quite different from potential impacts to
urban and agricultural areas also within the dry land category.
The percentages for Brevard County are used as an approximation of the
relative amounts of these land cover types in any area contaminated by an
early ascent phase release. A data base obtained from the East Central
Florida Regional Planning Council (ECFRPC1988a) was used to determine the
percentage of urban area and natural vegetation. Data on the percentage of
agricultural lands were obtained from another study (DOE1983), which included
identification and tabulation of land uses within 32 kilometers of Launch
Complex3g at KennedySpace Center and overlaid on the East Central Florida
Regional Planning Council data base to determine the relative percentages of
the three cover types. The results of this analysis showthat dry land areas
are composedof approximately 74 percent natural vegetation, 21 percent urban
areas, and 5 percent agricultural land. These percentages, represented as
decimal numbers, are then multiplied with the dry land total reflected in
Table 4-4, to estimate the area of these cover types affected for each early
ascent phase accident case.
The last step in environmental assessmentmethodology is the
identification of the nature and magnitude of the impacts in the areas
affected. A brief discussion of how PuO2.movesthrough the ecosystem and how
it could affect plant and animal species is presented in Section 4.3.
Potential exposure effects are determined through a survey of PuO2 research
literature. In addition to effects caused by exposure to PuO2 in-the
environment, decontamination and mitigation activities employed to reduce PuO2
exposure could also affect natural habitats and humanland uses. Potential
decontamination and mitigation methods are also presented in 4.3, along with
an analysis of the impacts resulting from mitigation activities.
Because PuO2 deposition is partially dependent upon the distribution of
PuO2 particles released during an accident, two fundamental assumptions were
made. The first is that particles of released PuO_will be distributed such
that the majority of large particles are deposited-closer to the accident/
impact site, with the size of particles decreasing with distance. The second
assumption is that the highest concentrations of released curies are closer to
the release point, and that concentrations will tend to decrease with
distance.
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4.2.2 Global Assessment
Beyond 45 seconds of the first stage ascent, about 9g percent of any
potential release would be deposited in the ocean. The remainder consists of
small particles (less than 10 microns in size) which would be subject to long-
term residence time and transport in the upper atmosphere before settling to
Earth.
In the latter stages of Phase I and for Phases 2, 3, and 4, release may
occur due to reentry, RTG breakup, and ground impact of he_t source modules.
The environmental impacts are estimated based upon global average population
data and general environmental conditions. The relative percentages of
natural vegetation, urban areas, and agricultural land cover types elsewhere
in the world are unlikely to match the percentage for the KSC vicinity.
Therefore, no distinctions are made within the dry land class presented in
Table 4-4 for these later phases.
4.2.3 Economic Impact
Due to the uncertainty in defining the exact magnitude of economic costs
associated with the radiological impacts, a range of mitigation costs were
estimated in order to bound the costs which could result from ascent phase
accidents. The minimum economic impact is based on the estimated cost of a
radiological monitoring program. This estimate represents the costs of
equipment and personnel needed to develop and implement a comprehensive
long-term monitoring program. The maximum economic impact is defined as
comprehensive mitigation actions undertaken on all areas contaminated above a
25 mrem/yr dose level (see Appendix C for details). However, since the
accident consequence results do not exceed this level, these costs were not
generated (see Table 4-4). The economic costs following a potential accident
could be reasonably expected to fall within this range. Only economic impacts
associated with the effects of radioactive deposition are estimated in this
analysis.
The post-accident monitoring program builds on the initial monitoring
effort in place at the time of the launch. Before launch, monitoring teams
and equipment from DOE, EPA, NASA, and the State of Florida will be in place
and commence monitoring. In the event of an accident, these teams would
continue monitoring for at least 30 days, after which EPA assumes
responsibility for long-term monitoring. A large percentage of the costs
associated with this program occur in the first year or two when a program
plan must be developed, equipment must be purchased, and personnel must be
hired and trained. After the program has been initiated and a shakedown
period has been completed, costs decrease to a maintenance level necessary to
run the program in the succeeding years. The minimum cost estimates are
presented in Table 4-7.
A number of factors can affect the cost of radiological decontamination
and mitigation activities, including:
• Location The location can affect the ease of access to the
deposition (e.g., a steep hillslope could be more expensive to cleanup
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TABLE 4-7. MONITORING PROGRAM COST ESTIMATES
Period Activity Cost
Year one
Year two
Year three
Year four and
each succeeding
year
Transition from launch monitoring
activity, plan development,
supplemental equipment purchases,
hiring of personnel.
Testing and shakedown of program
methods and monitoring network,
monitoring of mitigation actions.
Transition to long-term monitoring
of impacts and mitigation actions.
Program maintenance.
$I,000,000
$ 500,000
$ 250,000
$ I00,000
Source: NASA 1989a
than a level field), as can access to the site location and necessary
decontamination resources, such as heavy equipment, water, clean soil,
etc.
Land Cover Type The characteristics of some kinds of land covers
make them more difficult and therefore more expensive to decontaminate
(e.g., plowing and restoration of a natural vegetation area could be
more costly than using the same technique in an agricultural area).
Initial Contamination Level - Higher levels of initial contamination
can require more sophisticated and more costly decontamination
techniques to meet a particular cleanup standard than a lower level of
initial contamination.
Decontamination Method More sophisticated decontamination methods,
such as wetland restoration, are much more expensive than simple
actions, such as water rinses.
Disposal of Contaminated Materials - Disposal of contaminated
vegetation and soils onsite could be much more cost effective than
transportation and disposal of these same materials to a distant
repository.
• Cleanup standard.
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In setting the level at which specific mitigation efforts will be taken,
the characteristics of the material deposited must be taken into account.
Plutonium dioxide has extremely low solubility in water and has a low
bioaccumulation rate within the food chain; its alpha emissions are short
range, and the primary concern is inhalation of respirable fines.
In the event of an accident, the ground monitoring program will be based
upon:
e Measurement of ground concentrations to characterize the nature and
extent of contamination
• Airborne measurements of the amount and characteristics of the release
• Atmospheric model estimates of the amount and location of material
deposited, using recent climatological data.
The accident consequences results predict that cleanup would not be
indicated (see Table 4-4). The need for cleanup, however, would be based upon
actual conditions, as characterized by the monitoring program initiated
following an accident. While the actual cost of cleanup associated with a
potential Phase 1 accident can not be predicted with great precision because
the number of factors involved (see above), an approximation can be developed
from data provided in an EPA report (EPA 1977). That report indicated that in
1977, cleanup costs could range from approximately $250,000 to $2,500,000 per
square kilometer ($1,000 to $10,000 per acre) if removal and disposal of
contamination is not required. Removal and disposal of contaminated soil at a
near-surface facility could cost from approximately $36,000,000 to $47,500,000
per square kilometer ($145,000 to $190,000 per acre). In terms of 1990
dollars, these costs should be approximately doubled. (It is estimated that
cleanup without removal and disposal would range from $500,000 to $5,000,000;
and with disposal could range from $72,000,000 to $95,000,000.)
In addition, there are significant secondary costs associated with the
decontamination and mitigation activities, such as:
• Temporary or longer term relocation of residents
• Temporary or longer term loss of employment
• Destruction or quarantine of agricultural products, including citrus
crops
• Restriction or bans on commercial fishing
• Land use restrictions (which could effect real estate values and
tourism activity)
• Public health effects and medical care.
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To gain an appreciation for the potential magnitude of these secondary
effects, results from a nuclear reactor risk assessment model were used. A
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) document (NRC 1975) presents results
from a probabilistic risk assessment and an economic cost distribution for
accidents at commercial nuclear power plants. Although the kinds of
radioactive contamination resulting from a potential nuclear reactor accident
are quite different than the contamination resulting from an RTG accident, the
decontamination and mitigation activities would be very similar. Therefore,
the NRC findings are considered applicable in this study. The cost
distribution study found that decontamination costs account for approximately
20 percent of the total economic cost of an accident. In other words, the
total cost of a radioactive contamination accident could be as much as five
times the direct decontamination costs. This multiplier of 5, however,
applies only to those types of areas that would incur secondary costs, namely
the urban and agricultural land cover types described in Section 4.2.1.
As a benchmark for purposes of this EIS only, cleanup to a level of 25
mrem/yr is utilized. In other words, the land area contaminated by accidents
at a level of greater than a dose of 25 mrem/yr would be subject to cleanup to
the 25 mrem/yr level. The 25 mrem/yr level was selected as a reasonable level
on the basis of adoption of this level by Federal agencies for the protection
of radiation workers and the public from releases associated with the land
disposal of radioactive wastes (10 CFR 61.4]); from radionuclide emissions
from DOE facilities (40 CFR 61.92); and as associated with the management and
disposal of spent nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and transuranic waste (40
CFR 191.15). In addition, the 25 mrem/yr level is one-fourth of the 100
mrem/yr continuous exposure level recommended by the National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP 1987) as an "acceptable risk" for
latent cancer mortality risk to individual members of the public over their
lifetime. Actual cleanup levels will depend upon a number of factors, such as
the location and use of the specific area contaminated, potential threat to
the public, evaluation of the specific exposure pathways, and the specific
particle size distribution of the contamination. The potential range of
cleanup techniques that could be utilized are listed in Table 4-8.
Not withstanding this estimate, actual mitigation activities and cleanup
levels will be based upon a separate specific environmental analysis.
Cleanup costs beyond that required for the monitoring program, as
described above, are not presented in the EIS, because review of Table 4-4
indicates that for the Base Cases over all mission phases, no dry land areas
are contaminated at levels where an individual could receive a dose of 25
mrem. In fact, the dispersion modeling did not result in any land areas
contaminated at doses exceeding 10 mrem/yr at the second year following an
accident.
4-]8
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4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS RELEASING RTG FUEL
This section presents the environmental consequences of an accident in
which plutonium dioxide is released to the environment. A brief discussion of
how PuO_ behaves in the environment precedes the impact anal is. The
descrip¢ion of the affected environment is found in Section _
Results are presented for exposure impacts and mitigation impacts.
Exposure impacts ire those that result from the deposition of PuO_ on various
environmental medla and subsequent movement of PuO_ in the enviroBment. They
include impacts to natural environments, water resources, man-used resources,
and agricultural resources. Mitigation impacts are those impacts caused by
decontamination and mitigation activities undertaken to reduce radioactive
contamination levels in the environment.
It should be emphasized that the following discussions are provided for
illustrative purposes and are not intended to reflect a definitive statement
regarding specific areas that would be contaminated in the event of an
accident involving a release of plutonium dioxide fuel. In the unlikely event
such an accident occurred, the amount of contamination and the specific
affected areas would be determined and appropriate actions taken. This would
include evaluation of alternatives in accordance with the National Contingency
Plan and development of appropriate cleanup levels for contaminated sites.
4.3.1 plutonium DiQxide in the Environment
The extent and magnitude of potential environmental impacts caused by
PuO 2 releases resulting from STS/IUS/PAM-S accidents are dependent on the
mobllity and availability of PuO2 in the environment. The mobility and
availability of PuO_ in turn, is directly controlled by a number of physical
and chemical parameCers, including: particle size, potential for suspension
and resuspension, solubility, and oxidation state of any dissolved PuO_. It
is these factors, in conjunction with the three potential exposure patfiways
(i.e., surface contact, ingestion, and inhalation), that determine the impacts
on marine, aquatic, and terrestrial ecosystems.
The size of PuO_ particles is an important factor in assessing impacts to
environmental resources resulting from an accidental release. Particle size
can affect the rate of dissolution of PuO_ in water and the initial suspension
and subsequent resuspension of particles _n air and water. The dissolution
and the suspension/resuspension potential ultimately control the mobility and
availability of PuOp to plant and animal species, including man. Generally
speaking, larger particles have less potential for suspension and
resuspension; as particle size decreases, particles are more easily kept in
suspension.
Particle sizes have been predicted for the first stage ascent phase
accident in which accident released plutonium dioxide can be incorporated into
the resulting fireball. Plutonium dioxide particle size is inversely related
to deposition range. For a fireball accident representative of SRB case
failure accidents in the period 0 to 10 seconds of the first stage ascent
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phase, approximately 92.8 percent of the released curies will be deposited as
particles greater than 44 microns, and the greatest number of these particles
will fall in an area from 0 to 10 km from the accident. Approximately 2.5
percent of the released curies will be deposited as particles in the range of
30 to 44 microns, and the greatest number of these particles will fall in an
area from 10 to 20 ks from the accident. Approximately 3.4 percent of the
released curies will be deposited as 10 to 30 micron particles, and the
majority will fall within the range of 20 to 50 km from the accident. The
smallest particles, those less than ]0 microns, account for approximately 1.3
percent of released curies, and the majority will travel greater than 50 km.
The greater the distance over which a release will be transported, the more
dilute will be the ground level deposition. These finer particles could also
be more easily resuspended by subsequent wind action and human disturbance.
In marine and aquatic systems, larger particles will quickly settle to
the bottom sediments, while smaller, silt-size particles may remain in
suspension within the water column indefinitely. Smaller particles may not
even break the water surface due to surface tension, instead forming a thin
layer on the water surface and subsequently being transported to the shoreline
(Bartram & Wilkinson 1983). Resuspension of smaller particles from the bottom
can occur due to physical disturbance of the sediments by wave action,
recreational use of the water bodies (e.g., swimming, boating, and fishing),
as well as by the feeding activity of various marine and aquatic species.
Plutonium dioxide particles, as a component of the bottom sediments, may also
be transported toward and along the shoreline by wave action and currents in
near-shore environments.
A number of factors can affect the solubility of PuO. in water.
Physiochemical parameters most important to the solubility of plutonium
dioxide are the reactive surface area and oxidation state of PuO 2 and the
water chemistry including pH, reduction/oxidation potential, and temperature.
Mass to surface area ratios of particles affect reactivity and solubility,
with solubility being inversely related to particle size. The dissolution
rate of the plutonium dioxide fuel in the RTG is very small, ranging from 1.2
to go nCi/m'/sec in sea water and fresh water, respectively, based upon the
dissolution rate per unit surface area of the fuel.
It is also important to note that dissolved plutonium concentrations in
water can increase under the following conditions (Bartram & Wilkinson 1983):
• Increasing pH
• Increasing dissolved organic carbon concentrations
• Increasing oxidizing conditions
• Increasing carbonate concentrations
• Increasing nitrate concentrations
• Increasing sulfate concentrations.
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Plutonium dioxide also tends to dissolve more readily in fresh water and
at cooler temperatures. Once in solution, this plutonium dioxide can coexist
in multiple oxidation states that can affect its availability to organisms.
Plutonium dioxide entering into a water/sediment system would be
preferentially taken out of solution and bound in saturated sediments in
amounts 10 to 100,000 times greater than the amounts that would remain in the
associated water column. The solid/solute distribution coefficient (Kd) for
plutonium has been estimated at 10' to 10° (Looney et al. 1987, Bartram &
Wilkinson 1983). The Kd for plutonium also varies based on the oxidation
state of the element. Dnder the oxidizing conditions similar to those
encountered in most surface water bodies, Pus÷ would tend to be the dominant
species of plutonium, and the Kd would be approximately 103. Under the
reducing conditions encountered-in most bottom sediments and ground-water
bodies, Pu4+ would tend to be dominant, and the Kd would be approximately 106
(Bartram & Wilkinson 1983).
Plutonium dioxide may be carried into the soil by a number of routes,
including percolation of rainfall and subsequent leaching of particles into
the soil, animal burrowing activity, and plowing or other disturbance of the
soil by man. Migration of the PuO; particles into the soil column is of
concern, primarily because of the potential for PuO; to reach ground-water
aquifers used as drinking water supplies. The opportunity would most likely
occur where surface contamination is deposited on primary aquifer recharge
zones. Once deposited on soil, plutonium dioxide appears to be extremely
stable. Soil profile studies have shown that generally more than 95 percent
of the plutonium dioxide from fallout remained in the top 5 cm of surface soil
after 10 to 20 years of residence time in undisturbed areas (DOE 1987).
Direct contamination of an aquifer where it reaches the surface is remote
but possible. It would be expected that clays, organics, and other anionic
constituents would bind most of the PuO.. The binding of PuO_would occur in
the first few meters of sediment, therefore greatly reducing _he concentration
of this constituent with depth. This natural filtering of PuO z would probably
reduce concentrations to levels that would be below the Primary Drinking Water
Standard of 4 mrem for exposure due to drinking water.
It is also possible that surface water run-off containing PuO_ could
directly contaminate drinking water supplies from surface water boaies since
this type of contamination is greatest due to suspended PuO_ and not from
dissolved PuO2. Filtering of the surface water before chemTcal treatment
would reduce lhe concentration of total plutonium to very low exposure levels.
The availability of PuO_ to biota in marine, aquatic, and terrestrial
environments depends on the _oute of PuO_ exposure to the biota and the
physical and chemical interaction of PuO_ with the water and soil of the
affected area. These interactions determine whether PuO_ is available for
root uptake by plants and for ingestion and/or inhalatioB by marine, aquatic,
and terrestrial fauna. The route of PuO 2 exposure differs between the two
basic categories of biota-flora and fauna. Flora, in marine, aquatic, and
terrestrial environments, can be exposed to PuO2 contamination via surface
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contamination, root uptake, and leaf absorption. Fauna can be exposed via
skin contact, ingestion, and inhalation of PuO2 particles.
Surface contamination and skin contact does not pose a significant danger
to the biota. The alpha radiation emitted by plutonium has very little
penetration power (Hobbs and McClellan 1980). Therefore, little penetration
can occur through the skin of fauna. In addition, several studies on root
uptake and leaf absorption of PuO 2 indicate that very little, if any, PuO2 is
absorbed by plants when PuO_ is iS an insoluble form (Bartram & Wilkinson
1983, Cataldo et al. 1976, Schultz et al. 1976).
The significance of ingesting PuO_ can vary between terrestrial, and
marine and aquatic fauna. Studies of _nimals indicate that the digestive
tract tends to discriminate against transuranic elements (Bartram and
Wilkinson 1983, Cataldo et al. 1976, Schultz et al. 1976). However, ingestion
may be significant for small fauna in terms of total exposure, especially for
those that burrow, ingesting soil along with food material. If the soil is
contaminated, ingestion of PuO_ could result. Although the transfer factor
from the intestinal tract to the blood and other organs is small, total
activity passing through the tract could be large relative to total body size.
Summary
The impact of ingesting PuO_ by marine and aquatic fauna can be
significant depending on PuO_ availability. For example, studies have found
that bioaccumulation of PuO2-does occur in benthic organisms that ingest
sediments contaminated with-PuO_ (Thompson et al. 1980). However, most of
these studies also indicate that the bioaccumulation of PuO 2 is not critical
to the upper trophic levels, including man.
Inhalation is considered to be the most critical exposure route for
terrestrial fauna (Wicker 1980). However, inhalation impact depends on
several factors, including the frequency of resuspension of PuO_, the
concentration and size of resuspended particles, and the amount(actually
inhaled (Schmel 1980, Pinder et al. undated). Smaller particles have a
greater chance than larger particles for being resuspended and inhaled.
Although many of the particles may be subsequently exhaled, the smallest
particles have the greatest likelihood of being retained deep in the lung
(Hobbs and McClellan 1980, Thompson and Wachholz 1980). However, resuspended
material available for inhalation is on the order of ]x]O TM (one-millionth) of
the ground deposition, thus high levels of ground concentration would be
required to constitute a risk to animals through this route. Given the
deposition levels estimated in the safety analysis (DOE 19gOc), this risk is
not likely to be significant.
No definitive research has been conducted that defines the specific
effects of PuO_ on plant and animal species, particularly at the relatively
low contamination levels resulting from potential STS/IUS/PAM-S accidents.
Generally speaking, however, radiation can cause three main types of physical
effects on organisms: 1) somatic injury, that is damage to the normal
morphology and functioning of the exposed organism; 2) carcinogenic injury,
4-23
that is an increase in the incidence of cancers; and 3) genetic injury,
affecting reproductive cells and causing deleterious genetic changes in an
organism's offspring. Any of these three physical effects could cause
increased mortality to exposed organisms. Overall ecosystem structure is not
expected to change, and therefore no significant ecological consequences are
anticipated. At the low levels of deposition determined in the safety
analysis (DOE lggOa, DOE lg9Ob, DOE lggOc), the effects are not likely to be
significant.
4.3.Z A$@essment of Imoacts to Kennedy Space Center and Vicinity
4.3.2.1 Surface Areas Contaminated by Representative Accidents
In the unlikely event that an accident severe enough to cause a release
of RTG fuel occurs, the land and ocean areas potentially contaminated by the
release are noted in Table 4-4.
Accidents occurring within the first 45 seconds of the first stage ascent
phase would result primarily in deposition on the controlled land areas of
KSC. Beyond 45 seconds into the first stage ascent phase, the Shuttle has
gained enough altitude and down range distance from KSC that about 99 percent
of an accident release would result in ocean deposition, with the remaining I
percent (small particles less than I0 microns in size) subject to long-term
residence time and transport in the upper atmosphere before settling to Earth.
4.3.2.2 Exposure Effects
Deposition of PuO2 from ascent phase accident releases will have little
direct effect on land Eover. The material will not physically alter land
cover unless a particle provides enough heat to start a fire. Although PuO2
can affect the human use of these land covers, there is no initial impact on
soil chemistry, and most of the PuO_ contamination deposited on the water
bodies is not expected to react chemically with the water column. No
significant consequences to flora and fauna are expected from surface
contamination and skin contact with the PuO., except where particle
concentration and/or size is great enough tO overheat the contaminated
surface.
Plutonium dioxide deposition would not have any direct effects on
historical or archaeological resources. It will not physically alter nor
chemically degrade historical or archaeological resources.
4.3.2.3 Long-Term and Mitigation Effects
Natural Veqetation and Wetlands
Plutonium dioxide deposited on the soil will interact with inorganic and
organic ligands to form primarily insoluble compounds. It is expected that
over 95 percent of the plutonium dioxide will remain in the top 5 cm (2 in) of
surface soil for at least I0 to 20 years. No mitigation is necessary because
of long-term impacts to soil. Mitigation required for other reasons may
result in significant soil impacts.
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As discussed in Section 4.3.1, surface contamination and skin contact do
not pose significant dangers to biota. No significant consequences to flora
are expected from root uptake and leaf absorption. Ingestion by terrestrial
fauna is negligible except for small fauna due to ingestion of contaminated
soil. This could result in a large total activity passing through the general
intestine track. Inhalation due to resuspended material is small [I x 10.6
percent (one-millionth of one percent) of ground deposition]. No significant
impacts to biota would be expected in any of the areas receiving surface
contamination. Areas of highest concentration are the result of deposition of
larger particles or chunks, which are noninhalable.
The particulate PuO 2 on the surface of the water bodies is not likely to
be readily available for consumption by pelagic aquatic fauna. The amount of
PuO 2 to be suspended or dissplved in the water column is predicted to be
slightly higher than I x 10"_ (i.e., .00001) times the concentration of PuO_
deposited in the bottom sediment (i.e., the amount dissolved or suspended fn
the water column is 100,000 times less than the amount in the sediment).
Thus, for example, even if a wetland area were contaminated by 2.0 _Ci/m 2 of
PuO 2, only about 2XI0 "_ _Ci/m _ of PuO_would be dissolved or suspended in the
water column. This sma!l amount of _uO 2 available in the water column is not
considered to have signlficant impacts to the aquatic fauna that may ingest
the dissolved or suspended PuO.. In addition, studies have indicated that
higher trophlc level organisms, such as fish, that are likely to live within
the water column have a low accumulation factor (DOE 1987, DOE 1990c).
Overall, the major potential impacts to the natural vegetation and
wetland biotic resources of the KSC and vicinity resulting from early first
stage ascent phase releases accidents include bioaccumulation of PuO2 by
benthic organisms and bioaccumulation of PuO2 by the aquatic vegetation.
Because of the potential for bioaccumulation-to occur in aquatic vegetation
and benthic organisms, there is a potential for the PuO_ to travel up both the
terrestrial and aquatic food chains. However, bioaccum_lation of plutonium
decreases with higher trophic levels, thus impacts to the biological diversity
are not expected to occur. Redistribution of PuO> is a possible occurrence,
especially when contaminated terrestrial fauna, iEcluding birds, move from one
place to another. However, it is unlikely that they will create any
additional impacts that have not already been described. Recycling of PuO 2
will predominantly occur with vegetation and fauna having short-life spans.
The bacteria that decomposes the organic matter may accumulate Pu02." However,
most of the PuO2 should return to the sediments. In the aquatic envlronment
this may promote the continuance of bioaccumulation of PuO2 by the benthic
organisms and aquatic vegetation.
Mitigation of the impacts to flora and fauna in natural vegetation and
wetland areas could be accomplished through a combination of monitoring and
remedial action based on monitoring. The amount of PuO2 resuspended in the
air in natural areas determines if PuO_ concentrations may pose inhalation
health hazards to man. If levels are Betermined to pose inhalation health
hazards, then access to the area could be restricted until monitoring
indicates that PuO>concentrations wiii no longer pose a potential health
hazard. The impacts of wetland migration activities (see Table 4-8) could
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range from temporary disturbance of wetland soils and vegetation associated
with low range decontamination/mitigation methods, to complete removal of
vegetation and sediments/soils from localized areas of contamination followed
by longer-term recovery of the affected areas with habitat restoration.
Aqricqltural Land
Citrus groves on the Kennedy Space Center are likely to be contaminated
with PuO. at or above 0.2 _Ci/m ( from an early first stage ascent phase
accldent resulting in a release. A study on citrus groves contaminated with
PuO. indicated that the plutonium dioxide on the fruit surfaces was not
readily washable with water. The PuO. could enter the human food chain
through transfer to internal tissues _uring peeling or in reconstituted
juices, flavorings, or other products made from orange skins. Approximately I
percent of the PuO2 deposited on the orange groves would be retained on fruit
harvested in the year following deposition. Almost all would be from fruit
surface contamination. In contrast with the fruit, plutonium was readily
washed away from leaf surfaces (Pinder et al. undated). Thus, if the leaf
surfaces were washed, recontamination of the fruit should not occur.
Resuspension of plutonium from the soil via splash up was also studied. Very
little, if any, reached the fruit or leaf surfaces. This was thought to occur
because splash up generally does not reach a height greater than ] m (3 ft)
above the ground. Most orange tree leaves are over I m (3 ft) above the
ground.
Mitigation of contaminated citrus fruit could include collection and
disposal of the contaminated fruit according to Federal and State regulations.
To prevent future contamination of citrus crops and protect the safety of
workers the trees could be washed down to remove PuO_ from the leaves, and
' . _ .
the soil around the trees could be covered wlth new soll to reduce
resuspension. Future citrus crops could be monitored for PuO 2 contamination
before sold on the market.
Other crops grown in areas off the Kennedy Space Center site may be
contaminated by surface deposition. These crops would be examined and washed
to ensure no contamination. Those crops that can not be decontaminated may be
destroyed. The land on which the crops have been grown would be monitored and
scraping implemented if the monitoring shows significant PuO 2 concentrations.
Urban Areas
The areas of land cover used by man (e.g., buildings, roads, ornamental
vegetation, and grass areas) contaminated above the 0.2 _Ci/m 2 level would be
monitored to determine if decontamination or mitigation actions might be
necessary. Given the results of the accident consequences analyses of the
base case (Table 4-4), which show no dry land areas contaminated at 25 mrem/yr
(or even 10 mrem/yr), it is likely that monitoring would indicate no cleanup
is necessary. If mitigation actions were necessary, temporary relocation of
the population from their homes and workplaces may be required. Cleanup
actions could last from several days to several months. Rainfall could wash
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paved surfaces and exteriors of buildings and move PuO 2 into the surface soil
and surface waters.
There are several archaeological sites on the Kennedy Space Center site
and vicinity that may receive deposition by first stage ascent phase
accidents. In addition, Kennedy Space Center facilities that have historical
significance and are not damaged in the blast, could also have PuO_ deposited
on them. Presently, unknown archaeological sites could be within tBe area of
deposition. While the present analyses indicate that cleanup actions would
not be necessary (Table 4-8), should monitoring indicate otherwise, these
sites could be affected.
The deposition also has a long-term effect on future investigations at
any archaeological site. Archaeological digs, by their very nature, disturb
the soil surface with digging and sifting operations, which could expose
workers and others to the PuO2. Radiologicai safety measures would need to be
taken to prevent potential health effects to the workers and could greatly
increase the cost of investigating these sites. If investigation of
archaeological sites that have PuO_ deposited on them is proposed, a safety
analysis would be completed and approval given to proceed from appropriate
Federal and/or state authorities.
|qland WBt_r and Ocean
The waters surrounding Merritt Island are classified by the State of
Florida as Class II and Class Ill waters, with radionuclide contamination
threshold limits of 15 pCi/l. Most of the PuO2deposition is not expected to
be dissolved in the water column; therefore, this threshold level is not
expected to be exceeded.
Some of the waters surrounding Merritt Island are considered Outstanding
Florida Waters. These waters are designated to receive protection which
supercedes any other water classifications and standards, and as such
prohibits any activity which reduces water quality parameters below existing
ambient water quality conditions. An ascent phase accident leading to a
release could deposit sufficient amounts of PuOz to result in violation of
this protection standard.
Although shellfish harvesting is prohibited or unapproved in some waters
surrounding Merritt Island, deposition above 0.2 _Ci/m z could impact an area
of conditionally approved shellfish harvesting. Again, the screening level is
used here only as an indicator. The EPA suggested screening level applies
only to land areas.
Mitigation of PuO2 impacts to inland water bodies may include any of the
following.
• All ditches and borrow pits with shallow depths and in close proximity
to human activity receiving surface concentrations of 0.2 _Ci/m _ or
greater may need to be monitored. If the monitoring results provide
evidence of contamination, the ditches and borrow pits may need to be
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drained and any contaminated sediment removed and disposed of within
Federal and State requirements. Larger areas of ponded water in close
proximity to human activity can also be monitored. Mitigation could
include skimming to remove the surficial film of PuO.. Monitoring
after skimming will determine the need for water and_or sediment
removal. Measures should be employed to reduce surficial runoff and
sediment from entering water bodies used by man.
Recreational water activities (e.g., swimming, boating), as well as
sport and commercial fishing, may need to be restricted in larger
water bodies until monitoring results indicate that it is safe for
them to be resumed.
Monitoring the amount of PuO_ suspended and/or dissolved in the water
columns of impacted water bodies _ill determine if PuO_ has been deposited in
the sediments. Benthic organisms, such as clams, scallops, and crabs, should
be monitored for bioaccumulation of PuO_. If bioaccumulation of PuO. in
benthic organisms is significant, then it should be determined if consumption
of such organisms would pose a human health hazard. If it is determined that
consumption of such organisms will pose a human health hazard, harvesting of
such organisms should be banned until concentration levels within the
organisms no longer pose a threat.
If it is determined that PuO2 concentrations are significant in either
the water or sediment of impacted water bodies, then PuO_ bioaccumulation in
aquatic vegetation should be monitored. If bioaccumulatlon of PuO_in aquatic
vegetation is found to be significant, then organisms that feed oft of these
aquatic plants should also be monitored for PuO. bioaccumulation and the
levels of bioaccumulation determined that could<pose a human health threat if
such organisms are consumed.
Surface contamination levels may also impact the recharge areas of the
surficial aquifer. The surficial aquifer serves as the potable water source
for the cities of Titusville, Mims, and Palm Bay. In addition, many wells on
private land in the area use the surficial aquifer as a source of water.
Plutonium dioxide may have the potential to contaminate this aquifer, but
since PuO. is essentially insoluble, it is unlikely for any contamination to
reach the_wellheads of municipal water supplies. It is also highly unlikely
that any contamination on the Kennedy Space Center will reach offsite wells,
including municipal water supply wells. Transport through the underlying
aquatard to the lower Floridan aquifer is considered very unlikely.
Mitigation could include assessment of the amount of contamination in the
different soil horizons in aquifer recharge areas to determine if the
plutonium dioxide is migrating to the water table. If the potential for
migration of PuO_ to the aquifer is high, these areas could be scraped to
below the contamlnation depth and the spoil disposed of properly. Private
wells in the area of contamination could be monitored and alternative water
supplies would need to be developed if contamination occurs.
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4.3.2.4 Assessment of Global Impacts
This section presents the environmental consequences of the last three
mission phases. The contamination from a release during any of these later
phases will result from accidents in which GPHS modules or fueled clads impact
a hard surface. Each of the GPHS modules or fueled clads involved in the
accident release would release PuO2 at a different location separated by a few
kilometers to hundreds or thousands of kilometers. Each release point is
independent of the other.
The radiological consequence analysis indicated that deposition from an
accident in any of the last three mission phases did not exceed the cleanup
level of 25 mrem/yr (or even 10 mrem/yr) as noted in Table 4-4.
Should an accident occur during the mission, resulting in deposition
outside the United States, the Federal government will respond with the
technical assistance and support needed to clean up and remediate affected
areas, and to recover the plutonium fuel.
In summary, due to its low solubility in water and its limited uptake in
the food chain, in the unlikely event of an accident, the plutonium dioxide
RTG fuel released is expected to have very limited health or environmental
effects through these pathways, given the accident and risk analyses provided
in the Safety Status Report (DOE IggOa, DOE 19gOb, DOE 19gOc).
4.3.3 Emerqency Response PIBnninq
For NASA missions involving space nuclear power, comprehensive
radiological contingency plans are developed to address all launch/landing
phase accidents involving an RTG. These plans are developed through the
combined efforts of various government agencies, including NASA, DOE, the
Department of Defense, the EPA, and the State of Florida, and are formulated
to conform to the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These plans
are being updated for the Ulysses mission. Development and implementation of
these plans will ensure the availability of appropriate response personnel,
equipment, facilities, and procedures in the event of a launch accident.
The primary objectives during the early phases of an accident are to
determine whether a release of radioactive materials has occurred, to assess
and characterize the extent of the release, to predict the propagation of the
released materials, and to formulate/recommend mitigating actions to safeguard
humans and the environment from the consequences of the release. Another
objective is to locate and recover the RTG. These objectives will be achieved
through the evaluation and analysis of real-time data provided by mobile field
monitoring teams and ground air-sampling stations, airborne monitoring and
surveillance aircraft, ground and airborne meteorological stations, and
computerized dispersion modeling.
Follow-on objectives would be to isolate contaminated areas, recover the
fuel materials, and decontaminate and/or recover affected areas, facilities,
equipment, and properties.
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4.4 INCOMPLETE OR UNAVAILABLE INFORMATION
This Draft EIS (Tier 2) uses as its primary data source, the safety
analysis being conducted by DOE for the Ulysses mission. That safety analysis
is in preparation, and therefore, DOE has not published its FSAR for the
Ulysses mission. The analyses of the last three mission phases are complete.
There is continuing analysis of the fragment environment in Phase 1,
first stage ascent phase. Most of the possible impact situations have been
analyzed and are reflected in the first stage ascent phase data in Tables 4-3
and 4-4. Based upon available information, it is anticipated that the risks
associated with the Ulysses mission are well below any of the common risk
values encountered in everyday life (see Table 4-6).
4.5 NO-ACTION ALTERNATIVE
There are no environmental impacts associated with the no-action
alternative; however, there are major economic, programmatic, and geopolitical
consequences of such a cancellation. Cancellation of the mission would
violate the agreement between NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA).
Through FY ]990 (i.e., through September 30, 1989), NASA will have expended
approximately $150 million on the Ulysses program. Cancellation would mean
the abandonment of that investment and a loss of the anticipated scientific
gains identified in Section 1.2.
Currently, the United States has a clear lead in the exploration of the
solar system. Programmatically, there are currently no backup missions that
could achieve Ulysses' scientific goals within this century. Thus, the United
States would forego detailed scientific knowledge from the Ulysses mission.
4.6 SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
The proposed action is the completion of preparations and operation of
the Ulysses mission, including its launch on the STS/IUS PAM-S in October 1990
or November ]ggI as the backup contingency opportunity. The alternative to
the proposed action is no-action; that is, to terminate further commitment of
resources to the mission. The only expected environmental consequences are
associated with a normal launch. These impacts have been treated elsewhere in
NASA National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation. Even in the
statistically rare event of an accident leading to a release of plutonium, the
estimated consequences are quite limited, and the risks are small.
4.7 ADVERSE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS THAT CANNOT BE AVOIDED
During the normal launch, hydrogen chloride will be produced by the SRBs.
This will likely produce short-term acidification of the mosquito control
ponds near the launch pad and deposition on nearby vegetation. The airborne
concentrations of aluminum oxide particulates within the launch cloud will
exceed air quality standards (see Table 3-3) for a short period, but will be
below levels of exposure considered hazardous by the National Academy of
Sciences. No significant deterioration in ambient air quality has been
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recorded at the two environmental air quality monitoring stations located 3
and 5 miles from Launch Complex 39, however. The deposition could result in
some vegetation damage near the launch pad and possible fish kills in onsite
ponds near the launch pad. Launch of the Ulysses mission will contribute to
long-term changes in species richness in the near-field environment that will
be experienced with the resumption of STS launches at Launch Complex 3g.
In the event of an accident near KSC, it is possible that some areas
could be contaminated by plutonium di@xide. The probability of this occurring
is predicted to be less than 1.77x10"" (I in 6 million). If such an accident
did occur, decontamination of land, vegetation, and buildings could be
required, and costs would be incurred.
4.8 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USES OF MAN'S ENVIRONMENT AND THE
MAINTENANCE AND ENHANCEMENT OF LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY
4.8.1 Short-Term Uses
The affected environment, for the short term, includes the KSC and
surrounding areas. The short-term uses of the area include NASA operations, a
fish and wildlife refuge, citrus groves, residential communities, and
recreational areas. The proposed action will be conducted in accordance with
past and ongoing NASA procedures for operations at the launch site.
4.8.2 Lonq-Term Productivity
The KSC region will continue to support citrus groves and wildlife
habitat, as well as human activities. The proposed action should have no
long-term effect on such uses. Successful completion of the project, however,
may have an impact on the future of the space program and the continued
economic stability of Merritt Island and the surrounding areas. Both the
human and biotic ecosystems are expected to maintain their harmonious
productivity.
A potentially large benefit to be gained from successful completion of
this project is a better understanding of Earth through exploration and study
of the environments of other planets.
4.9 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES
4.g.] Iridium
A total of 109.5 troy ounces of iridium are contained in the Ulysses RTG.
This amount represents less than 0.000] percent of the discovered reserves of
this metal in the world. Based on a cost of $315 per troy ounce, the December
1989 market price of iridium (DOI 1989), approximately $34,46] worth of
iridium would be irreversibly committed to the Ulysses mission.
Essentially all platinum-group metals, including iridium, are recycled in
domestic use, resulting in a small percentage loss. Consequently, the total
supply available does not appreciably decrease with time, as is the case with
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less precious materials that are not aggressively recycled. The United States
maintains a strategic stockpile of iridium and, in 1988, had an inventory of
approximately 29,500 troy ounces (DOD ]989). Although the amount of iridium
lost in the successful implementation of the missions would represent about
0.46 percent of the current U.S. stockpile, this amount could easily be
replaced from the world supply through current sources.
4.9.2 P1utontum-238
The RTG contains approximately 23.7 pounds of plutonium dioxide.
Therefore, successful implementation of the Ulysses mission therefore would
result in the loss of this much plutonium-238.
4.9.3 Other Materials
The total quantities of other materials in the payloads that would be
irreversibly and irretrievably committed to the Ulysses mission are relatively
minor. These materials consist primarily of steel, aluminum, titanium, iron,
molybdenum, plastic, glass, nickel, chromium, lead, zinc, and copper, as well
as small quantities of silver, mercury, gold, and platinum.
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5. CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EIS
This Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared by Code EL of the
Office of Space Science and Applications of the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA). The organizations and individuals listed below
contributed inputs for use by NASA Code EL in the preparation of this
document. Table 5-1 summarizes, for each contributor, the sections of the EIS
for which inputs were prepared.
PREPARER
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Dudley McConnell, Ph.D. Deputy Director for Advanced Program
Studies, Code EL
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John Klein, Ph.D.
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Manager, Ulysses Mission Design, Operations
and Engineering
Member, Technical Staff
Supervisor of Power Systems Engineering
and Control Group
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Joyce Jatko NASA Acting NEPA Coordinator, Code NXF
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
M. Joseph Cork
Lawrence Reinhart, Ph.D.
Manager of Engineering Operations, Flight
Projects Office
Member, Technical Staff
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NUS Corporation
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Richard Englehart, Ph.D.
Senior Executive Consultant
Senior Executive Consultant
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6. AGENCIES AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED
This Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) will be made available
for review and comment by Federal, state, and local agencies and the public,
as applicable, for a 45-day comment period. All information received will be
considered during the preparation of the Final EIS.
In scoping this EIS, NASA has actively solicited comments from a wide
group of interested parties. NASA views this process as an opportunity to get
inputs from groups of individuals having differing viewpoints concerning the
launch of the Ulysses spacecraft and to incorporate any subjects that may have
been inadvertently missed during NASA's internal planning for the EIS. In
addition to the publication in the Federal Register (54FR 48168) of a Notice
of Intent (NOI), as required under the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), NASA mailed copies of the NOI to agencies and organizations which may
have interest in environmental impacts and alternatives associated with the
Ulysses mission. Comments will be solicited from the following:
Federal Agencies:
Council on Environmental Quality
Federal Emergency Management Agency
National Academy of Sciences
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management and Budget
U.S. Department of the Air Force
U.S. Department of Commerce
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services-Centers for Disease Control
U.S. Department of the Interior
U.S. Department of State
U.S. Department of Transportation
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
State Agencies:
Florida Department of Environmental Regulation
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
Intergovernmental Coordination--Office of the Governor of California
State of Florida, Office of the Governor
State of New Mexico
State of California
Local Agencies:
Brevard County: Board of Commissioners
Economic Development Council
Planning and Zoning Department
Canaveral Port Authority
Cape Canaveral, City of
Cocoa, City of
Titusville, City of
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Organizations:
Air Pollution Control Association
Brevardians for Peace and Justice
Center for Law and Social Policy
Christic Institute
Citizens for Peace in Space
Citizens to Stop Plutonium in Space
Common Cause
Concern, Inc.
Environmental Policy Institute
Federation of American Scientists
Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice
Florida Defenders of the Environment
Foundation on Economic Trends
Friends of the Earth
National Audubon Society
National Mobilization for Survival
National Wildlife Federation
Natural Resources Defense Council
Physicians for Social Responsibility
Project Censored
Radioactive Waste Campaign
SANE/FREEZE
Sandia National Laboratory
Sierra Club
Sierra Club, Florida Chapter
The American Association for the Advancement of Science
The Committee to Bridge the Gap
The Planetary Society
The Union of Concerned Scientists
Women's International Coalition to Stop Making Radioactive Waste
6-2
7. REFERENCES
Bartram, B.W. 1983. "Retention of Plutonium Dioxide Particles on Water
Surfaces Due to Surface Tension Effects." Presented at DOE/OSNP
Plutonium Environmental Program ReviewMeeting, Los Alamos, NewMexico.
August 9, 1983.
Bartram, B.W., and M.J. Wilkinson. 1983. A Review of Research Programs
Related to the Behavior of Plutonium in the Environment, NUS Document
No. 4371. Prepared by NUS for U.S. Department of Energy.
Brevard County. 1988a. Brevard County Data Abstracts. Prepared by the
Brevard County Research and Cartography Division, Research Section.
May 1988.
Brevard County. 1988b. Brevard County Comprehensive Plan. Prepared by
Brevard County Research and Cartography Division.
Campbell, A.R. 1989. Letter from A.R. Campbell of the Mound Laboratory to
W.R. Amos. November 29, 1989.
Cataldo, D.A., E.L. Klepper, and D.K. Craig. 1976. "Fate of Plutonium
Intercepted by Leaf Surfaces: Leachability and Translocation to Seed
and Root Tissues" (IAEA-SM-199/60). Pages 291-300 in International
Atomic Energy Agency, editor. Symposium proceedings of Transuranium
Nuclides in the Environment. IEAE, Vienna.
Cull, Theresa A. 1989. General-Purpose Heat Source Development: Extended
Series Test Program Large Fragment Tests. Publication No. LA-IISg7-MS.
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. August 1989.
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council. Perspective on Regional
Growth 1987-1991. Undated.
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council. 1987. East Central Florida
Comprehensive Regional Policy Plan. Winter Park, Florida. June 1987.
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council. Ig88. GBS Data Base for Land
Cover, Endangered Species, and Indian River Lagoon Fishes. Winter Park,
Florida.
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council. 1988a. FGFWFC Landsat
Derived Habitat Inventory Data. Winter Park, Florida. October 27, 1988.
Florida State University. 1984. Water Resources Atlas of Florida. (E.A.
Fernald and D.J. Patton, editors). Tallahassee, Florida.
Harer, K.F. ]988. Personal Communication from K.F. Harer of NASA's John F.
Kennedy Space Center to B. Bartram, NUS Corporation, October 12, 1988;
with regard to on-site visitors during launch and new Impact Limit
Lines.
7-]
Hobbs, C.H., and R. O. McClellan. 1980. "Radiation and Radioactive
Materials," in J. Doull, C.D. Klaassen, and M.O. Amdur, editors.
Toxicology: The Basic Science of Persons, 2nd ed. Macmillan Publishing
Co., Inc., NewYork.
International Commissionon Radiological Protection.
Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers. ICRP-30.
Elmsford, N.Y.
]978. Limits for
Pergamon Press,
Jet Propulsion Laboratory. 1989. Jupiter Solar Mission Alternative
Feasibility Study. Document No. JPL D-6679. Pasadena, California.
August 15, 1989.
Kennedy Space Center. ]989. "Work at KSC Generates $1.24 Billion Boost to
Florida's Economy." KSC News Release ]31-89. Public Affairs Office.
December 1], 1989.
Looney, B.B., Grant, N.W., King, C.M. 1987. Environmental Information
Document, Estimation of Geochemical Parameters for Assessing Subsurface
Transport at the Savannah River Plant, DPST-85-g04, Prepared by E.I. du
Pont de Nemours and Company, prepared for U.S. Department of Energy.
Mahon, Joseph B. 1990. Letter from NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for
Space Flight to NASA Deputy Director, Solar System Exploration Division.
Washington, D.C. January 16, 1990.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1978. Final Environmental
Impact Statement, Space Shuttle Program. Washington, D.C. April ]978.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. ]979.
Statement for the Kennedy Space Center, Final.
October 1979.
Environmental Impact
Washington, D.C.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1985. Near-Field
Deposition Patterns of Chlorides and Particulates Resulting from
Launches of the Space Transportation System at the John F. Kennedy Space
Center. NASA Technical Memorandum No. 89194. October ]985.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1986. Environmental
Resources Document, Kennedy Space Center. KSCoDF-3080. Prepared for
NASA by Edward E. Clark Engineers-Scientists, Inc. November ]986.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1986b. Far-Field Deposition
from Space Shuttle Launches at John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
NASA Technical Memorandum No. 83104. July 1986.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. ]988a. Final (Tier 1)
Environmental Impact Statement for the Galileo and Ulysses Missions.
Washington, D.C. November 1988.
7-2
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1988b. Space Shuttle Data for
Planetary Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) Safety
Analysis. NSTS 08116, Revision B. September 27, 1988.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1988c. Letter from L.A. Fisk,
NASA Code E, to D.F. Bunch, USDOE Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Nuclear Energy. Subject: Shuttle Accident Scenario Probabilities.
July 13, 1988.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 1989a. Final (Tier 2)
Environmental Impact Statement for the Galileo Mission. Washington,
D.C. May 1989.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, U.S. Department of Energy,
and Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel. 1989. 51-L and Titan 34
D-9 Explosion Working Group. NASA, Kennedy Space Center. June 16,
1989.
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. ]987a.
Recommendations on Limits for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation.
Report No. 91. Bethesda, Maryland. June 1, 1987.
NCRP
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 1987b. Exposure
of the Population in the United States and Canada from Natural
Background Radiation. NCRP Report No. 94, Bethesda, MD. December 30,
1987.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 1980. Delta Atlas -
Eastern United States Coastal and Ocean Zones. Washington, D.C. August
1980.
National Research Council. 1980. The Effects on Populations of Exposure to
Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: 1980, (BEIR III Report). Washington,
D.C.
National Research Council. 1988. Health Risks of Radon and Other Internally
Deposited Alpha-Emitters (BEIR IV Report). Washington, D.C.
National Research Council. 1990. Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of
Ionizing Radiation (BIER V Report). Prepared by the Committee on the
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiations, Board on Radiation Effects
Research, Commission on Life Sciences. National Academy Press.
Washington, D.C.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ]975. Reactor Safety Study:
Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants.
Washington, D.C.
An Assessment of
WASH-]400.
Pinder, J.E., D.C. Adriano, T.G. Ceravalv, A.C. Daswell, and D.M. Yehling.
Undated. Final Report: The Potential Transport to Man of Pu-238 into
Orange Tree Groves. Savannah River Ecology Laboratory, Aiken, South
Carolina. Undated.
7-3
Schmel, L.A. 1980. Transuranic and Tracer Simulant Resuspension. Wayne C.
Hanson, editor. Transuranic Elements in the Environment. National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia.
Schultz, R.K., G.A. Tomkins and K.L. Babcock. 1976. "Uptake of plutonium and
Americium by Plants from Soils: Uptake by Wheat from Various Soils and
Effect of Oxidation State of Plutonium Added to Soil. International
Atomic Energy Agency, editor. Symposium proceedings of Transuranium
Nuclides in the Environment. IAEA, Vienna.
State of Florida. 1987. Ambient Air Quality in Florida, 1986. Department of
Environmental Regulation, Bureau of Air Quality Management, Tallahassee,
Florida.
State of Florida. 1987b. Outdoor Recreation in Florida-1987.
of Natural Resources, Division of Recreation and Parks.
Florida. February 1987.
Department
Tallahassee,
Thompson, R.C., and B.W. Wachholz. 1980. Biological Effects of Transuranic
Elements in the Environment: Human Effects and Risk Estimates. Wayne
C. Hanson, editor. Transuranic Elements in the Environment. National
Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA.
Turi, J.A. ]989. Declaration on RTG Safety Testing Program. Sept. 19, 1989.
United States Air Force. 1986. Environmental Assessment for the
Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle (CELV) at Cape Canaveral Air
Force Station, Florida. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters Space
Division. June 1986. (The Complementary Expandable Launch Vehicle,
i.e., 34D7, has been renamed the Titan IV.)
United States Air Force. 1988. Supplement to the Environmental Assessment
for the U.S. Air Force, Space Division Titan IV Program at Cape
Canaveral Air Force Station, Florida. Department of the Air Force,
Headquarters Space Division. May 1988.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 1974. Plutonium and Other Transuranium
Elements. Sources, Environmental Distribution and Biomedical Effects.
USAEC WASH ]359, available from NTIS.
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. 1975. Overall Safety Manual, Volume 3,
Reference Data. Prepared by NUS Corporation. January 1975.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1986. Statistical Abstract of the United States;
1987, ]07th Edition. GPO, Washington, D.C. 1986.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1988. Current Population Reports, Series P-25,
No. ]022, United States Population Estimates, by Age, Sex and Race:
1980 to 1987. GPO, Washington, D.C.
7-4
U.S. Department of Defense. 1989. Strategic and Critical Materials Report to
Congress, Operations Under the Strategic and Critical Stock Piling Act
During the Period April 1988 through September 1988. GPO, Washington,
D.C. 1989.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1983. Kennedy Space Center Demographic and Land
Use Study. Prepared for DOE by NUS Corporation. October 7, 1983.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1987. Environmental Research on Actintde
Elements, DOE 86008713. Washington, D.C.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1988a. Final Safety Analysis Report for the
Galileo Mission, Volume 1. Reference Design Document. GE Document
Number 87SDS4213. May 1988.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1988b.
Galileo Mission, Volume II.
87SDS4213. December 1988.
Final Safety Analysis Report for the
Accident Model Document. GE Document No.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1989a. Final Safety Analysis Report for the
Galileo Mission, Volume Ill. Nuclear Risk Analysis Document. NUS
Corporation Document Number NUS-5126, Revision ]. January 1989.
U.S. Department of Energy. ]989b. Supplement to the Final Safety Analysis
Report for the Galileo Mission. Document No. 89SDS4221. August 1989.
U.S. Department of Energy. IggOa. Safety Status Report - Summary. NUS
Corporation, Document No. NUS-5238. January 1990.
U.S. Department of Energy. Ig90b. Safety Status Report - Accident Analysis.
GE Document. January ]990.
U.S. Department of Energy. 1990c. Safety Status Report - Nuclear Risk
Analysis. NUS Corporation, Document No. NUS-5235. January IggO.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 1989. 1987 Vital Statistics of
U.S., Volume II - Mortality. National Center for Health Statistics.
Hyattsville, MD.
U.S. Department of the Interior. ]989. Metals Week, Volume 60, No. 49. U.S.
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines. McGraw Hill. Washington,
D.C. December 4, 1989.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1977. Proposed Guidance on Dose Limits
for Persons Exposed to Transuranium Elements in the General Environment.
U.S. EPA 520/4-77-016; NTIS PB 290314.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. ]988. Draft Manual of Protective
Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents. EPA/520/I-
75-001; December ]988, Office of Radiation Programs.
7-5
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. ]989. National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants; Radionuclides (NESHAPS); 40 CFR 61.
Washington, D.C.
Wicker, F.W. 1980.
Environment.
Environment.
Virginia.
Ecological Effects of Transuranics in the Terrestrial
Wayne C. Hanson, editor. Transuranic Elements in the
National Technical Information Service, Springfield,
7-6
8. INDEX
-A-
Abbreviations, A-I
Abort
landing sites, 2-17
launch, 2-17
types of, 2-17
Accident
Challenger, 4-4
cleanup costs, 4-15
decontamination, 4-]5
general, 4-I
global impacts, 4-15, 4-29
impact of, 4-13
launch, 4-4, 4-6
mitigation, 4-]I, 4-20, 4-27
monitoring, 4-15, 4-17
RTGs, 2-23, 4-4
scenarios, 4-4, 4-6
shuttle, 4-4
Acronyms, A-I
Advanced Solar Dynamic, 2-5
Aeroshell, 2-8
Agencies and Individuals Consulted, 6-1
Alkali Metal Thermoelectric Converter, 2-3, 2-5
Alternative
to launch vehicle, 2-5, 2-26
to proposed action, 2-I, 2-18, 4-30
to the RTG power source, 2-5, 2-7
-B-
Battery, 2-3, 2-5
Benefits of launch, I-1, 1-3
-Co
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, 3-I, 3-13
Centaur, 2-5, 4-5, 4-6
Challenger, 4-4
Clean Water Act, 3-22
Cleanup of Contaminated Areas: EPA Guidance for, 4-7
Collective Dose, 4-7
Consequence
of accident, 4-I, 4-6
environmental, iv, 4-I, 4-6, 4-20
8-I
Consultations with Agencies and Individuals, 6-1
Contributors to the EIS, 5-1
-D-
Deep Space Network, ttt, 2-18, 2-25
De mintmus, 4-17, C-]O, C-]4, c-]g
Department of Defense, i, ti, 3-41
Department of Energy, v, 2-8, 2-]3, 3-41, 4-1, 4-4, 4-7, 4-15, 5-2
-E-
East Central Florida Planning Regional Council, 3-1
Eastern Space and Missile Center, 2-]7
Eastern Test Range, 2-24
Edwards Air Force Base, 2-17
EMERGE model, C-7
Emergency response planning, 4-29
Environmental Consequences, 4-1
Environmental Protection Agency, 3-41, 4-7, 4-1], 4-15, 4-]7
European Space Agency, ii, iii, 1-1, 2-1, 2-5, 4-30
External Tank, 2-]4, 4-4, 4-6, 4-7
-F-
Fault trees, B-]
Federal Emergency Response Plan, 4-2g
Final Safety Analysis Report, 4-], 4-5, 4-8, 4-16
Fine weave, pierced fabric, 2-13
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 3-]3
Florida Department of Natural Resources, 3-27
Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Plan (FUSRAP), 4-7
Fuel Cell, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6
Fueled Clad, 2-]0, 2-]2, 4-]0, 4-]1, 4-]5, 4-]8
-G-
Galileo Mission, it, iii, Iv, 2-8, 3-]
General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS), 2-8, 2-9, 2-]0, 2-12, 4-7, 4-15
Graphite impact shell, 2-8, 2-10, 2-12, 4-15
-H-
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuels (HERF), 2-24
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance (HERO), 2-24
HIPAR model, c-g
Hydrazine monopropellant, 2-14, 4-]
8-2
-I-
Inertial Upper Stage, i, iii, 1-1, 2-1
Integrated risk analysis elements, C-17
International Solar Terrestrial Program, 1-6
Iridium, 2-8, 2-12, 4-31
-j-
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL), 5-I
Johnson Space Center, 4-3
Jupiter, I-], ]-2, 2-2, 2-5
-K-
Kennedy Space Center, ii, 2-]7, 2-23, 3-I, 3-13, 4-I, 4-11, 4-22, 5-1
-L-
LASEP models, 4-6, C-I, C-7
Launch Vehicle
external tank (ET), 2-12, 2-14, 4-3, 4-6, 4-7
inertial upper stage, i, I-I, 2-I
solid rocket booster (SRB), 2-12, 2-14, 4-3, 4-6
LOPAR model, C-7
-M-
Maximum Individual Dose, 4-7
Mission Objectives, I-l, 2-19
Mission Phases, 4-6, 4-10, 4-12
Monomethyl hydrazine, 2-14, 4-3
-N-
National Environmental Policy Act, I, 4-30
National Park Service, 3-13
Nuclear
federal radiological emergency response plan, 4-16
plutonium, ii, iv, 2-8, 2-11, 2-13, 2-23, 2-24, 4-4, 4-6, 4-11, 4-20
radiological consequences of accident, 4-I, 4-6, 4-11, 4-20
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, v, 4-18
-O-
Orbital Maneuvering System, 2-14
8-3
-p-
PAM-S,i, iii, 1-1, 2-1, 2-13, 2-15, 2-16
Patrick Air Force Base, 2-2, 2-13
Photovoltaic, 2-3, 2-5, 2-6
Pioneer Spacecraft, I-3, 2-8, 2-13, 2-19, 2-26
Plutonium, ii, iv, v, 2-8, 2-11, 2-12, 2-23, 2-24, 4-4, 4-6, 4-]I, 4-20
bioaccumulation, 4-25, 4-26
effects on citrus groves, 4-26
effects on marine and aquatic fauna, 4-21
effects on soil, 4-22
effects on water, 4-21
worldwide levels, 3-46
Proposed action
alternatives to, 2-1, 2-19, 2-20
description of, iii, 1-I, 2-I,
environmental consequences of, 4-I
-R-
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG), iv, 2-3, 2-4, 2-8, 2-13, 2-23,
4-5, 4-31
RTG safety design goals, 2-12
Range Safety Officer, 2-17, 4-3
References, 7-I
-S-
Safety
abort landing sites, 2-17
RTG evaluation, 2-8
range, 2-17
Science Applications International Corporation, 5-1
SNAP 19B2, 2-13
SNAP 27, 2-14
Solar activity cycles, I-5
Solar array, 2-5
Advanced Photovoltaic, 2-5
Solar Physics Program, iii, 1-I
Solar System Exploration Program, iii, I-I
Solar Wind, 1-3
Solid rocket booster, 2-12, 2-14, 4-2, 4-3, 4-6
Sonic boom, 4-2
Space Shuttle
Challenger, 4-7
Major elements, B-I
Transportation System, i, iii, 1-I
Spacecraft Propulsion Subsystem, 2-14
B-4
SPASM Computer Code, C-17
Sun, I-2
-T-
Titan IV, i, iii, 2-18, 2-19, 2-25
Trajectory, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 2-5, 2-18
Turbine Energy Conversion, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 2-8
-U-
Ulysses Mission, i, ii, iii, I-1, 2-1, 2-3, 2-5
Use of Mission Findings, 1-2
-V-
Vertical Assembly Building, 3-40
Viking Spacecraft, 2-8, 2-13, 2-]9
Voyager Spacecraft, ]-3, 2-8, 2-]3, 2-19, 2-26
8-5

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AFO
AOA
ALARA
ALSEP
AMTEC
APSA
ASD
ATO
AU
BEIR
BRC
CAA
CBCF
CCAFS
CEQ
Ci
cm
CO
DEIS
DOC
DOD
DOE
DOI
DREF
DSN
ECFRPC
EDE
EIS
EMC
EMI
EMISM
Abort-From-Orbit
Abort-Once-Around
As Low As Reasonably Achievable
Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package
Alkali Metal Thermoelectric Converter
Advanced Photovoltaic Solar Array
Advanced Solar Dynamic
Abort-To-Orbit
Astronomical Units
Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation
Below Regulatory Control
Clean Air Act
Carbon Bonded Carbon Fiber
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station
Council on Environmental Quality
Curie
centimeter
Carbon Monoxide
Draft Environmental Impact Statement
Dissolved Organic Carbon
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Interior
Dose Reduction Effectiveness Factor
Deep Space Network
East Central Florida Regional Planning Council
Effective Dose Equivalent
Environmental Impact Statement
Electromagnetic Compatibility
Electromagnetic Interference
Electromagnetic Interference Safety Margins
A-I
EPA
ESA
ESD
ESMC
ET
ETR
FAST
FC
FEIS
FDER
FDNR
FGFWFC
FRERP
f/s
FSAR
FTS
FUSRAP
FWPF
FY
g
GIS
GPHS
HERF
HERO
ICE-E
ISEE-3
ICRP
IMP-8
INSRP
ISEE-3
IUS
JPL
JSC
Kd
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
European Space Agency
Electrostatic Discharge
Eastern Space and Missile Center
External Tank
Eastern Test Range
Failure/Abort Sequence Tree
Fueled clad
Final Environmental Impact Statement
Florida Department of Environmental Regulations
Florida Department of Natural Resources
Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
feet per second
Final Safety Analysis Report
Flight Termination System
Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program
fine weave, pierced fabric
Fiscal Year
gram
Graphite impact shell
General Purpose Heat Source
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Fuels
Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
International Cometary Explorer-E
International Solar Earth Explorer
International Commission on Radiological Protection
International Monitoring Platform-8
Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel
International Solar Earth Explorer
Inertial Upper Stage
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Distribution Coefficient
A-2
kg
KSC
km/s
kmz
LASEP
LES 8/9
LET
Ibs
MECO
MET
MMH
mm
m/s
MSA
NAS
NASA
NCRP
NESHAP
NEPA
NIH
NOAA
NOI
NOX
NO2
NRC
NSTS
OFW
OMS
PAMS
PAM-S
ppm
PSAR
psi
Pu
kilograms
Kennedy Space Center
kilometers per second
square kilometers
Launch Accident Scenario Evaluation Program
Lincoln Experimental Satellite 8 and 9
Low Energy Transfer
pounds
Main Engine Cut Off
Mission elapsed time
Monomethyl hydrazine
millimeter
meters per second
Metropolitan Statistical Area
National Academy of Sciences
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
National Environmental Policy Act
National Institutes of Health
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Notice of Intent
Nitrogen Oxides
Nitrogen Dioxide
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Space Transportation System
Outstanding Florida Waters
Orbital Maneuvering System
Permanent Air Monitoring Station
Payload Assist Module-Special
parts per million
Preliminary Safety Analysis Report
pounds per square inch
Plutonium
A-3
PuO2
RCE
RCRA
RDT&E
ROD
RSO
RSS
RTG
RTLS
SAR
SER
SNAP
SOz
SPP
SRB
SRM
SSEP
SSME
STS
TAL
TEC
TOPEX
uCi
ug/m 3
UNSCEAR
USAEC
USAF
USFWS
VAB
VAFB
W
WIND
Plutonium dioxide
Reaction Control Equipment
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Record of Decision
Range Safety Officer
Range Safety System
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator
Return to Launch Site (abort)
Safety Analysis Report
Safety Evaluation Report
Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power
Sulfur Dioxide
Space Physics Program
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Solar System Exploration Program
Space Shuttle Main Engine
Space Transportation System
Transoceanic Abort Landing
Turbine Energy Converter
Ocean Topography Experiment
micro Curies
micrograms per cubic meter
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
United States Atomic Energy Commission
United States Air Force
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Vertical Assembly Building
Vandenberg Air Force Base
Watt
Weather Information Network Display
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B.I ACCIDENT SCENARIO DEFINITION APPROACH
The National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) approach to
defining potential accident scenarios and probabilities involved several
steps. First, potential failures were identified that could occur in each of
the seven major elements of the Shuttle Space Transportation System (STS):
• Launch Support Equipment
• Payload
• Orbiter
• External Tank (ET)
• Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs)
• Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSMEs)
• Range Safety Destruct System.
The failure modes of concern are those that generally cause a loss of the
vehicle and may produce an accident environment which is a potential threat to
the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). These are generally single
point failures in systems and subsystems which cannot be mitigated by
astronaut intervention or other pre-planned system overrides. These failure
modes represent exceptions to the program requirement of single-failure
tolerance. They have been accepted by NASA technical and program management
and by the contractor, after extensive review indicating that they were
impractical or impossible to eliminate.
The next step involved dividing the mission into five phases, with each
of the phases subdivided further, as necessary. Fault trees were developed
for each of these mission phases. Each fault tree encompassed, as
appropriate, all relevant failures that could occur in the seven major Shuttle
systems. Finally, because many of the accident scenarios represented by the
fault trees looked similar, representative accident scenarios were developed
for each of the mission phases.
After the Johnson Space Center developed the mapping of system failures
into scenarios, NASA provided estimates of failure probabilities for each of
the systems as a function of time (NASA 1988c). These estimates were
generated based on reviews of system characteristics, historical failure rate
data from similar systems, and previous safety analyses. Because of the wide
uncertainty in applying historical data, NASA provided estimates with an order
of magnitude range for each system. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), with
NASA concurrence, then used the geometric means of each range in performing
its safety analysis. The representative accident scenarios and accident
probabilities are presented in Tables B-] and B-2, respectively. The
accidents listed represent only failures that can potentially lead to RTG
damage and possible fuel release.
B-I
TABLEB-I. ACCIDENTSCENARIOSBYMISSIONPHASE,STS
Phase Description Accident Scenario
3
4
Prelaunch to Launch
(T-8 hrs. to T i 0 sec.)
First Stage Ascent
(T + 0 sec. to 128 sec.)
Second Stage (SSME) Ascent
(T + 128 sec. to 532 sec.)
On-Orbit
(T+532 sec. to 6 hrs.4Om.)
Payload Deploy
(T + 6 hr 40m. to
Spacecraft Escape)
Inadvertent Range Safety System (RSS)
destruct
Pad Fire/explosion
Solid Rocket Booster failure*
Case Rupture
Tower Impact
Loss of Thrust
No Ignition
Range Safety System destruct*
Aft compartment explosion
Vehicle breakup
Orbiter Failure
External Tank Failure
Payload Failure
Crash landing
Ocean ditch
Intact Abort Scenario - RTLS, TAL
Vehicle Breakup*
Orbiter failure
External Tank failure
Space Shuttle main engine failure
Payload failure
Range Safety System destruct
Crash landing
Ocean ditch
Intact Abort Scenario - TAL, ATO
Orbiter failure and reentry*
Intact Abort Scenario - AFO
Solid Rocket Motor Case burst/
burnthrough (IUS)
Other IUS Failures/Reentry*
Solid Rocket Motor no ignition,
Low impulse
Tumbling from separation or
recontact
Misaligned burns due to guidance
failure
Erratic burns
* Indicates scenario potentially resulting in release of RTG fuel.
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TABLEB-2. MISSIONACCIDENTPROBABILITIES
PHASE 0
PRE-LAUNCH/LAUNCH
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3
FIRST STAGEASCENT SECOND STAGEASCENT ON-ORBIT
PHASE 4
PAYLOAD DEPLOY
INADVERTENT
RSS DESTRUC_
6.32 x 10""
SRB FAILURE_ ORBITER FAILURES ORBITER FAILURE
3.80 x 10"" 2.37 x 10 TM & REENTRY
1.58 x 10"4
FIRE/EXPLOSI_I RSS DESTRUCI ET FAILURE_
1.79 x 10 _ 1.51 x 10"" 1.9 x 10""
AFT CONPARTHENT
EXPLOSION
3.95 x 10 .4
VEHICLE BREAK:UP
8.98 x 10.5
CRASH LANDING
3.79 x 10""
OCEANDITCH_
7.21 x 10 .5
SSHE FAILURES
1.23 x 10""
PAYLOADFAI.L_JRES
2.40 x 10"
RSS DESTRUCI
1.58 x 10 "
CRASH LANDING
8.85 x 10""
OCEANDITCH.
1.68 x 10"4
IUS SRM CASE_URST
2.89 x I0""
OTHER IUS FAILURES
& REENTRY _
1.48 x 10"z
Source: DOE 1990b
B.2 ACCIDENT SCENARIOS
This section summarizes information contained in the Accident Analysis
document of the DOE Safety Status Report for the Ulysses mission (DOE 1990b).
Accident scenarios and environments by mission phase (from NASA 1988, and
as described in DOE IggOb) are summarized in Table B-I. The applicable intact
abort modes for each phase are also indicated in Table B-]. The intact abort
modes are: Return to Launch Site (RTLS), Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL),
Abort-Once-Around (AOA), Abort-To-Orbit (ATO), and Abort-From-Orbit (AFO).
The first four are generally caused by premature shutdown of one of the SSMEs.
AFO would be a result of ATO or a problem with the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
or spacecraft which prevented deployment on orbit. If two or more SSMEs shut
down during parts of the ascent to orbit, a contingency abort mode leading to
crew bailout and ocean ditch of the Shuttle would occur. Finally, there is a
very small probability of multiple Shuttle system failures leading to a crash
during the landing phase. Both types of crash accidents were evaluated in the
Safety Status Report (DOE 1990a, DOE 1990b, DOE 1990c).
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The primary accidents for each phase are generally caused by the most
active portion of the system during that phase. For the propulsive phases, it
is generally that system providing the propulsive thrust, the structure
supporting the thrust and being acted on by external loads, and/or the
guidance system. Multiple redundancies in the Shuttle guidance tend to
decrease the likelihood of guidance failures for the Shuttle.
Environments created by the accidents generally depend on the source of
the accident and the time that it occurs. Time is important because it may
affect the character of the source or the resulting secondary environments.
For example, the Shuttle SRB fragments will achieve higher velocity if an SRB
case failure occurs near the end of the burn when less propellant is available
to be accelerated along with the case wall. Liquid propellant explosions are
more severe near the ground where the ground promotes mixing. Early failures
can result in ground impacts, while failures above the upper atmosphere can
result in reentry heating and subsequent ground or water impact.
Phase 0 Accident Scenarios (Pre-Launch)
Phase 0 accidents of concern are those associated with propellant
loading. A pad fire or a pad explosion are the primary accidents of concern.
The causes for either accident are the same, being linked to failures in
launch support equipment, vehicle structural failures, propellant
contamination, and inadvertent Range Safety System destruct activation. The
latter accident could occur only after destruct arming in the last 20 seconds
before launch.
PhBse | Accident Scenarios (SRB Burn)
Phase I commences with launch at T-O seconds and ends with separation of
the SRBs at T+128 seconds. Phase I accident scenarios (Table B-I) represent
the period in which the SRBs are the primary failure threat, and the external
environments which may be seen by the RTG can be affected by ground surface
interactions. A failure of the left SRB in the first 2 seconds can cause
vehicle impact with the launch tower. Between 0 and 10 seconds, a release of
ET propellants caused by either a Shuttle main engine failure or a rupture of
the ET initiated by a SRB case rupture can cause a ground surface pool
explosion, which is explained in Section B.3. After about 17 seconds, the
trajectory of the launch vehicle, if thrust were stopped, would lead to water
impact rather than land impact.
An aft-compartment explosion causing the large bipropellant feed lines to
rupture and propellant flow onto the launch pad can result from a Shuttle main
engine failure. In this accident, the Shuttle continues its ascent until the
blast wave, from explosion of the propellants pooled on the launch pad,
reaches the vehicle and causes it to break up. The SRBs continue their ascent
until Range Safety System (RSS) destruct occurs.
In-flight vehicle breakup occurring between T+IO seconds and the end of
Phase I can occur with a catastrophic structural failure of the ET. Between
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T+]O to T+30 seconds, the massive dump of liquid propellants can lead to an
explosion with breakup of the Shuttle and subsequent ground impact. Between
T+30 seconds and the end of Phase l, a trailing fire and small local
explosions would ensue with vehicle breakup and impact in the ocean.
In addition to vehicle breakup by instantaneous failures of the SRBs or
SSMEs, RSS destruct is an intentional abort action by the Range Safety Officer
in the event the Shuttle vehicle trajectory could result in endangering
populated land areas.
Automatic shutdown of one of the SSMEs during Phase I can lead to a RTLS
intact abort mode. After SRB separation, the vehicle reverses the direction
of flight till such a time when main engine cutoff (MECO) point is reached,
which allows acceptable Orbiter/ET separation conditions, acceptable ET impact
location, and an acceptable range for the Shuttle to glide back to the Kennedy
Space Center (KSC). A Shuttle failure on touchdown can result in a crash
landing.
If a combination of failures occurs which does not allow the Shuttle to
safely return to KSC, the contingency abort plan of crew bailout will occur,
leading to ocean ditch.
Phase _ Aqcident Scenarios (Start of I$t Orbital Maneuverinq System Burn)
This phase of the flight starts when the SRBs separate from the vehicle
at T+128 seconds and extends until start of Ist Orbital Maneuvering System
burn at T+532 seconds. The primary vehicle catastrophic accidents during this
period (Table B-I) result in vehicle breakup or in failure to achieve orbit,
leading to uncontrolled reentry. Given a normal mission trajectory, accidents
in this phase would occur at altitudes in excess of 150,000 feet with the
vehicle a minimum of 40 miles down range from KSC.
At altitudes exceeding 150,000 feet, explosions and fragment environments
are no longer a threat to the RTG. The SRBs are no longer attached and
formation of explosive mixtures of liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen from the
ET cannot result in explosion overpressures, considering the rarefied
atmosphere at the altitudes during which this phase takes place. Ballistic
reentry of the spacecraft will result in breakup and release of the RTG. If
the RTG impacts rock or a similar hard surface during the African overfly
portion of this phase (5.5 seconds of the entire 404 second Phase 2), the
impact shell could be damaged and a small amount of fuel released.
Non-catastrophic shutdown of one or more SSMEs during this phase can lead
to a variety of intact or contingency abort modes. The TAL abort mode is used
if a SSME shutdown places the vehicle beyond the trajectory limits of a RTLS
abort yet prior to attaining an AOA or ATO capability. After selection of
this abort mode, the vehicle will continue to accelerate downrange to the TAL
MECO target. After ET separation, the onboard computers are loaded with the
entry flight software, and the Orbiter glides to the designated landing
site. Tentative TAL sites for the Ulysses mission are:
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• Primary
• Alternates
- Ben Guerir, Morocco
- Moron, Spain
- Dakar, Senegal
- Zaragosa, Spain
- Banjeel, Gambia.
If a SSME shutdown occurs after the vehicle exceeds the parameters for a
TAL, the Shuttle will attempt to reach the nominal MECO target. A combination
of orbital maneuvering system (OMS) engine burns and propellant dumps can be
performed to increase powered flight performance. After MECO, the OMS fuel,
vehicle velocity, and velocity required for orbit are evaluated. If
performance margins do not exist for orbit insertion and a subsequent deorbit,
an AOA maneuver will be performed with the OMS engines. The following AOA
landing sites have been identified for NSTS-34:
• Primary
• Alternate
• Alternate
- Edwards Air Force Base, California
- White Sands Space Harbor, New Mexico
- Kennedy Space Center, Florida.
An ATO generally involves loss of propulsion late in the ascent where the
vehicle velocity is adequate to achieve a safe, yet lower than planned orbit.
Since the Shuttle must achieve a specified orbit to perform the initial
conditions for IUS injection, it is likely that an ATO will result in
transition to an AFO.
Contingency abort conditions are defined when two SSMEs fail prior to
single engine TAL capability, or when three engines fail prior to achieving an
AOA capability. These events would result in a crew bailout and subsequent
ocean ditch of the Orbiter. There is a possibility of performing an RTLS
abort if two or three main engines fail within 20 seconds after launch, or a
TAL, if three engines fail during the last 30 seconds of powered flight.
However, during the remainder of the ascent phase, two or three main engine
failures result in a contingency abort scenario.
Phase 3 Accident Scenarios fist Orbita!Maneuverinq System Burn to IUS/
propulsion Assist Module-Special DeDloymentl
Phase 3 commences with initiation of the Ist Orbital Maneuvering System
burn at T+532 seconds and ends with deployment of the Ulysses/IUS/Payload
Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) at about T+6 hours 40 minutes. Accidents in
this phase would occur after vehicle orbit has been achieved but prior to
deployment of the UIysses/IUS/PAM-S. The accidents of primary concern (Table
B-I) are those associated with Shuttle failures that would result in orbital
decay and eventual uncontrolled reentry. The entry angle would be very
shallow at a velocity of less than 26,000 feet per second. Should a
reentering General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) module impact rock or a similar
hard surface, small amounts of fuel could be released.
If problems are found with either orbital parameters, the Ulysses
spacecraft, or the IUS/PAM-S, that clearly indicate deployment from the
Shuttle would not result in a successful Earth escape trajectory insertion,
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then two options exist. If safe return of the Shuttle is threatened,the cargo
will be jettisoned in low Earth orbit. However, if it is determined no threat
exists to a safe landing, the Shuttle will return with the cargo. The primary
and alternate landing sites noted previously for the AOAmay be employed in
this abort mode.
Although abort landing accidents are theoretically possible from AFO, the
probability was considered to be very small comparedto RTLS, TAL, or AOA
related accidents because the SSMEdoes not affect AFO, and time pressures are
muchreduced. Becauseof these considerations and since the consequences
would be no different, a separate treatment was not included in the Phase 3
analyses.
Phase 4 Accident Scenarios (UIYsses/IUS/PAM-S Deployment to Earth Escape)
Phase 4 commences with deployment of the spacecraft/IUS/PAM-S at T+6
hours 40 minutes and ends with firing of the IUS and insertion of the
spacecraft on its trajectory to Jupiter. Accidents in this phase would occur
between UIysses/IUS/PAM-S separation from the Shuttle and trajectory
insertion. The accidents of primary concern (Table B-I) are IUS propulsion or
guidance failures which could result in vehicle breakup and/or in reentry from
orbit. The IUS motor case burst accidents could lead to large chunks of the
solid propellant interacting with the RTG. Reentry conditions can range from
speeds of 6,900 to 36,400 ft/sec at angles of -0.5 to -8g.O degrees. Should
the RTG impact rock or a similar hard surface, a small amount of fuel could be
released.
B.3 ACCIDENT ENVIRONMENTS
The following paragraphs summarize the key accident environments which
were addressed in the Safety Status Report for the Ulysses mission (DOE
1990b).
SRB Fraqment Environment
During operation of a SRB, fragments will be produced upon rupture of the
steel pressure-containment motor case either by random failure or by range
destruct action. These substantial fragments may damage an RTG or propel it
into another structure. The size, velocity, and directional distributions of
SRB fragments are based in part upon analysis of films and recovered debris of
the destructed SRBs from the Challenger (STS 51-L) and the Titan 34D-g
accidents. To supplement these empirical data and to fill gaps not
represented by the two accidents, analytical modeling was performed and
calculations were made using a computer code capable of predicting the very
fast structural breakup of the rocket motor case and the ensuing fragment
motion away from the centerline of the motor.
The characteristic mechanism for fragment formation is a rapid release of
the operating motor pressure through a fracture in the case causing further
extensive breakup of the case and rapid acceleration of the pieces to
velocities of hundreds of feet per second. The peak velocity of case wall
B-7
fragments depends on motor pressure and volume. The mass of propellant
remaining attached to a case wall fragment is also a major determinant of the
final fragment velocity. In addition to velocity, the fragment also rotates
or spins as it travels. Since all these parameters vary with mission elapsed
time, the spectrum of SRB fragment characteristics is highly dependent upon
mission elapsed time (MET) at the time of initial case fracture.
In the range destruct scenario, the two SRBs are destroyed
simultaneously. The two fragment fields thus created could result in
sequential hits on the RTG. Tests in which GPHS modules and intact RTGs were
subjected to impact by SRB motor case fragments have indicated that a fuel
release will not occur when the intact RTG is struck by the face of SRB
fragments (face-on) at velocities up to 695 feet-per-second (fps). (Note that
fragment velocities will not be in this range until near the end of Phase I;
i.e., between 105 and 120 seconds after launch. During this period, a minimum
of 95 percent of the SRB fragment impacts would be in a face-on orientation.)
When struck by fragments in the edge-on orientation at velocities of 3]2 f/s
or greater, the leading fueled clads impacted can be breached with gram
quantities of fuel released. The probability of the range destruct scenarios
is much smaller than the probability of SRB random failure (see Table B-2).
Pre- and Earl Y-F!iqht Ground Pool Explosions
A significant explosion source for the Shuttle is possible should a
massive spill of the liquid oxygen and hydrogen ET propellants occur. Spills
of these propellants, as a result of ET structural breakup, Shuttle impact
with the launch tower, early range destruct, SRB case rupture, or Orbiter aft-
compartment explosions could lead to collection, mixing, and ignition of
significant portions of the propellants on launch pad surfaces while the
Shuttle is still essentially at the pad. The resulting blast wave
subsequently sweeps past the Orbiter, acting on the exterior surfaces in a
manner to implode or crush the structure into the RTG within the Orbiter. It
is also possible that, as the blast wave causes the structure to fail, the RTG
will be directly exposed to the blast environment. Thus, not only Orbiter
fragmentation but also blast loading (acceleration) hazards are presented to
the RTG.
There have been no pad accidents involving the spillage of ET propellants
from which to base estimates of potential explosion environments, therefore,
environments are based on results from a hydrodynamic computer code capable of
predicting the blast loading parameters of a fast moving planar blast pulse as
it travels through the air above the pad. The behavior of the explosion
energy release itself (source characteristic) is varied over a wide range to
include the range of uncertainty in the initial collection, mixing, and
ignition of the propellants. Since the explosion source characteristic
controls the blast pulse loading parameters, a probabilistic computational
treatment of the source characteristic yields a probabilistic estimate of
blast loading parameters at specified heights above the pad. Application of
these loading parameters to an analytical fragment acceleration model for the
Orbiter cargo bay door yields a probabilistic estimate of fragment velocity
for this closest component to the RTG.
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An explosion of ET propellants on or near the launch pad would cause the
walls of the Shuttle payload bay to implode around the Ulysses spacecraft and
the RTG. Because ensuing distortion of fueled clads within the RTG is
estimated at 10 percent or less, fuel would not be released. The distortion
threshold for breach is 25 percent as determined in bare clad impact tests
conducted for the safety verification and test program.
In-Fliqht Explosions
A second explosion source involving the ET propellants is possible for a
short time after the Shuttle has cleared the tower. Aerodynamic conditions
through the next 20 seconds (up to a MET of 30 seconds) are such that failures
of the ET structure can lead quickly to its breakup and the consequent
airborne dump of liquid hydrogen and oxygen propellants. The hydrogen quickly
vaporizes and mixes with air to form a vapor cloud. The burning SRBs provide
an ignition source to ignite the mixture at some distance from the Shuttle
depending upon velocity of the vehicle. A hydrodynamic computer code is used
to compute the blast loading parameters of a fast-moving, spherically-
expanding, blast pulse.
As the ET breaks up, propellant dump and mixing require an elapsed time
on the order of a second. As Phase I proceeds, the increasing speed of the
Shuttle over elapsed time allows an increased distance to develop between the
Orbiter and the center of explosion for the later occurring breakup. Hence,
the potential blast environment for airborne explosions rapidly diminishes.
Beyond MET 30 seconds, changing atmospheric and aerodynamic conditions will
preclude significant airborne explosions. No source terms are predicted for
this accident scenario.
An IUS solid-fuel rocket was in the Shuttle bay during the Challenger
accident as the booster to propel a data relay satellite into its prescribed
orbit. Detailed examination of photographic records, telemetry data, and
fragments recovered from the Challenger accident have shown that I) no major
explosion occurred, rather a rupture of the external propellant tank,
initiated by the effects of the Shuttle booster joint failure, was followed by
release and rapid burn of some of the liquid propellants; 2) the Shuttle
Orbiter subsequently broke up under flight dynamic and aerodynamic forces; and
3) the IUS booster came out of the cargo bay relatively intact, broke up under
aerodynamic forces, and fell 50,000 feet to the ocean surface without violent
solid propellant ignition. Uncertain photographic evidence and an incomplete
recovery of the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite did not permit an assessment
of its response sequence.
The interagency study group formed to evaluate both the Challenger and
Titan 34 D-g explosions (NASA et al. ]989) concluded that, had an RTG been on
board, both it and its cladded heat sources would have survived the Challenger
accident with no release of plutonium fuel. This study did not consider solid
rocket motor fragments since these were not a factor in the case of the
Challenger accident.
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Fireball {nvirQnment FrQm _T Propellants
The updrafts and high temperatures within the fireball produced by a
large liquid propellant ground fire are important if the exposed RTG fuel
clads have been breached earlier by severe mechanical impact loads. The
released fuel fines in this case can be vaporized and dispersed into the
atmosphere by the fireball environment. It should be noted that bare fuel
clads, that is those unprotected by any of the graphitics (aeroshell or
graphite impact shield, or the RTG case), have been demonstrated to survive
temperatures of at least 4,360"F, almost 400 degrees greater than expected in
the peak fireball (experimental data : 4,000"F), without a loss of fuel. The
fireball will, however, modify the particle size distribution or location of
fuel released from clads damaged by SRB fragments. Fires and the fireball
above, cannot cause a release of fuel.
Abor_ Crash Environments
During the latter aerodynamic flight portion of a return from a mission
abort, the Orbiter flies without engine thrust and exhibits the same general
flight characteristics as a conventional heavy aircraft during a final landing
approach. Assuming that the orbiter has entered this final phase of the abort
return under normal control, a crash could ensue due to control error or
mechanical failures of the flight control system or landing gear.
Examination of the Orbiter flight profile and flying characteristics
leads to a set of four abort crash accidents that are deemed credible: two
landing scenarios and two ocean ditch scenarios. In each case, crashes with
and without the final landing flare are considered in estimating the resulting
relative-impact velocity of the RTG with the surrounding Orbiter structure.
The estimated upper and lower bounds of these impact velocities are shown in
Table B-3. The environments experienced by the RTG during a landing crash or
ocean ditch are relatively mild compared with other accident environments.
The GPHS modules are capable of surviving impacts on steel up to 177 fps and
concrete up to 213 fps, much more severe than the impacts experienced inside
the Shuttle while crushing up during an accident. For this reason, landing
and ocean ditch crash accidents are not considered to be threatening accident
environments for the RTG.
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TABLEB-3. RTGIMPACTVELOCITIESDUETOABORTCRASH: STS/IUS/PAM-S
Crash Scenario RTG Impact Velocity (fps)
Ditch No Flare
Ditch With Flare
Landing Pre-Flare
Landing Post-Flare
Flat Spin
65-115
50-100
60-115
50-60
60-200
Environments For Uncontrolled Orbiter Reentry
Aerodynamic and heat transfer analysis of the uncontrolled, accidental
reentry of the Shuttle prior to the deployment of the upper stage and payload
shows that the RTG condition just prior to earth surface impact varies with
the time of launch failure. For the time interval of interest between SRB
separation (MET = 128 seconds) and the achievement of the parking orbit (MET =
510 seconds), the predictions are:
I) The Orbiter and IUS will always break up during reentry and will not
reach the surface intact.
2) For MET between 128 and 210 seconds, the RTG will reach the surface
intact without case melting and attached to the spacecraft.
3) For MET between 210 and 238 seconds, the RTG can either reach the
surface without case melting, or if the case melts, the GPHS modules
may be released prior to reaching the surface.
4) For MET greater than 238 seconds, the GPHS modules are released prior
to surface impact.
5) For all MET less than 495 seconds, the RTG or GPHS modules reach the
surface over the Atlantic Ocean.
6) Between MET 495-501 seconds, the GPHS modules will impact on the
African continent along the ground track of the Shuttle.
Inertial Upper Staqe and Payload Environments
The IUS/PAM-S does not significantly add to any of the accident
environments produced by the main launch vehicle. The solid propellant is not
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detonable under accident conditions of concern for the Ulysses mission.
Although solid propellant impacting the ground as ejecta from other events may
react vigorously as an explosion, these events produce only localized blast
effects. In addition, the propellant does not contribute significantly to
fireball environments, since the burn is relatively slow and occurs at ambient
pressure.
Some IUS failures after the deployment of UIysses/IUS/PAM-S from the
Orbiter result in errant reentry within the design capability of the RTG.
Earth impact conditions are similar to those for reentry from orbit.
The only IUS failure that can cause a direct threat to the RTG is a motor
case rupture during the second firing of the IUS. The dominant threat from
this failure is the production of fragments of solid propellant estimated to
be traveling at velocities in the range of 92 to 728 feet per second and
weighing from 2 to 8 pounds per fragment.
With a successful second-stage (IUS) burn, the spacecraft will be on its
trajectory toward Venus and will have escaped Earth's gravitational influence.
Thus, a failure in the PAM-S at this point in the mission will not result in a
threat that the spacecraft will reenter into the Earth's atmosphere and have a
potential of release of any RTG fuel into the Earth's environment.
The Ulysses spacecraft also does not significantly add to any of the
accident environments produced by the launch vehicle accident scenarios.
GPHS modules released by orbiter reentry or upper stage/payload accident
environments may release small amounts of fuel upon impact with land if rock
or other hard surfaces are hit.
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C.I PROCEDURE FOR ANALYSIS OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) conducts a detailed analysis of the
safety of the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) systems used on
space missions. DOE documents that analysis in a Final Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR). The elements of the analysis and the information flow are summarized
in Figure C-]. For the Ulysses mission, work on the FSAR is underway but not
yet complete. Therefore, the DOE has prepared a Safety Status Report (DOE
]ggOa, DOE ]ggob, DOE 1990c) to provide the basic safety data used in this
Draft (Tier 2) Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS). The information flow
illustrated in Figure C-] is the same as that utilized in developing the
Safety Status Report. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of
RTGs has been an ongoing activity within the DOE for over 3 decades and
continues at the present time. Specifically, RDT&E work on the
Galileo/Ulysses RTGs has been underway since the late ]970s. For instance,
even after publication of the FSAR for the Galileo mission (DOE ]g88a, DOE
1988b, DOE 1989a), additional test and analysis results were documented in a
supplement (DOE 1989b). The Ulysses safety analysis utilizes the data base
techniques and experience developed over the years. This appendix summarizes
key information found in the DOE Safety Status Report (DOE 1990b, DOE 1990c),
which forms the basis for the evaluation of radiological consequences found in
Chapter 4 of the Ulysses DEIS.
The accident scenarios and environments were reviewed in Appendix B. Not
all accident scenarios were found to pose a threat to the RTG in terms of fuel
release. This appendix deals only with the accident scenarios potentially
leading to a release of fuel (see Appendix B, Table B-I).
C.2 SOURCE TERMS
A source term consists of the quantity of fuel released (expressed in
Curies of plutonium dioxide), the location of the release, the particle size
distribution of the released PuO2, and the probability of release. The
methods for developing the source terms are described in the Safety Status
Report (DOE Iggob) and are summarized below.
Shuttle-related accident source terms for Phase 0 and Phase ] were
calculated using the Launch Accident Scenario Evaluation Program (LASEP-3).
LASEP-3 uses a Monte Carlo approach to simulate RTG response to a given
accident environment. This is done using 100,000 trials for each scenario or
subscenario considered, representing variations on accident environment
severity and RTG component responses determined by probability distributions
of conditions based on the accident environments, hydrocode modeling, and
component test results. The LASEP-3 model directs the calculations to arrive
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ultimately at fueled clad distortion and quantification of fuel release if it
is found to occur. LASEP-3 was developed specifically for the Ulysses safety
analysis, utilizing the LASEP-2 program developed for the Galileo analysis
(DOE Ig88a, DOE Ig88b, DOE 1989a) as a foundation. The following subsection
discusses some key revisions and modifications incorporated into the LASEP
program for use as LASEP-3 in the Ulysses safety analysis.
Source terms for Phases 2, 3, and 4 accidents were developed utilizing
prior analyses of the response of the General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS)
modules to various types of reentry conditions. Among the tests providing
results pertinent to these analyses were the Safety Verification Test series,
the Design Iteration Test series, and the Reentry Testing program [details of
these programs are provided in the Accident Analysis document of the Safety
Status Report (DOE 19gOb)].
LAS{P-3 Model
A number of revisions were made to LASEP utilizing updated environments
from the Shuttle Data Book (NASA Ig88b) and more recent results obtained from
the GPHS Safety Test and Development Program conducted by DOE on the RTG and
its components. These revisions and others were incorporated into LASEP-3, as
discussed in the Ulysses Safety Status Report (DOE IggOa, DOE 19gOb, DOE
1990c).
Changes were also made to LASEP-3 for Ulysses to accommodate the addition
of the Payload Assist Module-Special (PAM-S) to the Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)
and the positioning of the Ulysses RTG in the Orbiter bay. The long axis of
the Ulysses RTG is oriented perpendicular to the long axis of the Shuttle,
whereas the Galileo RTGs were folded into the sides of the spacecraft.
The Monte Carlo calculational technique incorporated in LASEP-3 samples
values from the range of variables and conditions applicable to each failure
mode and accident scenario or subscenario. For example, in a given LASEP-3
trial (i.e., one of the 100,000 individual trials in a run) for a Solid Rocket
Booster (SRB) case rupture accident analysis, LASEP-3 randomly samples
variables and conditions such as SRB fragment size, fragment velocities, spin
rates of the fragments, the direction and angle at which the fragment leaves
the disintegrating SRB case, and the point along the mission trajectory
(Mission Elapsed Time) at which the accident occurs. LASEP-3 then determines
if the RTG is hit by a fragment, and utilizing the data base of RTG response
to accident environments developed through component tests and hydrocode
modeling, determines the scenario of the RTG damage as a result of the hit.
If the damage is sufficient, LASEP-3 then calculates the amount of fuel
released in the air and at what altitude. LASEP-3 then continues to analyze
the trajectory of the RTG or RTG component (e.g., GPHS module, fueled clad) to
determine its Earth impact location (e.g., steel, concrete, sand) and
associated release if any. For Phase I accidents, LASEP-3 also determines
whether or not the release occurs within the confines of the fireball and
whether impact would occur on steel or concrete surfaces at the launch pad or
on the surrounding sandy areas, or in the ocean. Each release or source term
is further described by a particle size distribution.
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The releases or source terms resulting from the Phase I LASEP-3runs are
reported in the Accident Analysis documentof the Safety Status Report (DOE
IggOb) as the average for the given accident scenario or subscenario. (The
output from LASEP-3are in the form of a distribution of source terms by
quantity of release.) The average source term is simply the average of the
source terms from those trials which result in a release (i.e., the average is
not based upon the 100,000 trials in a run, only those that have a release).
Average source terms are reported for each release mechanism(in-air fragment;
GPHSmodule impacts on steel, concrete, or sand; and fueled clad impacts on
steel, concrete, or sand).
Source terms resulting from accidents in Phases2, 3, and 4 associated
with GPHSmodules hitting rock were estimated on the basis of test data.
Results of the accident analyses for all of the accident scenarios within
each mission phase show that only the accident scenarios listed below have any
potential for a release or source term.
e Phase 0 None
• Phase ] SRB Case Rupture and Range Safety System (RSS) Destruct
• Phase 2 Vehicle Breakup
• Phase 3 Uncontrolled Reentry of the Orbiter (Shuttle) and Payload
• Phase 4 IUS/PAM-S Failure and Reentry with Breakup of the
Spacecraft.
C.2.1 PHASE 0 SOURCE TERMS
None of the Phase 0 (Prelaunch) accident scenarios resulted in a release
of RTG fuel. The inadvertent RSS destruct scenario will not generate any case
or propellant fragments because the SRBs have not been ignited in this phase,
thus there is no chamber pressure in the SRBs with which to generate
fragments. (SRB fragments are the principal threat to the RTG during Phase l
of the mission.) The pad fire/explosion scenario also does not result in a
release of RTG fuel. Implosion of the payload bay doors will not cause the
doors to strike the RTG in an edge-on manner because there is not enough room
in the bay for the doors to orient in this fashion before striking the RTG.
Initial distortions of the fueled clads would be less than 10 percent, well
below that needed to breach the clads (25 percent). Subsequent impacts of
modules or bare clads on the steel and concrete surfaces of the launch pad or
on the surrounding land (sand) have been demonstrated in the Bare Clad Impact
tests and the Safety Verification Tests to be insufficient to cause fuel
release. Thus, Phase 0 was not considered further in the evaluation of
potential radiological consequences of accidents.
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C.2.2 PHASE ] SOURCE TERMS
The Monte Carlo runs for the Phase ] SRB case rupture scenario were
treated differently than the other accident scenarios. The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)-supplied failure probabilities
(NASA 1988b) indicated that the conditional probability of a random SRB
failure varied over six different periods in Phase 1: 0-10 seconds, 11-20
seconds, 21-70 seconds, 71-105 seconds, 106-120 seconds, and 121-128 seconds.
(A conditional probability is defined as the probability of a particular event
occurring, given a defined set of precursor events happening.)
The 121-128 second interval has a conditional probability of zero for a
case rupture because the SRBs have essentially completed their burn by 119
seconds and can no longer rupture because the SRB chamber pressure drops
rapidly to zero by 120 seconds into the flight.
Thus within Phase 1, the source terms for the SRB case rupture scenario
were developed by 100,000 Monte Carlo runs for each of the five remaining time
intervals. In addition, given the revisions to LASEP (i.e., LASEP-3) for the
Ulysses safety analysis which enable LASEP-3 to track the affected RTG
components, type of ground impact (e.g., steel, concrete, sand), and whether
or not a release would occur within a fireball, the individual source terms
were reported by location of release (i.e., fireball, ground-level, or in air)
and the altitude of the release.
Releases into the fireball are an important consideration because of the
potential for the fireball to vaporize and/or modify the particle sizes and
dispersion of the released plutonium dioxide (see Appendix B). Particle sizes
in the range of 10 microns or less can be inhaled by humans and are thus the
principle source of human health consequences, through the inhalation pathway.
The particle size distributions associated with these releases are based
on aeroshell module and fueled clad impact tests conducted at Los Alamos
National Laboratory (DOE Ig90c). Based on the fueled clad crack sizes
calculated by LASEP-3, the particle size distributions were cut off at a
particle size equal to one-half the maximum crack size and then renormalized.
The particle size distributions which are the basis for these cases are
summarized in the risk analysis volume of the Safety Status Report (DOE
1990c).
A more detailed discussion of the particle size considerations is
presented in Appendix D to the Risk Analysis document of the Safety Status
Report (DOE 1990c). The results of this analysis show that:
I •
.
Stratification of the particles in an explosion plume is very rapid,
usually occurring within the first kilometer (.6 mi) of plume
movement after an explosion.
The vaporized PuO 2 is a significant component of dose (86 percent of
the short-term do)e and 69 percent of the long-term dose).
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3. The primary contributor to surface contamination above th_ U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) suggested 0.2 _Ci/m ( screening
level (EPA 1971) are particles in the 10 to 20 micron range.
C.2.3 PHASES 2, 3, AND 4 SOURCE TERMS
The source terms for Phases 2, 3, and 4 were derived by factoring the
probability of one or more of the GPHS modules impacting rock on the Earth's
surface into the analyses. In Phase 2 (T+128 seconds to T+532 seconds), an
accident leading to breakup of the Shuttle and payload during the period T+128
seconds to T+210 seconds will result in the RTG reaching the Earth's surface
intact. After T+210 seconds, the GPHS modules will be released from the RTG
by thermal failure of the RTG case prior to impact. The RTG or GPHS modules
will impact only the ocean during Phase 2, except for a 5.5 second period when
the ground-track of the vehicle crosses the African continent (i.e., 5.5
seconds out of the total 404 second duration of Phase 2).
A Phase 3 accident causing breakup of the Shuttle and payload due to an
uncontrolled reentry results in thermal failure of the RTG case, with release
of the 18 GPHS modules. The modules will survive reentry to impact on either
land or ocean. The Phase 3 source term was developed utilizing the
distributions of ocean and land within the North-South latitude band where
impact could occur, and within the land category the distribution of
soil/water versus rock. Ocean and soil/water land impacts will not result in
a release of RTG fuel; however, a rock impact may.
In Phase 4, an IUS failure with subsequent reentry and breakup of the
spacecraft will cause release of the GPHS modules from the RTG due to thermal
failure of the RTG case. The 18 GPHS modules in the RTG are assumed to each
reenter and impact the Earth's surface independently of each other over a
large area of the impact band. Based upon the reentry analysis performed for
the Ulysses Safety Status Report (see DOE 1990b, Appendix I), the GPHS modules
will survive reentry intact to impact either ocean or land. An ocean impact
will not result in a source term; whereas, a land impact on rock may result in
fueled clad failure with a release of RTG fuel. The resulting source term is
the same as in Phase 3.
C.3 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES METHODOLOGY
The evaluation of the radiological consequences of fuel releases from
postulated accidents include the following steps:
1. Identification of the postulated accident, fuel release probability,
and release location.
2. Source term characterization in terms of quantity, particle size
distribution, and volume distribution.
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. Analysis of the dispersion of the released fuel in the environment to
determine concentrations in environmental media (i.e., air, soil, and
water) as functions of time and space.
. Analysis of the interaction of environmental radioactive
concentrations with people through inhalation, ingestion, and
external exposure pathways.
5. Evaluation of resulting radiological consequences in terms of maximum
individual and population doses and contaminated environmental media.
For the purposes of the Risk Analysis document of the Safety Status
Report (DOE ]g90c), the original LASEP-3 runs from the accident modeling
volume were utilized to develop the average source terms for radiological
consequence analyses on the basis of configuration of the release (i.e., in
the fireball, at ground-level, in the air). Thus, the source terms within a
given LASEP-3 run were not modified or changed, but reaggregated by transport
mechanism for use in the dispersion analyses used to develop individual and
population exposures (doses) to the given accident release. The embedded
probabilities for impact on rock found in Phases 2, 3, and 4 source terms were
separated out for the development of the average source terms to be used in
the radiological consequence analyses. The reaggregated average source terms
to be used in the radiological consequences analyses are listed in Table C-].
It should be noted that the Phase I RSS destruct scenario analyses
yielded release probabilities on the order of 10"1° (I in ]0 billion) to 10"11
(1 in 100 billion) or about 1,000 times less probable than the SRB case
rupture accident. In addition, the releases or source terms were of the same
order of magnitude. Thus, the RSS destruct scenario contributes only a small
fraction of the risk attributable to Phase ] SRB failures and was not carried
into the risk analyses for the Ulysses mission.
The radiological consequences for the first stage ascent phase were
calculated using the EMERGE, LOPAR, and HIPAR computer models. Releases in
the troposphere (up to about 6.2 miles in altitude; i.e., reached at a Mission
Elapsed Time of about 60 seconds) are treated using EMERGE, and higher
altitude releases are treated using LOPAR for small particles (less than 10
microns in diameter) and HIPAR for large particles (greater than 10 microns in
diameter). EMERGE is a three dimensional Gaussian puff-trajectory model that
treats meteorology which varies in time and space (vertically) and accounts
for vertical plume configuration; particle-size-dependent transport,
deposition, and plume depletion; and sea-breeze recirculation in the vicinity
of KSC. HIPAR is a particle trajectory model which accounts for atmospheric
properties which affect the velocity of particle fall, specifically,
altitudinal variation in atmospheric conditions and the rotation of the Earth.
HIPAR utilizes a wind field that is a function of latitude, longitude, and
altitude. LOPAR is an empirical model derived from weapons testing data, and
accounts for worldwide circulation patterns and delayed fallout as a function
of latitude band. Both HIPAR and LOPAR interface with a worldwide demographic
data base to facilitate the estimation of radiological consequences. The
consequences for the remaining three mission phases were estimated using
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average population densities from the worldwide demographic data base for the
affected area, and time-independent median meteorological conditions utilzing
the EMERGE model.
Key features and assumptions of the analysis are summarized below.
Details of the methodology are presented in the Risk Analysis document of the
Safety Status Report (DOE IggOc).
The reaggregated average source terms with their particle size
distributions are given an initial spatial distribution appropriate to the
conditions for release. Releases in the launch area from surface impacts
outside a fireball are given an initial cloud diameter of 33 ft (10 m) at a
height of 16 ft (5 m).
The fireball (assuming involvement of the full load of External Tank
propellant) would have a diameter of about 1,000 ft and a mean duration of 30
seconds. The fireball sphere would lift off the ground after about 7 seconds,
with the trailing stem lifting off the ground after about 10 seconds.
Material released into a fireball starting out at ground level is given a
distribution in which 80 percent of the material is in an elevated cloud and
20 percent is in a vertical stem reaching toward ground. (See Appendix B for
additional discussion of the fireball environment.)
The plume configuration resulting from liquid propellant explosions and
fire has been estimated based on results of high explosive field tests
involving both liquid and solid high explosives. The center release height
and the diameter of the stabilized cloud resulting from the explosion fireball
are correlated to the TNT equivalent yield of the explosion.
Of the thermal energy associated with the complete combustion of liquid
propellants, it is estimated that 50 percent contributes to the thermal
buoyancy of the initial fireball. The resulting center release height and
diameter of the cloud were assumed to be representative of the base case for
launch pad accidents during the first ]0 seconds (0-10 sec.) of Phase I.
Launch area ground-level source terms result when fueled clads impact
hard surfaces at speeds above their failure thresholds or when previously
breached fueled clads impact any surface outside of the initial fireball.
Impact points would be distributed around the launch pad. All of these
distributed releases have been assumed to be at the launch pad with an initial
height of 16 ft (5 m) and an initial 33 ft (10 m) cloud diameter. Collective
(population) doses should not be significantly affected.
Due to the forward velocity of the vehicle beyond T+IO seconds, the
release is distributed in a "puff," the diameter of which is equal to the
distance travelled by the vehicle in ] second, determined by the velocity of
the vehicle at the release altitude.
The atmospheric dispersion of the source term material with the initial
cloud specifications determined, as described in the preceding paragraphs, is
then calculated, using models described below.
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Meteorology for the launch period (October 5 23) reflects the complex
coastal meteorology of the KSC launch area. Historical meteorological data
were examined to provide 40 sets of actual sequential data representative of
the launch window. Each set consisted of ]S-minute averages of surface wind
speeds and direction, temperature lapse rate, and wind variability over the
12-hour period of T-2 hours to T+IO hours. The radiological consequences were
calculated from the average source terms utilizing the 50th percentile data
set to define the Base Case consequences associated with each phase and sub-
phase of the Ulysses mission.
Radiation doses to populations are calculated based on environmental
concentrations. The dose conversion factors have been derived using a model
published by the International Commission on Radiologtcal Protection in
ICRP-30 (ICRP 1978).
In presenting population doses, the concept of de mtnimis has been used,
meaning a dose level below regulatory concern and from which negligible health
effects are expected. De minimis, as a concept in determining the risk from
exposure to ionizing radiation, remains a controversial topic within the
regulatory as well as in the scientific community. The Council on
Environmental Quality has been following the issue for some time; however, it
presently offers no guidance on either the approach to de minimts or the
levels of "de minimis risk." While EPA appears to be moving toward proposing
a "below regulatory concern" (de minimis) level for individual dose, it has
not yet supported the concept for collective doses. The National Council on
Radiation Protection and Measurement in 1987 established a "Negligible
Individual Risk Level" of ] in 10 million annual risk, which corresponds to a
dose rate of 1 mrem/yr applicable to truncation of collective dose estimates
(NCRPM ]987a). For the purpose of this document, the de mtnimis dose was
taken to be ] mrem/yr and 50 mrem total dose commitment. It should be noted
that these values are considerably below the average U.S. individual's
exposure to natural background radiation: 360 mrem/yr; 18,000 mrem over a 50-
year period (NCRPM 1987b). Total population doses are reported both with and
without _ minimi_.
The assumptions and features of the analyses significant to the magnitude
of the results reported here are:
I. The fuel remains in the insoluble PuOz form in the environment.
2. Particle size distributions are unchanged following the accident
except for the effects of vaporization in fireballs.
3. The initial plume configuration (cloud size, height) of ground-level
and elevated releases is important to the results.
. Long-term doses contain a component due to food ingestion. In other
words, no credit was taken for dose reduction measures, such as
sheltering, cleanup operations, or food restrictions.
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C.4 RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE RESULTS
The results of the radiological consequence analysis for the Base Case
are summarized in Table C-2. Reference should be made to Table C-1 in
relating accident fuel release scenarios and radiological consequences.
Table C-3 provides a list of doses experienced in everyday life from common
sources, for purposes of comparison.
The types of radiological consequences include:
Io The "short-term" radiation dose resulting from the initial exposure
and dose from continuing exposure to materials in the environment
over an extended period following release. Long-term doses include
those to KSC workers and to offsite KSC and worldwide populations due
to inhalation of resuspended material and ingestion of contaminated
food over a 50-year period. The doses are 50-year dose commitments
resulting from the extended retention of material in the body.
o Estimates of land- and water-surface areas contaminated by deposition
of radioactivity above certain levels. It should be noted that the
estimates presented here are for illustrative purposes. In the event
of an accident, real-time estimates of wind transport and deposition
would use meteorological conditions current at that time.
This information is presented in the following terms:
•
Maximum Individual Dose. The maximum individual dose commitment
which an individual could receive. For launch area accidents
(mission phase I), this estimate takes account of the location of
launch site visitors and workers and local demographics. For
succeeding phases, average population distributions are used.
2_ Collective (or Population) Dose (i.e., the sum of all doses to
exposed individuals). This accounts for the fact that as the
released material is transported by the atmosphere, in general its
concentration decreases but the area of deposition and exposed
population increases. The collective dose thus accounts for the
number of people exposed and their level of exposure and is reported
in terms of person-rems.
(It should be noted that the Maximum Individual Dose and the Total
Collective Dose are committed effective dose equivalents•
Specifically, "committed" means that the dose from uptake from the
radioactive material into the body is accounted for over a 50-year
residence time in the body. "Dose equivalent" means the dose to (a)
specific organ(s). Effective means that the "dose equivalent" to (a)
specific organ(s) is then converted to the equivalent of a dose
delivered to the whole body. The collective dose above de minimis is
based upon the dose to individuals that is greater than I mrem/yr,
i.e., the de minimi_ level.)
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TABLE C-3. AVERAGE ANNUAL EFFECTIVE DOSE EQUIVALENT OF IONIZING
RADIATIONS TO A MEMBER OF THE U.S. POPULATION
Source
Dose Eauival ent"
mrem
Effective Dose Equivalent
mrem % of Total
Natural
Radon D 2,400 200 55
Cosmic 27 27 8.0
Terrestrial 28 28 8.0
Internal 39 39 ]J__.
Subtotal--Natural -- 300 82
Man-Made
Medical
X-ray diagnosis 39 39 11
Nuclear medicine 14 14 4.0
Consumer Products 10 10 3.0
Other
Occupational o.g <I <0.3
Nuclear fuel cycle <1.0 <I <0.03
Fallout <1.0 <1 <0.03
Miscellaneous c <1.0 <1 50.03
Subtotal--Man-Made -- 63 18
Total Natural and
Man-Made -- 360 100
Source: adapted from Nat. Res. Coun. 1990
a To soft tissues.
b Dose equivalent to bronchi from radon daughter products. The assumed
weighting factor for the effective dose equivalent relative to whole-body
exposure is 0.08.
c Department of Energy facilities, smelters, transportation, etc.
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. Estimates of the dry land area affected within which the annual dose
level would exceed 10, 25, and 100 mrem per year at the second year
after the accident, assuming no cleanup or other remedial activities
have taken place. At this point, the weathering process slows
greatly as does the delivery of dose from contaminated soil. It is
over these first years when administrative controls can be very
effective in controlling human exposure. The estimation of these
areas at the second year is consistent with draft EPA guidance which
indicates that cleanup actions would occur over the period of I to 50
years following an accident (EPA 1988).
. Land areas on which initial deposition would exceed the screening
level of 0.2 _Ci/m 2 suggested by the EPA, as a level below which no
further consideration need be given, has been used (EPA 1977). The
ocean area contaminated at this level has been included only as an
indication of the areas that could be affected by deposition.
Table C-2 presents for the Base Case, the total probability of a release
by mission phase, and within Phase ], by sub-phase or time interval.
Expectation values of all Phase ] consequences are also included. (The
expectation values are determined by probability weighting the average source
terms for each time period.) In Phase 1, for example, an SRB case rupture
during the first 10 seconds of the phase is predicted to result in a release
of 288 Curies into the fireball and 0.283 Curies at ground level (Table C-I),
with a total probability of release of 8.16 x I0"B. As noted in Table C-2,
that source term would result in a maximum individual dose of 3.54 x 10.3 rem
(3_54 mrem), with a total collective dose to the exposed population of 5.93 x
10' person-rem (59.3 person-rem), _ith 0 person-rem above de minlmi$. A total
land area of about 10 mi ( (25.7 km_) would be subject to deposition at levels
exceeding the 0.2 _Ci/m 2 screening level. Within the dry land area affected
by deposition, the deposition would not be sufficient for the resulting annual
dose to exceed 25 mrem/yr or even ]0 mrem/yr at the second year following such
an accident.
Looking at Phase I overall, the expectation source term (388.05 Ci total)
has a total release probability of 1.77 x 10.7 (Table C-1). As noted in Table
_2_ the expectation release would result in a maximum individual dose,S2x__
rem_(O.02 mrem). Land area contamination would extend over about . mi 2
(12.3 km_), with none of that area exceeding a dose level of 25 mrem/yr (or
even 10 mrem/yr) at the second year following the accidental release.
Only in Phases 2, 3, and 4 would any of the Base Case accident scenarios
result in any collective dose above de minimis (Table C-2).
The Base Case analyses for Phases 2, 3, and 4 yielded maximum individual
doses ranging from 2.00xI0 "_ rem (20 mrem) in Phase 2 to 3.62xI0 "_ rem (36.2
mrem) in Phases 3 and 4. Deposition exceeding the 0.2 _Ci/m 2 screening level
would be very localized to small areas in Phases 2, 3, and 4. None of the
scenarios resulted in dry land deposition sufficient to yield doses exceeding
25 mrem/yr or even 10 mrem at the second year following the accident.
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Collective dose for the Base Case thus ranges from 579 person-rem in a late
Phase I SRBcase rupture accident to 0.157 person-rem for Phase 2.
For the purposes of comparing the accident consequences and the release
probabilities from a Ulysses mission accident as estimated in the Safety
Status Report (DOE |990a, DOE 1990b, DOE 1990c), a list of common accident
causes, numbers of fatalities, and the chances of an individual in the U.S.
population succumbing to those causes is provided in Table C-4.
Representative radiological consequences of accident scenarios were
presented in Section C.4 in terms of the Base Case using average source terms,
50th percentile meteorological conditions, and a set of pathway parameter
values and assumptions representing central estimates. Variations about the
Base Case results reflecting the source term distribution, the range of
meteorological conditions, and possible variations in parameter values and
assumptions affecting radiological consequences have been characterized
through an integrated risk analysis. The analysis combines the output of the
entire source term distribution from LASEP-3 and the EMERGE results for the 40
meteorological data sets using Monte Carlo techniques to arrive at a
probability distribution of radiological consequences in terms of 5th, 50th,
and gSth percentile and mean values. In addition, variations in possible
parameter values, assumptions, and initiating accident probabilities affecting
the results are also included in the Monte Carlo sampling.
The overall approach taken in the integrated risk analysis consists of
the following elements:
Identification of important parameters, conditions, or assumptions
affecting the final results (collective dose, health effects, and area
contaminated).
For each of the above, establish a range of variability in the values
used in the development of the radiological consequences and the
probability distribution of those values within the range.
Establish the functional relationship among all important parameters,
conditions, and assumptions leading to the final result (e.g.
collective dose, health effects, and area contaminated). These are
usually multiplicative or additive relationships.
Combine the probability distributions of all the areas of variability
using a Monte Carlo approach to determine an overall probability
distribution on the final results. The final results can then be
presented along with 5th and 95th percentile values determined from
the overall probability distribution.
The integrated risk analysis was implemented using the Monte Carlo
techniques provided in the SPASM computer code to evaluate the variation of
important parameters or conditions on the radiological consequences and
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TABLEC-4. CALCULATEDINDIVIDUALRISK OF FATALITY BY VARIOUS CAUSES"
Accident Type
Number of
Fatal Accidents
for 1987
Approximate
Individual Risk
Per Year c
Motor Vehicle
Falls
Drowning
Fires and Flames
Poison
Water Transport
Air Travel
Manufacturing d
Railway
Electrocution
Lightning
Tornadoes b
Hurricanes b
Suicide
Homicide and Legal Intervention
(Executions)
Guns, Firearms, and Explosives
Suffocation
All Accidents
Diseases
ALL CAUSES
48,290
11,733
4,360
4,710
5,315
949
1,263
1,200
624
76O
99
1145
46 b
30,796
21,103
1,656
3,688
95,020
1,993,381
2,123,323
2 in 10 thousand
5 in 100 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
2 in I00 thousand
2 in 100 thousand
4 in 1 million
5 in 1 million
5 in I million
5 in 2 million
6 in 2 million
4 in 10 million
5 in 10 million
2 in 10 million
12 in 100 thousand
9 in 100 thousand
7 in ] million
3 in 200 thousand
4 in 10 thousand
8 in 1 thousand
9 in 1 thousand
aUSDHHS 1989.
b1946 to 1984 average.
CFatalities/Total Population (USBC 1989).
dSource USBC 1986.
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mission risks. The SPASMcode is a general purpose Monte Carlo simulation
code that propagates variabilities. A total of i5,000 trials for each run
were utilized in developing the uncertainties that can be expected in the
radiological consequence results.
Important parameters or conditions affecting the radiological
consequencesand mission risks include the following:
• Accident scenario
Accident environment
Accident probability
• Release characterization
- Conditional source term probability
- Source term
- Source term modifiers
- Particle size distribution
- Particle size distribution modifiers
- Initial cloud dimensions
o Vertical source term distribution
- Release location
• Meteorological conditions
- Atmospheric stability
- Wind speed and direction
- Mixing height
- Sea-breeze recirculation
- Fumigation
- Space and time variation
• Exposure pathway parameters
Population distribution
Resuspension factor
Deposition velocity
Vegetable ingestion
Protective action
• Radiation doses and health effects
Internal dose factors
- Health effects estimator.
Potential variation in these parameters or conditions and their effect on the
radiological consequences and mission risks are evaluated in the integrated
risk analysis.
A key aspect of the integrated risk analysis was to identify the areas of
variability, establish the range for each parameter value, and the probability
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distribution within the associated range of results. The principal focus of
the analysis was the calculation of variability in radiological consequences
associated with the ranges of initiating accident probabilities provided by
NASA(1988c), the ranges in the source terms calculated by LASEP-3for the
accident modeling volume of the Safety Status Report (DOEIggOb). The
integrated risk analysis does not account for variability in LASEP-3parameter
assumptions in the model.
Two types of probability distributions are commonlyused. If all values
within the range are considered equally probable, then a flat-top distribution
can be used. If a "best-estimate" value has been determined, the range of
uncertainty can be represented as ±2 standard deviations of a normal or log-
normal distribution with the "best-estimate" treated as a meanor geometric
mean, respectively. Other probability distributions can be generated using
either actual data for the parameter value range, or by modeling the
distribution through a sensitivity analysis.
Combining these ranges and probability distributions using the Monte
Carlo techniques, the overall variations in the radiological consequencesare
combined with the Base Case results presented in Section 4 of the DEIS to
estimate mission risks with 5th and 95th percentile bounds.
The risk of an event is defined as the product of the probability of that
event and its consequences. The risk from a mission phase is the sumof the
risks of the accident scenarios within the phase. Similarly, the mission risk
is the sumof the risks of the phases. The results of the integrated risk
analysis were used to estimate 5th, 50th, and 95th percentile and meanvalues
of the calculated risk.
Table C-5 shows the results of the analysis described above. Whenless
than one health effect (cancer death) is calculated for an event, then it is
reasonable to interpret that result as zero. Nevertheless, there would be
radiological impact involved in any accident releasing fuel, and the product
of probability and consequence (collective dose or fractional health effect)
gives a measure of non-lethal relative risks of the individual phases. It
should be noted that for all phases and subphases, with the exception of the
106-120 second time period of Phase ], even at the 95 percent of the time, an
SRBcase rupture accident at this point in the mission will yield less than
2.5 excess health effects in the exposed population (ignoring de minimis).
Referring back to Table 4-6 of the DEIS, it is noted that the analysis
resulted in no collective doses above de minimi$ for any mission phase. Thus,
when de minimis is considered, no health effects would be expected.
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TABLEC-5. SUMMARYMISSIONNUCLEARISK ESTIMATE
Phase
]
(SRBCase
Rupture)
2
3
4
Health Effects b
Time Total 95th
Period (sec.) Probability Mean Percen_iIQ
0-]0 8.]6x10 "B 0.0955 0.2800
]1-20 1.92x]0 "B 0.0203 0.0]04
21-70 4.82x10 "9 0.00]6 0.0065
71-105 7.93x10 "9 0.2096 0.7290
105-120 6.38xi0 "B 1.1670 3.0000
0-120 a 1.77xi0 "7 0.4754 1.2400
2.31xi0 6 0.0002 0.000588
6.16xi0 6 0.0005 0.00136
2.40xi0 4 0.0005 0.00136
b
This represents the expectation of all Phase I health effects, determined
by probability weighting the values for each sub-period.
Health effects calculated without de minimis.
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